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Although the government of the United States of America was established to protect the  
rights to life,  liberty and the pursuit of happiness among all  American citizens, this  
thesis argues intractable gang violence in inner-city Chicago has persistently denied  
these rights, in turn undermining fundamental (and foundational) American political  
values. Thus, gang violence can be argued to represent a threat to both civil order and  
state legitimacy. Yet, where comparable (and generally lower) levels of community-level  
violence in Northern Ireland garnered the sustained attention and direct involvement of  
the United Kingdom's central government, the challenge posed by gang violence has  
been unappreciated, if not ignored, by the American federal government. In order to  
mobilise the political commitment and resources needed to find a durable resolution to  
Chicago's long and often anarchic 'uncivil war', it  is first necessary to politicise the  
problem and its  origins.  Contributing to  this  politicisation,  this  thesis  explains  why 
gang violence in Chicago has been unable to capture the political imagination of the  
American government in a way akin to paramilitary (specifically republican) violence  
in Northern Ireland. Secondly, it explains how the depoliticisation of gang violence has  
negatively affected response, encouraging the continued application of inadequate and  
largely ineffective response strategies. Finally, it makes the case that, while radical, a  
conditional  agreement-centric  peace  process  loosely  modelled  on  that  employed  in  
Northern Ireland might offer the most effective strategy for restoring the sense of peace  
and security to inner-city Chicago lost over half a century ago.
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Introduction
Over the course of the last fifty years, widespread gang violence in Chicago has 
presented itself as a serious and persistent yet under-appreciated threat to American civil 
order  and  the  principles  of  liberal  democracy  upon  which  the  United  States  was 
founded. Since the emergence of the city's 'supergangs' in the 1960s, the scale of gang 
violence  in  the  city  has  consistently  been  comparable  with  (often  surpassing)  that 
experienced  in  Northern  Ireland  during  the  thirty-year  period  of  low-intensity  civil 
conflict  known as  the  Troubles.  Yet,  where  civil  disorder  and violence  in  Northern 
Ireland resulted in a robust and sustained response from the central government of the 
United Kingdom, the political response to gang violence on the part of the American 
state at the federal level has remained troublingly muted and inconsistent. It is only in 
recognising  the  seriousness  of  the  threat  posed  by  gang  violence  and  its  political 
significance  that  it  becomes  possible  to  mobilise  the  political  resources  needed  to 
restore full civil order in Chicago for the first time in generations. The aim of this thesis 
is three-fold. It sets out to: (1) Help account for the failure of gang violence in the city 
of  Chicago  to  gain  recognition  as  a  political  and  civil  order  issue  of  national 
significance meriting a serious and sustained federal-level response in a manner similar 
to  central  government  prioritisation  of  the  Northern  Ireland  'crisis'  in  the  United 
Kingdom; (2) Explain how the failure to recognise the politically-determined roots and 
political implications of gang violence have facilitated the persistence of ineffective and 
inadequate responses to the issue; (3) Explore how an approach similar to the Northern 
Irish  peace  process,  if  adapted  appropriately  offers  a  radical,  yet  potentially  more 
effective, means of pursuing a transition from a state ‘uncivil war’ to ‘civil order’ in 
Chicago.  
The  most  recognisable  passage  of  the  foundational  document  of  the  United 
States of America, the Declaration of Independence (1776)1 reads:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, 
that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to 
secure these rights, governments are instituted among men,  deriving 
their just powers from the consent of the governed.
Inspired  by  the  the  social  contract  theory  of  John  Locke,2 the  Declaration  of  
Independence establishes that the fundamental purpose of the American government is 
to secure and ensure the rights of the citizenry defined as life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness.  Though the Declaration speaks of the universal equality of men, it  limits 
direct  government  responsibility  to  those  who  partially  transfer  their  individual 
sovereign authority to the state in exchange for its protections (citizens).3 
1 Stephen  E  Luca,  “Justifying  America:  The  Declaration  of  Independence  as  Rhetorical 
Document,” in American Rhetoric: Context and Criticism, ed. Thomas W Benson (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), 85.
2 Carl Lotus Becker, The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas,  
Revised  Edition (New York:  Vintage,  1970),  27;  Gary  Wills,  Inventing  America:  Jefferson's  
Declaration of Independence (New York: First Mariner Books, 2002), vii.
3 Something that can be argued to be an outgrowth of the 'social contract'  thinking behind the  
Declaration and early American republicanism.
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The penalty for the failure of the government in its paramount responsibility as 
set out in the Declaration is severe:
That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these 
ends,  it  is  the  right  of  the  people  to  alter  or  to  abolish  it,  and  to 
institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and 
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely 
to effect their safety and happiness... But when a long train of abuses 
and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object evinces a design 
to reduce them under absolute despotism, it  is their right, it  is their 
duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for 
their future security.
Thus, where the government has, in the opinion of the citizenry, shirked or failed in its 
basic responsibilities, it is to be replaced. Where it engages in long-term abuse of its 
position and refuses to abide by the will of the people, it may be overthrown. However 
the  means  of  exercising  discontentment  is  indirect,  mediated  through  elected 
representatives  (in  keeping  with  the  state's  republican  nature  as  established  by  the 
Constitution of the United States (1787)). Furthermore, taking into consideration the 
bipartisan nature of American politics, in practice there only ever been one ready option 
for the replacement of any given government.
Citizenship, or the right to participate in the American state project, has always 
been  exclusive.  Blacks,  male  and female  alike,  were  also  denied citizenship.  Basic 
citizenship  was  only  extended  to  the  black  population  in  the  years  following  the 
American Civil War with the passage of the  Fourteenth Constitutional Amendment  in 
1867 (voting rights would come later). Prior to emancipation in 1863 the majority of 
blacks were denied legal personhood by virtue of their status as slaves (with slaves the 
legal  property of  their  owners).  As detailed  extensively  in  chapter  2,  it  would take 
another century for African Americans to achieve full legal equality. But just as African 
Americans were finally able break down many of the legal  and political  barriers to 
formal institutional equality during the civil rights movement, the growth of lethal and 
intractable gang violence came to present a new threat to life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness in socio-economically deprived black urban neighbourhoods across Chicago 
and other major urban centres. While Los Angeles and New York also experienced a 
considerable growth in gang violence starting in the mid-to-late 1960s, Chicago could 
be argued to be the first major city hit by this new supercharged wave of community 
violence.  Since  the  emergence  of  sustained and  intense  gang  violence  in  the  early 
1960s,  the  American  federal  government  has  failed  to  take the  measures needed to 
protect and uphold the rights inner-city Chicagoans. Most disheartening perhaps, there 
is a significant portion of the citizenry without any hope that things might change, as 
faith in the local agencies and officials left with the burden of response has been long 
lost: “After watching one highly visible police action after another fail, many tenants 
gave  up  hope  for  improvement  and believed neither  the  police  nor  CHA [Chicago 
Housing Authority] officials could protect them effectively.”4 
4 Susan J Popkin et al,  The Hidden War: Crime and the Tragedy of Public Housing in Chicago  
(Piscataway: Rutgers University Press, 2000), 177.
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Threats  to  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness  are  numerous.5 Though  one 
should  be  cautious  about  overstating  risk,  many  parents  in  high-violence 
neighbourhoods  are  terrified  to  allow their  children  to  play  outside  freely,  even in 
playgrounds and parks, for any time spent outside (particularly during the tense summer 
months)6 increases the likelihood of being caught in a crossfire. For example Leone 
Sowell, quoted in Leonard S Rubinowitz and James E Rosenbaum's Crossing the Class  
and Color Lines laments, “It was unsafe for [June] to go outside. There were gangs all 
around the area where we lived. We lived in a bad area. Children were getting shot all 
around there.”7 Over the last 15 years, Chicago Public Schools' decision to close dozens 
of schools (disproportionately located in inner-city communities), resulting in mergers 
which place students from rival neighbourhoods (and thus rival gangs/factions) within a 
single school,  has  generated a tremendous amount of anxiety for both  students and 
parents.8 Though many adults raised in these areas have found ways to mitigate risk and 
retain a sense of normalcy, adults too have expressed concerns about their own safety, 
especially  in  the  evenings.9 Such restrictions  on geographic mobility  most  certainly 
impede one's  basic  liberties  such as  the freedom to associate  with others,  seek and 
maintain  gainful  employment,  conduct  necessary  business  and avail  of  the  services 
made available by the state. They also affect one's ability to pursue even the simplest 
forms of happiness such as playing a game of pick-up basketball with friends or using 
the swings at a nearby park. 
Additionally,  gang  violence  has  under-considered  spill-over  effects.  For 
example, where parents fear for their own safety after dark, this can create a reluctance 
to attend the parent involvement and information meetings. These events are generally 
held in the evenings so teachers do not lose valuable classroom teaching time and in 
5 Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs,  
Groups, and Guns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 132.
6 The summer months have traditionally featured a spike in gang-related homicides and shootings 
as school vacation and good weather conspire to bring gang-involved youth from all factions out 
into the streets, and in conflict with one another. Thus, rather than looking forward to the break 
from school, many young people fear the end of the school year. (Jane Penley, “Urban Terrorists: 
Addressing Chicago's Losing Battle with Gang Violence,” Depaul Law Review 61 (2012): 1186; 
Wesley G Skogan, Susan M Hartnett, Natalie Bump and Jill Dubois, Evaluation of CeaseFire –  
Chicago (Washington: National Institute of Justice, 2009), 3-22.) As Chance the Rapper (from 
the South Side of Chicago) raps on the track “Paranoia”: “It just got warm out/This the shit I've  
been warned 'bout/I hope that it storm in the morning/I hope that it's pouring out/ I hate crowded 
beaches/ I hate the sound of fireworks/ And I ponder what's worse/ Between knowing it's over 
and dying first/  Cause everybody dies in the summer/ Wanna say your goodbyes?/ Tell them 
while it's spring/ I  heard everybody's dyin' in the summer/ So pray to God for a little more  
spring.”
7 Leonard S Rubinowitz and James E Rosenbaum,  Crossing the Class and Color Lines: From  
Public Housing to White Suburbia (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 86.
8 Pauline Lipman, Janet Smith, Eric (Rico) Gutstein and Lisa Dallacqua. Examining CPS' Plan to  
Close,  Turn-Around,  or  Phase  Out  17  Schools  (Data  and  Democracy  Project:  Investigating 
Neighbourhoods  Research  Paper  Series  #3,   Collaborative  for  Equity  and  Justice  in 
Education/Nathalie P. Voorhees Centre for Neighborhood and Community Improvement, College 
of  Education/College  of  Urban  Planning  and  Public  Affairs,  University  of  Illinois-Chicago, 
Chicago, 2012).
9 David  Wilson,  Inventing  Black-on-Black  Violence:  Discourse,  Space,  And  Representation 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005), 34.
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order to help 'accommodate' working parents, although high rates of unemployment and 
precarious employment (shift-work; multiple  jobs) in low income communities calls 
this particular rationale into question.10 With parent involvement widely recognised as a 
key factor in a child's educational success, and education the key to socio-economic 
mobility for economically disadvantaged young people,  this example illustrates how 
pervasively gang violence affects one's right to pursue happiness in ways both direct 
and indirect.11
What  then  of  the  right  to  life?  The  American  gang  landscape  is  incredibly 
heterogeneous  and  while  there  are  affiliations/alliances  that  appear  to  have  spread 
nationally  (ex.  Bloods  and  Crips),  gang  violence  remains  a  highly  localised 
phenomenon in terms of intensity, historical development and patterns of ground-level 
interaction. Thus it can be argued that the level of the individual city remains the most  
amenable  context  for  understanding  this  phenomenon,  with  this  thesis  focusing 
specifically on Chicago. Chicago has developed an on-off reputation as the 'murder 
capital'  of  the Unites States,  albeit  always with numerous qualifiers.12 Over the last 
decade, comparisons of city homicide rates and American casualties in the Iraq war 
prompted the emergence of a new nickname for the city - 'Chiraq'. Still, what is most 
interesting about the city's gang problem is its historical entrenchment. 
With gang violence part of Chicago's urban landscape since at least the late 19th 
century,13 it was also the first American city to experience the rise of the 'supergang'14 in 
the 1960s. As such, Chicago was among the first cities to face serious sustained lethal 
gang violence.15 Although, based on Chicago Police Department (CPD) figures, there 
were only 763 gang related deaths between 1967 and 1980, the true figure is likely 
many times higher.16 At this time (and beyond), the CPD employed quite probably the 
strictest definition of 'gang-related' homicide used in the country, counting only those 
deaths which could be determined to be gang-motivated and which occurred within the 
context of a collective exchange (ex. gang fight).17 Though it still arguably represents a 
10 Anthony S Byrk et al,  Organizing Schools for Improvement: Lessons from Chicago (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010), 7-8.
11 Steven  R  Hara  and  Daniel  J  Burke,  “Parent  Involvement:  The  Key  to  Improved  Student 
Achievement,”  The School Community Journal  8, no 2 (1998): 9-19; William H Jeynes, “The 
Relationship Between Parental  Involvement and  Urban Secondary  School  Student  Academic 
Achievement: A Meta-Analysis,”  Urban Education  42, no 1 (2007): 82-110; Desmond Upton 
Patton, Michael E Wooley and Jun Sung Hong, “Exposure to Violence, Student Fear, and Low 
Academic Achievement: African American Males in the Critical  Transition to High School,” 
Children and Youth Services Review 34, no 2 (2012): 388-395.
12 Maurice Punch, Shoot to Kill:  Police Accountability,  Firearms and Fatal  Force  (Bristol:The 
Policy Press, 2011), 81; Harwin L Voss and John R Hepburn, “Patterns in Criminal Homicide in 
Chicago,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 59, no 4 (1969): 499.
13 Frederic M Thrasher,  The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1947), 17.
14 Consolidations of small neighbourhood groups into larger, more powerful gang organisations.
15 Walter  R  Miller,  Crime  by  Youth  Gangs  and  Groups  in  the  United  States,  1992  Edition  
(Washington: United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1992), 2.
16 Ibid , 85.
17 Miller, Crime by Youth Gangs and Groups in the United States, 82-83; Irving A Spergel, Gang 
Suppression  and  Intervention:  An  Assessment  (Washington:  Office  of  Juvenile  Justice  and 
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significant  underestimation  of  the  problem,  the  Chicago  Police  Department's  most 
recent  Crime  Trends  Report on  gang-related  homicide  reveals  that  there  were 
approximately 3,422 gang-motivated homicides in the city of Chicago between 1991 
and 2004,18 accounting for roughly a third of all homicides.19 
This number – 3,422 – is strikingly close to the total number of deaths suffered 
as a result of the thirty years of low-intensity civil conflict in Northern Ireland, known 
more commonly as 'the Troubles' (1968-1998)20 – 3,635.21 It is this particular statistic 
that  inspired  the  work  of  comparative  analysis  presented  here.  Of  the  three  major 
American cities  (New York, Los Angeles  and Chicago)  most  known for  their  gang 
problems,  Chicago  is  most  comparable  in  size  to  Northern  Ireland  (although  there 
remains a noteworthy population difference between Chicago and Northern Ireland, the 
former 219% more populous than the  latter  in 197022 and remaining approximately 
149% larger today). Yet, this population difference can by no means adequately explain 
a  15  year  'peace  time' single-source  violent  death  toll  approaching  that  of  an 
Delinquency Prevention, 1993), 29.
18 To  put  this  in  national  perspective,  the  2010  Small  Arms  Survey  estimates  a  total  of 
approximately  7,800  gang  related  deaths  nation-wide  between  2002  and  2006.  (Graduate 
Institute of International and Development Studies, Small Arms Survey 2010, 133) Furthermore: 
“For the same five-year period, the mean gang-related homicide rate was 893.4 per 100,000 gang  
members  [emphasis  original].  If  all  law  enforcement  agencies  employed  a  motive-based 
classification model and Maxson and Klein's 'half as great' was equally true for large cities in the  
United States, a conservative estimate would be in the range of 450 gang-related homicides per  
100,000 gang members – consistent with the figures reported by Maxson. Even this homicide 
rate is alarmingly high, especially when compared to the overall homicide rate in the United 
States (5.7 per 100,000) and to other countries such as Australia, England and Wales, or even 
South Africa (1.2, 1.6, and 54.0 per 100,000 respectively).” (Ibid, 134)
19 Richard M Daley and Philip J Cline, “Chicago Crime Trends: Gang-Motivated Murders, 1991-
2004” (Chicago: Chicago Police Research Division, 2005), 1.
20 Though the start and end points of the Troubles remain a point of contention in the literature, this 
research takes as its starting point 5 October 1968, the day police violence against a civil rights  
protest in Derry ignited riots in the Bogside. It takes as its end point the signing of the  Good 
Friday Agreement (GFA) on 10 April 1998. Although violence was not eradicated entirely with 
the  GFA, it did represent a firm commitment to peace on the part of the Provisional IRA, the 
paramilitary organization responsible for  far-and-away the  most Troubles-related  deaths.  The 
GFA also illustrated the capacity for long-term meaningful and peaceful co-operation among the 
main political representatives of both communities. (The Right Honourable Lord Maclean, The 
Billy  Wright  Inquiry  –  Report  (London:  The  Stationary  Office,  2010),  54;  Simon  Prince, 
Northern Ireland’s ’68: Civil Rights, Global Revolt and the Origins of the Troubles (Dublin: Irish 
Academic  Press,  2007);  Peter  Rose,  Making  Sense  of  the  Troubles (New  York:  Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2001), 79; Paige Whaley Eager,  From Freedom Fighters to Terrorists: Women and  
Political Violence (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 151.)
21 With years 1999-2001 subtracted. (Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA  
(London: Pan Macmillan, 2003), 379.)
22 According to United States  census data,  the population of  the city  of  Chicago in 1970 was 
3,366,957 while according to United Kingdom census data the population of Northern Ireland 
that  year was 1,536,065. (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency,“Northern Ireland 
Census 2011: Historic Population Trends (1841-2011)” (Belfast: Northern Ireland Statistics and 
Research Agency, 2012), 1; United States Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population and  
Housing:  Final  Report  –  General  Demographic  Trends  for  Metropolitan  Areas,  1960-1970,  
Volume 15, Illinois (Washington: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
1971), 6.)
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internationally-recognised  low-intensity  civil  conflict  precipitating  an  unprecedented 
38-year domestic military operation. Troubling and infuriating in equal measure is that 
in  the  early  1990s  the  American  federal  government  remained  mute  on  the  gang 
violence which reached new heights in Chicago23 while  taking an active role in the 
Northern Irish peace process at a time when violence levels had stabilised at a small 
fraction of that seen in Chicago. 
This  comparative  work  is  particularly  interested  in  the  development  and 
evolution of community violence in Chicago and urban Northern Ireland. It focuses on 
Chicago's  African  American  supergangs  and  republican  paramilitaries  violence  in 
Northern Ireland (with a special focus on the Almighty P Stone Nation in Chicago and 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland).24 Speaking first to 
the latter group, the Provisional IRA25 was the largest separatist republican paramilitary 
organisation active in the modern Northern Irish conflict, responsible for more conflict-
related  deaths  than  any  other  group  (paramilitary  or  state)  over  the  course  of  the 
Troubles.26 In addition to being the deadliest participant, the articulacy of its political 
rhetoric and strength of its communications strategy allowed the Provisional IRA to 
dominate their loyalist rivals not only militarily but in the propaganda war as well. At 
the same time, as the dominant non-state player in the conflict, the Provisional IRA's 
transition  to  non-violence  can  be  argued  to  be  the  most  remarkable.  If  Martin 
McGuinness and Gerry Adams can move from authorising mortar attacks against 10 
Downing Street (the headquarters of the British government) to skateboarding with the 
Prime Minister's son in the back garden in the space of a decade,27 it is certainly within 
the  realm  of  possibility  to  hope  that  Chicago's  street  gangs  might  also  be  able  to 
transform themselves into non-violent organisations. 
At the same time, by virtue of their emergence at the same time as the first (and 
only) major political mobilisation of black Americans, African American street gangs 
should theoretically have been best placed to establish themselves as a political threat at 
a time when race and urban issues sat high on the national political agenda. Of these  
groups it  has been the Almighty P Stones Nation that  has been the most outwardly 
political.  However it  was only when the group flirted with outwardly 'revolutionary' 
groups  such  as  the  Black  Panthers  or  terrorist  states  such as  Libya  that  the  group 
attracted any concerted political attention. It is true the the Stones remain the only street 
23 Except with continued financial investment in largely ineffective anti-gang programmes.
24 Some of the most extensive and compelling treatments of the organisation include: J Bowyer 
Bell,  IRA Tactics and Targets (Dublin: Poolbeg,  1990);  J Bowyer Bell,  The IRA 1968-2000:  
Analysis  of  a  Secret  Army (London:  Frank  Cass,  2000);  English, Armed  Struggle;  Richard 
English, Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland (London: Pan Macmillan, 2007; 
Seán Mac Stíofáin,  Memoirs of a Revolutionary (London: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975); Tommy 
McKearney, The Provisional IRA: From Insurrection to Parliament (London: Pluto Press, 2011); 
Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 2ed (London: Penguin Books, 2007); Kacper Rekawk, 
Irish Republican Terrorism and Politics: A Comparative Study of the Official and Provisional  
IRA (New York: Routledge, 2011); Robert W White, Provisional Irish Republicans: An Oral and  
Interpretive History (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993).
25 Known less formally as the PIRA or Provos.
26 English, Armed Struggle, 379
27 Coogan, The IRA, 238.; Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 278, 380.; Jonathan Powell, Great  
Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland (London: Bodley Head, 2008), 151.
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gang  organisation  to  face  conviction  for  domestic  terrorism  offences,  yet  these 
convictions related not to the 'terror' caused by hundreds (if not thousands) of murders 
and  many  more  assaults,  but  a  bizarre  'rocket-purchasing'  plot  on  behalf  of 
representatives of Colonel Gaddafi's Libyan government in the early 1980s.28 Perhaps 
more than any other series of events in the long history of Chicago's uncivil war, this 
highlights  the  skewed  understanding  of  'national  security'  held  by  the  American 
government.
The Landscape of Violence: Chicago's 'Supergangs'
As is the case elsewhere in the United States, the street gangs of Chicago are 
comprised largely (but not exclusively) of young men resident in low income/inner-city 
neighbourhoods. These neighbourhoods also house a disproportionate  percentage of the 
city's  racial/ethnic  minority  population.  Reflecting  their  geo-social  environment, 
Chicago's  street  gangs  tend  to  be  either  African  American  or  Latino/Hispanic  in 
composition (with fewer numbers in mixed gangs). Today, the street gang landscape of 
the city of Chicago is fragmented to the point of appearing almost entirely anarchic, yet 
nearly all gangs continue to claim some form of affiliation with one or more of the early 
black  or  Latino/Hispanic  supergang  networks  that  emerged  in  the  late  1950s/early 
1960s.29 The  use  of  the term 'supergangs'  distinguishes  these groups from the  city's 
earlier  white  'ethnic'  (Italian,  Irish,  Polish,  Lithuanian,  German,  other  central/eastern 
European or Jewish) and African American (Clovers, Apaches, etc.) delinquent youth 
gangs who were minimally involved in illegal activity and violence.30 
The first of these groups, the Latin Kings (also known as the Almighty Latin 
King and Queen Nation), was founded in the 1940s as a response by Chicago's Puerto 
Rican communities to attacks from ethnic gangs keen to show their displeasure with 
neighbourhood ethnic  transition.31 Though they developed separately  from the  other 
supergangs, they would come to be seen as 'one of the group' as a result of the loose 
28 Brent L Smith, Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1994), 121-125.
29 Still,  it  would be irresponsible  to  suggest  these alliances  continue to  have  much bearing on 
violence carried out by these groups.
30 Will  Cooley,  “  'Stones Run It':  Taking Back Control  of Organized Crime in Chicago, 1940-
1975,” Journal of Urban History 37, no 6 (2011): 912.
31 Key works exploring the Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation in Chicago and nationally 
include:  Luis  Barrios,  “The Almighty  Latin King  and  Queen Nation  and  the Spirituality  of  
Resistance:  Agency,  Social  Cohesion,  and  Liberating  Rituals  in  the  Making  of  a  Street 
Organisation,”  in  Gangs  and  Society:  Alternative  Perspectives,  eds.  Louis  Kontos,  David 
Brotherton and Luis Barrios (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 119-135; David C 
Brotherton, “What Happened to the Pathological Gang? Notes from a Case Study of the Latin 
Kings and Queens in New York,” in  Cultural Criminology Unleashed,  eds. Jeff Ferrell, Keith 
Hayward, Wayne Morrison and Mike Presdee (London: The Glass House Press, 2004), 263-274; 
David  C Brotherton  and  Luis  Barrios,  The  Almighty  Latin  King  and  Queen  Nation:  Street  
Politics and the Transformation of  a New York City Gang  (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2004); Monica Brown, Gang Nation: Delinquent Citizens in Puerto Rican, Chicano, and  
Chicana Natives  (Minneapolis:  The University of Minnesota Press,  2002):  136-142; Scott  H 
Decker, Tim Bynum and Deborad Weisel, “A Tale of Two Cities: Gangs as Organized Crime 
Groups,”  Justice Quarterly  15, no 3 (1998): 395-425; and Irving A Spergel,  Reducing Youth  
Gang Violence: The Little Village Gang Project in Chicago (Lanham: AltaMira, 2007).
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alliances  that  would  develop between  the  Latin  Kings  and some African  American 
supergangs. The first African American supergang to emerge was the Vice Lords, first 
founded in 1958 in North Lawndale on the West Side of the city.32 They were followed a 
year later  by the  Blackstone Rangers (now known as  the  Almighty  Black P Stones 
Nation, but also known as the Stones, P Stones and Almighty P Stones) in Woodlawn on 
the South Side.33 The Gangster Disciples emerged to rival the Stones for South Side 
dominance  in  the  mid-1960s,  eventually  growing significantly  larger  than  the  elder 
group, while the Maniac Latin Disciples developed in 1966 on the West Side.34 Together 
these five groups would represent the core Chicago supergangs.35 
By the 1980s, they combined their energies and those of other groups in the 
'People' and 'Folks' super-alliances. The 'People Nation' is comprised of the Almighty 
Latin King and Queen Nation, Vice Lords, Almighty Black P Stone Nation, Four Corner 
Hustlers, Mickey Cobras and respective affiliates. The 'Folks Nation', on the other hand, 
consists of the Gangster Disciples (currently the largest gang constellation in the City), 
Black  Disciples, La Raza Nation, Maniac Latin Disciples, Spanish Cobras and Spanish 
Gangster  Disciples.  There remain  a  few small  but  persistent  white  gangs who have 
forged  alliances  with  the  People  and  Folks.  The  Almighty  Gaylords  and  Insane 
Southside Popes are People affiliates while the Northside Popes and Almighty Saints 
represent  the  Folks.  Though  the  People  and  Folks  are  the  main  supergang alliance 
networks, it is very much the case that the supergangs might accurately described as 
alliance networks in their own right. 
The major supergangs built their empires in a way remarkably similar to how 
most major corporations have developed over the last half-century - through mergers 
and acquisitions. Small local 'gangs' (often little more than informally organised friend 
groups) would, as they grew outwards, merge with existing gang clusters. For example, 
the Blackstone Rangers (Almighty Black P Stone Nation) began life as a group of young 
toughs led by a 13 year-old named Jeff Fort who merged with a similar group called the 
Harper Boys that was led by Eugene 'Bull' Hairston.36 Now separate once again, in the 
late 1960s the Gangster Disciples (known at the time as the Black Gangster Disciple 
Nation) started as a merger of the High Supreme Gangsters (led by David Barksdale) 
32 David Dawley, A Nation of Lords: The Autobiography of the Vice Lords (Long Grove: Waveland 
Press, 1992); R Lincoln Keiser,  Vice Lords: Warriors of the Streets  (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1979);  George W Knox and Andrew V Papachristos,  The Vice Lords: A Gang  
Profile Analysis (Peotone: National Gang Crime Research, 2002).
33 Natalie Y Moore and Lance Williams’ The Almighty Black P Stone Nation: The Rise, Fall and  
Resurgence of an American Gang (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2011) remains the definitive 
account of the group. Other works exploring various aspects of the Stones’ history, racial politics 
and illegal activities include: Will Cooley, “ ‘Stones Run It’,”; Steven R Cureton, “Something 
Wicked  This  Way Comes:  A Historical  Account  of  Black  Gangsterism Offers  Wisdom and 
Warning for African American Leadership,” Journal of Black Studies 40, no 4 (2009): 353-354; 
and Rami Nashashibi, “The Blackstone Legacy, Islam and the Rise of Ghetto Cosmopolitanism,” 
Souls 9, no 2 (2007): 123-131. 
34 Michael D Lyman,  Drugs in Society: Concepts and Controls, 7ed (Waltham: Anderson, 2014), 
471.
35 John Hagedorn,  A World  of  Gangs:  Armed Young Men and Gangsta  Culture  (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 12.
36 Moore and Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 22.
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and Black Disciples (led by Larry Hover), themselves amalgams of smaller local groups 
including the likes of the Dutchtown Disciples  and African Sniper  Gangsters.  Once 
officially  part  of  the  gang,  these  smaller  local  groups  become  'sets'  or  'clicks'  and 
represent the organisation's front-line. Being part of a larger organisation enhances the 
power of these local sets, providing back-up in disputes with other gangs and offering 
new 'business' opportunities. However, it also means cutting the larger organisation into 
a share of the profits, something groups have increasingly resented since the mid-to-late 
1980s. Often presented as large, cohesive and well-organised criminal operations,  in 
reality even at the peak of gang cohesiveness a significant amount of autonomy has 
always remained at the local level. 
Considering the longevity of the gang violence  problem in Chicago,  the true 
'heyday'  of  the  cohesive  supergang  would  be  relatively  short-lived.  Following  the 
simultaneous arrest/murders of major leadership figures in the Vice Lords, Almighty P 
Stone Nation and Gangster Disciples during the late 1970s and early 1980s, Chicago's 
African  American  supergangs  (Stones,  Vice  Lords,  Disciples,  Micky  Cobras,  Four 
Corners Hustlers) became increasingly fragmented. This fragmentation process has sped 
up  tremendously  in  the  twenty  years  since  the  Chicago  Housing  Authority  first 
embarked on a plan to demolish and refurbish the city's major high-rise public housing 
complexes  (ex.  Robert  Taylor  Homes,  Carbrini-Green,  Dearborn  Homes  and  Ida  B 
Wells Homes), controlled by gangs since the late 1970s.37 One of the important goals of 
this 'urban renewal'  effort was the disruption of existing gang structures through the 
dispersion of gang members (and public housing residents more generally) across the 
city.38 The loss of the public housing projects as a base for drug-selling and prostitution 
did bring about changes in the way gangs conducted their business and played a role in 
dismantling hierarchies, with central leadership increasingly irrelevant to local sets, but 
it  did  not  eradicate  the  African  American  supergangs  by  any  stretch.  Instead,  it 
facilitated  the  development  of  evermore  splinter  groups,  renegade  factions  and 
'independent'  sets  who operated independently from broader gang hierarchies.  These 
groups sought not total isolation nor a lack of affiliation, with nearly all continuing to 
'rep' (display affiliation through colours, symbols, clothing, hand gestures and graffiti 
tags) their previous supergang. Instead the move towards independence could be seen as 
a result  of a desire for local control and freedom from the financial obligations that 
came with  formal  affiliation.  With  gang hierarchies  disrupted through dispersal  and 
imprisonment, central leaderships lost the power (or, just as likely, the will) to enforce 
compliance upon rebel sets. The overall result has been the creation of a landscape of 
loose and transitory alliances among sets that are more often based on kin, personal or 
business relationships than formal affiliation. 
The Grounds for Comparison
From  above  and  at  a  distance,  the  temptation  to  see  Troubles  violence  in 
Northern Ireland and gang violence in Chicago as incomparable is obvious. Where gang 
violence  has  been  widely  perceived  as  an  insular  urban  community  problem,  the 
37 Popkin et al, The Hidden War, 2.
38 Lawrence J Vale, Purging the Poorest: Public Housing and the Design Politics of Twice-cleared  
Communities (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 387.
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spectacle of the violence perpetrated by the Provisional IRA combined with its political 
articulacy garnered a wide and international audience for the group. Yet, in spite of the 
differences in articulated aspiration among the perpetrators of paramilitary violence in 
Northern Ireland and gang violence in Chicago, there are fundamental similarities at the 
individual, group, community and state levels that prime these two contexts of group 
violence for comparison. 
Profiling the Perpetrators and Victims of Community-level Urban Group Violence
In the introduction to his study on the process of leaving violent groups, John 
Horgan aptly warns that a psychological profile which can be ascribed to all (or most) 
individuals involved in political violence (even within the same group) has not yet been 
discovered.39 Nevertheless, it is possible to offer a demographic profile of those engaged 
in paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland. Recruits to both republican (separatist Irish 
nationalist)  and loyalist  (Protestant ultra)40 paramilitaries tended, by and large, to be 
young  men  aged  between  16  and  25  residing  in  highly  segregated  working-class 
neighbourhoods who came from working-class backgrounds. Common to the working-
class population of Northern Ireland they also tended to skew towards the lower end of 
the  educational  qualification  spectrum.41 Gang  membership  is  also  near  exclusively 
male42 and recruitment appears to skew young here also, with some evidence indicating 
gang recruits are even younger than paramilitary recruits in Northern Ireland (age 12-20 
as opposed to 16-20).43 As previously alluded to, gang members, in keeping with their 
geographical distribution, tend to come from the lowest echelons of the class stratum. 
Young socio-economically disadvantaged males are not simply those most likely 
to  become  engaged  in  paramilitary  or  street  gang  violence,  but  violence  more 
generally.44 It thus comes as perhaps little surprise that this same demographic group is 
39 John Horgan,  Walking Away from Terrorism:  Accounts  of  Disengagement  from Radical  and  
Extremist Movements (London: Routledge, 2009), 4.
40 Jean Guiffan, La question d'Irlande, vol 1 (Bruxelles: Éditions Complexe, 2006); Richard Rose, 
Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective  (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), 33, 92, 
109.
41 Charles A Russell and Bowman H Miller, "Profile of a  Terrorist,"  Terrorism: An International  
Journal 1, no 1 (1977): 17-29; Margaret Gonzalez-Perez, Women and Terrorism: Female Activity  
in Domestic and International Terror Groups  (New York: Routledge, 2009), 119-121; White, 
Provisional Irish Republicans, 64.
42 Bilchik, 1996 National Youth Gang Survey, 21.
43 Bilchik, 1996 National Youth Gang Survey, 16; Robert J Franzese, Herbert C Covey and Scott W 
Menard, Youth Gangs, 3ed (Springfield: Charles C Thomas, 2006), 21.
44 Martin  Daly,  Margo  Wilson  and  Shawn  Vasdev,  "Income  inequality  and  homicide  rates  in 
Canada and the United States," Canadian Journal of Criminology 43 (2001): 219-236; Richard 
Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit  Level: Why Equality  is  Better  for  Everyone (Dublin: 
Penguin,  2010),129-144;  Margo  Wilson  and  Martin  Daly,  Homicide (New  Brunswick: 
Transaction,  2009),  168-170.  While  this  research  seeks  to  distance  itself  from the  kind  of 
Darwinian reductionism found in Helena Cronin's The Ant and the Peacock, the quantitative data 
presented offers a compelling insight into the strength of the relationship between age, sex and 
violence  in  economically  advanced  Western  Societies.  (Helena  Cronin,  The  Ant  and  the  
Peacock:  Altruism  and  Sexual  Selection  from  Darwin  to  Today (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 332, 343).
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also at greatest risk of violent victimisation.45 According to the Sutton Index of Deaths, 
approximately 91% of those who died as a result of the Troubles were male, with young 
men  under  the  age  of  25  accounting  for  nearly  a  third  of  all  victims.46 Although 
information  regarding  the  income/employment  status  (full-time  employed/part-time 
employed/unemployed/long-term  unemployed)  of  conflict  victims  is  not  readily 
available, the geospatial pattern of death indicates that residents of Northern Ireland's 
urban working-class neighbourhoods were those most likely to be killed as a result of 
the  conflict.47 Gang  violence  in  Chicago  (and  the  United  States  more  generally)  is 
similarly concentrated in economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods.48 Still, there is 
an imperfect correlation between gang violence and poverty. The neighbourhoods with 
the  highest  levels  of  absolute  poverty  may  not  be  the  most  violent,  though  all 
neighbourhoods with high levels of violence also have high overall levels of poverty or 
pockets of high poverty (for example a public housing project).49 With the Troubles 
lasting from 1968 until 1998 and supergang violence in Chicago a serious problem since 
the mid-1960s,  it  can thus be summarised that both gang violence and the Troubles 
represent  prolonged  endemic  low-level  urban  conflict  concentrated  in  economically 
deprived  communities,  primarily  engaging  young  socio-economically  disadvantaged 
males as perpetrators and victims.50
State-level Comparability
Internationally,  urban group violence is  by no means limited to Chicago and 
45 Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Small Arms Survey 2010, 135.
46 Malcolm Sutton, “Sutton Index of Deaths,” CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet), accessed 
27 July 2014.
47 Carolyn  Gallagher,  Loyalist  Paramilitaries  in  Post-Accord  Northern  Ireland (Ithica:  Cornell 
University Press, 2007), 56-57; Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey and Marie Smyth, Northern 
Ireland’s Troubles:The Human Costs (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 133-146.
48 Carolyn Rebecca Block and Richard Block, “Street Gang Crime in Chicago,” National Institute 
of Justice Research in Brief December (1993): 2.
49 Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum, Crossing the Class and Color Lines, 88.
50 The link between racial  minority  status  and street  gang membership (predominately African 
American and latino) has been written about extensively. While the strength of both republican 
and loyalist  paramilitary organisations during the Troubles might, under other circumstances, 
indicate that minority status (defined in ethno-religious terms) is not as relevant in predicting 
paramilitary involvement in Northern Ireland, this is not quite the case. Catholics represent the 
minority within Northern Ireland, but its existence as a legal entity is largely the result of the  
extreme apprehension on the part of Ireland's Protestant population (concentrated largely in the 
north east of the island) about their minority status within an all-Ireland context. The Protestant 
population and its political leaders appear not to have given significant consideration to the fact  
that in the creation of Northern Ireland, Catholics within the six secessionist counties would be 
subjected  to  the  same  fate  they  themselves  feared  so  greatly.  Nonetheless,  it  remains  that 
Protestant unionists and loyalists justify their claims to regional self-determination on the basis 
of  the  threat  to  Protestant  minority  religious  and  cultural  freedoms  Irish  independence/ 
reunification would present. (Alex A Alonso, “Racialized Identities and the Formation of Black 
Gangs in Los Angeles,”  Urban Geography  25, no 7 (2004): 658-674; Bilchik,  1996 National  
Youth Gang Survey, 26; Sean Byrne, Growing Up in a Divided Society: The Influence of Conflict  
on  Belfast  Schoolchildren  (London:  Associated  University  Presses,  1997) 51-52;  John  M 
Hagedorn,  “Race  Not  Space:  A Revisionist  History  of  Gangs  in  Chicago,”  The  Journal  of  
African American History 91, no 2 (2006): 194-208; John Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 100-101.)
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Northern  Ireland  and  thus  a  case  for  their  comparability  must  also  be  made  with 
reference  to  state-level  factors.  Fundamentally,  both  the  United  States  and  United 
Kingdom  are  considered  bastions  of  liberal  democracy  in  an  international  context. 
Perhaps just as importantly, the strength of their relative economies over the past several 
centuries has meant both (first the US then the UK) have been charged with taking on 
an informal global leadership role. Although the global power of the United Kingdom 
has declined considerably over the last century,51 the UK and US alike remain economic 
leaders and members of the exclusive G7 group of countries while holding 'veto powers' 
on the  United Nations'  Security  Council.  The  latter  essentially  ensures  international 
military intervention must be approved by both (as well as China, France and Russia) in 
order  receive  official  UN-sanction  (and  also,  essentially,  provides  immunity  from 
international intervention). This is interesting, for while it is almost unimaginable that 
any third-party state would seriously consider intervention in the localised violence of 
the  Troubles/in  Chicago,  both  states  are  routinely  responsible  for  organising 
interventions  in  civil  order  and  civil  conflict  situations  around  the  world  (often  in 
developing countries).
Technically,  the  United  States,  as  a  constitutional  republic  (the  constitution 
responsible for codifying in detail the formal limits of governmental authority) is a more 
clear-cut  example  of  liberal  democracy  when compared  with  the  United  Kingdom's 
constitutional monarchy. Still, the United Kingdom, although it lacks a formal written 
constitution is nevertheless, like the United States, a:
...constitutionally  based  (primarily)  representative  government, 
resting on the separation of powers of rule and law. Based also on the 
principle  of  the  accountability  of  power  holders  to  the  people,  it 
requires free and relatively frequent elections as well as the effective 
protection of basic civil liberties.52
As liberal democracies, the US and UK share a belief in the basic equality of all human 
beings,53 but as discussed earlier with regards to the  Declaration of Independence the 
state's primary responsibility is seen to be towards its citizens as participants in a social 
contract. Since the establishment of liberal democracy on both sides of the Atlantic, the 
definition  of  who qualifies for  citizenship  (and even personhood) and therefore  full 
membership  in  the  state  has  expanded  considerably.  From  the  fairly  restrictive 
'propertied  men'  (with  varying  definitions  of  acceptable  property),  'the  people'  (or 
citizenry) has grown to include unpropertied men, women and, lastly (in an American 
context) persons of colour. Also crucial is the fact that as liberal states, legal equality is 
disconnected from economic equality. Where the social hierarchy continues to be based 
in large part on wealth, legal equality is thus disconnected from social equality. Limited 
government involvement in the economic (wealth-generating) activities of the citizenry, 
either  individually  (as  labourers/workers  or  entrepreneurs)  or  collectively  (as 
corporations  or  in  partnered  businesses)  is  characteristic  of  liberal  democracy,  with 
extensive government regulation seen as infringing upon the same individual freedoms 
51 Piers Brendon,  The Decline and Fall  of the British Empire, 1781-1997  (New York: Vintage, 
2008).
52 William E Sceuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 230.
53 Ibid, 230.
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the state was established to protect. 
Internationally, these leaders and pioneers of liberal democratic development are 
also  second  and  fourth  respectively  among  the  world's  most  advanced  economies 
(OECD members) in terms of income inequality.54 This inequality manifests itself at a 
community-level in pervasive residential clustering along socio-economic lines to the 
point of segregation by class. As will be discussed at length in chapter 2, the existence 
of  major  social  cleavages  has  also  affected  patterns  of  residential  segregation, 
particularly in working-class/low income neighbourhoods. Within the United Kingdom 
residential segregation along sectarian lines also remains common in, and limited to,55 
Northern  Ireland,  while  de  facto  (informal,  not  legally  supported)  racial  residential 
segregation persists in the urban America. The link between these overlapping forms of 
segregation  and  the  development  of  community  violence  in  Chicago  and  Northern 
Ireland will be a running theme throughout this work.
P-Stones and Provos in Context
This  is  not  the  first  scholarly  comparison between Northern  Ireland and the 
United States. Frank Wright's Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis, still the most 
extensive and outward looking comparative work of Northern Irish studies scholarship, 
makes extensive use of American history and includes a thoughtful consideration of the 
Northern Irish and American civil rights movements.56 Brian Dooley's Black and Green:  
The Fight for Civil Rights in Northern Ireland and Simon Prince's  Northern Ireland's  
'68:  Civil  Rights,  Global  Revolt  and  the  Origins  of  the  Troubles  also  examine  the 
development  of popular civil  rights movements on both sides of the Atlantic,  while 
simultaneously considering issues of social inequality and discrimination.57 On the other 
hand, the group violence that overlapped with and followed the civil rights movements 
has escaped similar (or any) serious consideration, a gap that this work uniquely fills. At 
the  same time,  where  Wright,  Dooley  and Prince  have  sought  to  use the  American 
experience to help shed light on events in Northern Ireland, this work (again uniquely) 
does the reverse, using the experience of violence in Northern Ireland to shed light on 
American urban community violence. Still, it is not in its comparative aspects that this 
54 Wilkinson and Pickett, The Spirit Level, 17.
55 There remains evidence of Irish migration leading to segregation and sectarian feuding in certain 
working-class neighbourhoods of Glasgow and Liverpool during the late 19th century, but this 
remained  a  limited  phenomenon.  (Tom  Gallagher,  Glasgow,  the  Uneasy  Peace:  Religious  
Tension in  Modern Scotland, 1819-1914  (Manchester:  Manchester  University Press,  1987); J 
Foster, M Houston and C Madigan, “Sectarianism, Segregation and Politics on Clydeside in the 
Later Nineteenth Century,” in New Perspectives on the Irish in Scotland, ed. Martin J Mitchell 
(Edinburgh:  John Donald,  2008),  65-96;  Tony Lane,  Liverpool:  City  of  the  Sea  (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1997), 110; Helen B McCartney,  Citizen Soldiers: The Liverpool  
Territorials  in  the  First  World  War  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2005),  16-17; 
Frank Neil, Sectarian Violence: The Liverpool Experience, 1819-1914 (Manchester: Manchester, 
1988); Joan Smith, “Labour Tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool,” History Workshop Journal 17 
(1984): 32-56.)
56 Frank Wright,  Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis  (Dublin:  Gill & Macmillan, 1987), 
164-216.
57 Brian Dooley, Black and Green: The Fight for Civil Rights in Northern Ireland & Black America 
(London: Pluto Press, 1998); Prince, Northern Ireland’s ’68.
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work's originality solely rests. Most significantly, this is the first work to present gang 
violence in the United States, Chicago specifically as a politically-significant major civil  
order issue and threat to state security arguing that there is essentially an unrecognised 
low-intensity civil conflict in the heart of the mid-west.
The 'violence transformation' approach to gang violence reduction presented in 
chapter 4 offers a radically innovative way forward, marking a clear departure from the 
dominance  of  traditional  intervention/suppression  approaches  (in  keeping  with  the 
advocated need for high-level state response). The tone of the argument presented thus 
far  might  lead  one  to  assume  this  work  will  advocate  for  military  involvement  in 
Chicago (or increased suppression-style efforts at the very least). Instead, it is proposed 
that  a  political  resolution  is  needed  as,  fundamentally,  gang  violence  represents  a 
political  crises  and  a  threat  to  core  American  political  values.  In  order  to  achieve 
resolution,  the  state  must  put  aside  issues  of  moral  legitimacy  and  recognise  the 
considerable amount of local power wielded by street gangs in large swaths of Chicago. 
As uncomfortable as such an admission (one that need not be made publicly) may be, in 
Chicago's 'gangland' the authority of the gangs is often stronger than that of the state, for  
the fear of summary execution by gang violence is greater than the fear of prison time 
which has become almost a right of passage.
Furthermore, given the persistence of high levels of gang violence, it is clear that 
the Chicago Police Department has neither the capacity nor mandate needed to truly 
manage the gang violence problem. Quite simply, if the CPD had been able to manage 
the gang problem successfully, there would be no need for continued discussion of how 
to  deal  with  ever-mounting  death  tolls.  An  appropriate  response  to  gang  violence 
acknowledges the limitations of not only community intervention approaches to gang 
violence reduction, but also the suppression approaches the government has been more 
directly  involved.  The  government  of  the  United  Kingdom had  to  recognise  that  a 
significant portion of Northern Ireland would remain beyond its authority (and under the 
influence of republican paramilitaries) so long as conflict persisted in Northern Ireland 
before it was able to invest the political resources needed to make the peace process 
work. It is these political resources which are most urgently needed. Financial resources 
do need to be mobilised in order to make progress in gang violence reduction, however 
their appropriateness as the core component of the federal response to gang violence in 
Chicago (and across the United States) to-date needs to be challenged. 
The Lay of the Land: Outlining the Remainder of the Thesis
The first substantive chapter of this thesis is titled 'Scholarly Binaries, The State 
of the Field(s) and Definitional Debates'. It contains overviews of the key patterns and 
trends in  the gang studies/Northern Irish studies literature  and presents some of  the 
critical  gaps  this  thesis  works  to  fill.  It  argues  the  lack  of  comparative  analysis 
incorporating  gang  violence  in  Chicago  (or  the  United  States  more  broadly)  and 
paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland stems not from the absence of similarity, but 
in the cleavage between the study of 'political violence' (as internally defined) and other 
forms of group violence, including gang violence. The intense focus on the distinctive 
political aspects (motivations and aspirations specifically) of 'political violence' has led 
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to  the  denial  of  the  political  meaning  and  significance  of  those  forms  of  violence 
excluded  from  political  violence's  scholarly  self-definition.  The  strong  influence  of 
criminology,  sociology  and  anthropology  in  the  gang  studies  literature  and  the 
comparative absence of political science voices has meant that the impetus, especially in 
an American context, for challenging either this de-politicisation or the exclusivity of 
the existing scholarly conceptualisation of 'political violence' has been lacking. 
Chapter  2,  titled,  'The  Emergence  and  Reproduction  of  Politicised  and 
Depoliticised  Difference:  The  Legacies  of  Sectarianism & Nationalism in  Northern 
Ireland  and  Race  in  the  United  States'  addresses  the  historical  origins  of  the  de-
politicisation  of  African  American  supergang  violence  in  the  city  of  Chicago.  The 
central question framing this chapter is that of why Chicago’s African American street 
gangs have failed to elicit a state-level response adequately reflecting the scale of the 
threat they pose to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness while the Provisional IRA 
was able to galvanise a significant state-level response before its first significant attack. 
It argues the key to understanding differential response lies in understanding how the 
major social cleavages out of which these violent groups emerged have historically been 
ascribed or denied political meaning and significance over the course of centuries. The 
politicisation  of  sectarian  difference  in  16th  century  Ireland  (and  the  mapping  of 
political attitudes towards Irish separatist nationalism onto this difference at the end of 
the 18th) created a context in which the Provisional IRA could not escape becoming 
framed as a political issue and threat to state stability. The scale of violence affected the 
scale and form of response, but not the fact of response in itself which was prompted by 
the group's very existence. Though Chicago’s African American supergangs emerged in 
the  midst  of  the  American  civil  rights  movement,  there  did  not  exist  a  similarly 
politicised history of violent contestation. Initially seen as simply the next iteration of 
the transitional juvenile ‘delinquent’ gangs first studied by Frederick M Thrasher in the 
late 1920s,58 there was little these groups could do to establish themselves as a serious 
political  threat  or concern regardless of  the intensity  of their  violence.  This chapter 
covers: the development of sectarianism and nationalism in Ireland and post-partition 
Northern Ireland; the emergence of the Provisional IRA; early British state response to 
Troubles violence;  the history of racial inequality in the United States, the limits and 
legacy of the civil rights movement; and the evolution of the Almighty P Stones. 
The  third  chapter,  'Previous  Responses  to  Gang  Violence  in  Chicago:  The 
Limitations of Intervention, Suppression and Integration', works to answer the question 
of how this framing of Chicago's gang violence as a community social problem and 
crime issue has affected response strategy and facilitated the promulgation of inefficient 
and  inadequate  responses.  This  chapter  argues  that  the  myriad  of  community-based 
intervention and crime-focused suppression efforts have not been able to yield the major 
reductions in the city’s gang violence programme to which they have aspired in spite of 
their  strong  theoretical  underpinnings.  Though  these  efforts  have  often  received 
financial  support  from  the  federal  government  and  its  departments/  agencies  (with 
funding  also  frequently  provided  by  state  and  local  governments),  the  federal 
government has adopted a  laissez-faire approach to gang violence reduction. Without 
58 Thrasher, The Gang.
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direct high-level involvement, existing intervention and suppression approaches have 
been inadequate. There was a major (and sustained) drop in overall levels of violence 
and  crime  in  Chicago since  the  mid-1990s  (reflecting  national  trends),  yet  existing 
evaluative evidence does not support a view that any particular gang violence reduction 
effort (or all efforts in combination) can claim any real credit for this decline. Included 
in  chapter  3  is  discussion  of:  the  Chicago  Area  Project  begun  in  the  1930s  by 
sociologist Clifford Shaw; the Youth Manpower Project administered by the Woodlawn 
Organization in 1968; the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project of the 1990s; 
the  more  recent  CeaseFire-Chicago  initiative  (now  Cure  Violence);  Project  Safe 
Neighbourhoods;  the  Chicago  Police  Department's  gang  specific  operations;  and 
federal, state and municipal legislation specifically targeting gangs.
If previous and current approaches to gang violence reduction in Chicago have 
been ineffective and inadequate as a consequence of the durability of their framing of 
the  issue  as  a  community social  problem and crime issue,  what  might  an approach 
reflective of the threat gangs pose to civil order and liberal democratic values look like? 
Answering this question is the purpose of the fourth and final substantive chapter of this 
thesis, 'Violence Transformation: A New Way Forward'.  This chapter argues that the 
eventual transformation of the Provisional IRA from the preeminent agent of violence 
during  the  Troubles  into  a  political  organisation  devoted  to  advancing  its  political 
agenda solely through political means provides hope for a similar transition in Chicago. 
In coming to understand gang violence as a political problem and a threat to the liberal 
democratic values at the heart of the state, it becomes easier to make the case that a new 
approach is needed, one that recognises the severity of the situation and the need for 
drastic action if there is any hope for creating a lasting peace. This chapter proposes a 
new approach to gang violence reduction referred to herein as 'violence transformation'. 
Violence transformation is modelled on the Northern Irish peace process, but 
adapted to reflect the fragmentary nature of Chicago's gang landscape and the impact of 
centuries  of  the  depoliticisation  of  American racial  inequality  on the  shape  of  gang 
violence in the city. It argues that the creation and implementation of a negotiated non-
violence agreement between the upper echelons of the federal government (including 
presidential  involvement)  and  Chicago's  most  lethal  gang  factions  where  strictly 
enforced carries strong, albeit radical, potential to generate major lasting reductions in 
gang violence. This process grants groups the ownership over their own transformation 
necessary  for  sustained  buy-in,  while  at  the  same  time  bounds  the  transformation 
process  with  clear-cut  accountability  measures.  This  approach  requires  tremendous 
political  courage,  but  with  great  risk  comes  the  potential  for  great  reward  –  the 
restoration of true civil order in Chicago for the first time in over half a century. 
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Chapter 1
Scholarly Binaries, The State of the Field(s) and Definitional Debates
Over the course of the last thirty years there has been a rapid proliferation of 
scholarship  in  the  terrorism  &  political  violence  field.  One  consequence  of  this 
tremendous growth has been that, intentionally or unintentionally, what was (and to a 
certain extent remains) a radically, fundamentally and proudly interdisciplinary field has 
come  to  display  increasingly  disciplinary  tendencies59 most  prominently  under  the 
banner of 'terrorism studies'.60 Concurrently,  one of the most  frequent and persistent 
criticisms of 'terrorism studies' in its most orthodox and Anglo-American form is that 
the  leaders  of  the  field  have  maintained  very  close  relationships  with  government, 
military and law enforcement agencies of the United Kingdom, United States and other 
Western countries. For some, this undermines the field's scholarly independence and 
willingness to engage in serious critical analysis.61 Combined, these factors have worked 
to increasingly separate, if not isolate, the study of 'political violence' from the study of 
other forms of violence,  including the broader  'group violence'  category to  which it 
would naturally belong. This has had a serious impact on the fields of 'Northern Irish 
studies' and 'gang studies' which have also experienced considerable growth over the 
same time frame. 
The  politicised  framing  of  the  Northern  Irish  conflict  in  public/political 
discourse (discussed in greater detail in chapter 2) together with the relative influence of 
terrorism studies  &  political  science  scholarship  within  'Northern  Irish  studies'  has 
meant  that  the  Troubles  have  been readily  (and  to  a  certain  extent  unquestionably) 
recognised as a case of political violence. 'Gang studies' on the other hand, being more 
sociologically and criminologically oriented, lacks a comparable relationship with the 
political violence field or the political science and international relations disciplines that 
have  become  increasingly  influential  within  it.  Thereby,  gang  violence  has  been 
excluded from the study of 'political violence' even as the definition of the term and, 
consequentially, the parameters of the field have continued to evolve through debate and 
contestation over the last few decades. As with other forms of violence which lie outside 
the  bounds of  'political  violence',  gang violence has  come to be  constructed  by the 
political violence field as criminal, lacking in political aspiration/motivation and devoid 
of  broader  political  meaning  and  significance.62 The  disciplinary  dominance  of 
59 In keeping with one of the major critiques of interdisciplinary studies as levied by Stanley Fish.  
(Stanley Fish, “Being Interdisciplinary is so Very Hard to Do,”  Issues in Integrative Studies  9 
(1991): 99-112.)
60 Lisa  Stampnitzky,  Disciplining  Terror:  How  Experts  Invented  'Terrorism'  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013).
61 Richard  Jackson,  “Knowledge,  Power  and  Politics  in  the  Study  of  Political  Terrorism,”  in 
Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, eds. Richard Jackson, Marie Breen-Smyth 
and Jeroen Gunning (London: Routledge, 2009), 67; Richard Jackson, “The Core Commitments 
of Critical Terrorism Studies,” European Political Science 6 (2007): 245; Sam Raphael, “In the 
Service  of  Power:  Terrorism Studies  and  US Intervention in  the  Global  South,”  in  Critical 
Terrorism Studies:  A New Research  Agenda,  eds.  Richard  Jackson,  Marie  Breen-Smyth  and 
Jeroen Gunning (London: Routledge, 2009), 49-50.
62 A reflection of  the continuing (but not  unchallenged) importance of  the Weberian notion of 
statehood,  defined in  terms of  the  state’s  monopoly on the use  of  violence,  within political 
scholarship more generally. (Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures, eds. David Owen and Tracy B 
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criminology  and  sociology  has  affected  the  field's  ability  to  challenge  this  mis-
representation. Furthermore, the increasing self-referentialism of 'Northern Irish studies' 
and 'gang studies'63 as the fields have grown has contributed to the perpetuation of this 
highly problematic binary.
While  this  work  as  a  whole  seeks  to  challenge  these  presumptions  and 
assumptions, this chapter focuses first on exploring the political/'non-political' violence 
binary and its implications for the study of both the Troubles in Northern Ireland and 
gang  violence  in  Chicago.  It argues  the  political/non-political  violence  binary  has 
contributed  to  the  denial  of  the  political  significance  of  endemic  gang  violence  in 
Chicago and the non-recognition, or at the very least underestimation, of the serious 
threat  it  poses  to  the  liberal  democratic  principles  outlined  in  the  Declaration  of  
Independence. The first half of this chapter is dedicated to bringing the existence and 
significance  of  the  polarised  political/non-political  violence  binary  out  from  the 
shadows for the purpose of its problematisation. The latter half of this chapter provides 
general overviews of the state of the gang studies and Northern Irish studies fields in 
order to set the stage for the descriptive and comparative work to follow. Within these 
cartographic sojourns the extent to which existing the gang studies and Northern Irish 
studies  literature  plays  into  the  political/non-political  violence  binary  becomes  even 
clearer,  especially with regards to the failure of existing gang studies scholarship to 
(thus far) present a serious intellectual challenge to the depoliticisation of gang violence.  
In this light it becomes easier to understand how heavy academic involvement in the 
design,  development  and implementation of most  of  Chicago's  major  gang violence 
reduction efforts since the 1930s has contributed to a lack of radical innovation in the 
area, with efforts failing to keep pace with the changing lethality and scale of the city's 
gang violence problem.
The fact that bombings, shootings, stabbings and punishment beatings constitute 
criminal  homicide  and  physical  assault  regardless  of  the  identity  of  the  individual 
responsible and their motivation (with exceptions made in the case of mental illness) is 
something that has seemingly gotten lost in the academic analysis of political violence. 
The  focus  on  eradicating  the  root  causes64 of  political  violence  and  understanding 
political motivation have contributed to the perception that speaking to its criminality 
denigrates its political  meaning and significance  while  at  the same time heralding a 
return to an outdatedly orthodox view of the subject couched in moralistic language 
unbefitting of contemporary social science.65 The pre-eminence of criminological and 
sociological  thinking  within  the  gang  studies  field  in  combination  with  its  close 
relationship to law enforcement agencies (rather than state governments and military as 
is the case with the political violence field) means that it lacks pressure to present gang 
Strong, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004), 33.)
63 Simon Hallsworth and TaraYoung, “Gang Talk and Gang Talkers: A Critique,”  Crime, Media  
and Culture  4, no 2  (2008): 186; Jack Katz and Curtis Jackson-Jacobs, “The Criminologists’ 
Gang,”  in  The Blackwell  Companion to Criminology,  ed.  Colin Sumner (Oxford:  Blackwell, 
2004), 97.
64 Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism, 3.
65 The shift in the terrorism studies field away from discussion of the criminological aspects of  
terrorist attacks and the activities of groups engaged in acts of 'political' violence is an important  
theme running through Stampnitzky. (Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror, 7, 61-64, 153.)
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violence as something beyond simple criminality.66 Nevertheless, the field has remained 
keen to maintain, if not celebrate, a sense of distinctiveness between gang and non-gang 
violence. Together, a continued emphasis on the distinctiveness of gang and political 
violence (including Troubles violence) only reinforces the barriers between these two 
areas of study, discouraging the cross-pollination of new ideas that can contribute to a 
stronger understanding of both types of violence and strategies for violence reduction in 
a more general sense. 
There is a pronounced lack of consensus around many issues within the Northern 
Irish studies literature, but one area of considerable agreement has been in the framing 
of the Troubles as an example of 'political violence'. Though consensus quickly breaks 
down  over  whether  it  might  best  be  described  as  'civil  conflict',  'ethnic  conflict',67 
'ethnopolitical conflict', 'insurgency', 'guerilla warfare' or 'terrorism', the idea that group 
violence  in  Northern  Ireland  during  the  Troubles  constituted  political  violence  has 
escaped serious contestation. However this does not mean that there is a universally 
accepted understanding of exactly what is meant by the term 'political violence'. As is 
the  case  with  the  term 'terrorism',68 the  the  definition  of  political  violence  remains 
fraught. In  Social Movements, Political Violence and the State, Donatella della Porta 
argues, “Political violence then is the use of physical force in order to damage a political  
adversary  [emphasis  original].”69 On  the  other  hand,  Ted  Gurr  makes  the  case  for 
understanding political violence as, “all collective attacks within a political community 
against the political regime, its actors – including competing political groups as well as 
incumbents  –  or  its  policies.”70 Most  broadly  still,  ABK  Kasozi  defines  political 
violence as, “violence connected with the struggle for, and maintenance of, political 
power and of the ‘the definition of the political community itself’.”71 Though they vary 
in nuance, these definitions are bound together by the sense that political violence is 
exceptional  and different  from other forms of  violence,  especially ordinary criminal 
violence. 
There  have  been efforts  in  the  past  to  integrate  theories  of  general  violence 
within theories of political violence, with notable examples found in Ted Gurr’s (at the 
time) seminal  Why Men Rebel (1970) and James B Rule’s  Theories of Civil Violence 
(1988).72 However, these theories have largely fallen out of favour having been found 
66 Hallsworth and Young, “Gang Talk and Gang Talkers,” 185; Katz and Jackson-Jacobs,  “The 
Criminologists’ Gang,” 91-124.
67 Among  these  terms,  this  is  the  most  difficult  to  define.  (Jeffrey  Stevenson  Murer,  “Ethnic 
Conflict:  An  Overview  of  Analyzing  and  Framing  Communal  Conflicts  From Comparative 
Perspectives,” Terrorism & Political Violence 24, no 4 (2012): 561.)
68 Bruce  Hoffman,  Inside  Terrorism,  Revised  and  Expanded  Edition (New  York:  Columbia 
University Press, 2006), 1-41; Alex P Schmid, “The Definition of Terrorism,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of  Terrorism Research,  ed.  Alex  P Schmid (New York: Routledge,  2011),  39-98; 
Charles Townshend,  Terrorism: A Very Short  Introduction  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2002), 3, 5-6.
69 Donatella  della  Porta,  Social  Movements,  Political  Violence  and  the  State:  A  Comparative  
Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2.
70 Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 3-4.
71 ABK Kasozi,  The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda 1964-1985 (Montréal: McGill-Queens 
University Press, 1994), 12.
72 Ted Gurr,  Why Men Rebel; James B Rule,  Theories of Civil Violence (London: University of 
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unable to fully account for fluctuations in levels of political violence across time and 
culture.73 From a bird's eye view, efforts to connect/re-connect thinking about political 
violence with more general explanations of violence have made little lasting headway. 
The result  is  a  conceptualisation of  political  violence  which positions itself  as  both 
separate from and almost oppositional to the violence excluded from its definition and 
subsequently constructed as 'non-political violence'.
The 'greed' versus 'grievance' debate among scholars of contemporary civil war 
offers some particularly useful insights into the political/non-political violence binary.74 
Of those engaged in this debate, it is perhaps Stathis Kalyvas who has the most to offer 
as  his  “The  Ontology  of  'Political  Violence':  Action  and  Identity  in  Civil  Wars”75 
problematises the way in which the popular conceptualisation of political violence has 
granted blanket political significance to civil war violence despite it taking a diversity of 
forms at the ground level. He argues that although civil war is broadly recognised as an 
important  part  of  the  'political  violence'  landscape,  (unlike  terrorism)  it  has  been 
extensively explored and understood through two dichotomously juxtaposed interpretive 
frames  labelled  'greed'  and  'grievance'.76 The  'greed'  framework  as  understood  by 
Kalyvas  offers  a  Hobbesian  interpretation  of  civil  war  violence.  This  label  is  most 
commonly  applied  to  ethnic  civil  wars  and 'new wars',77 alleged  to  “encourage  the 
privatisation of violence, bringing to the fore, in a virtually random fashion, all sorts of 
motivations  in  what  is  a  'war  of  all  against  all'.”78 Although the  'greed'  framework 
should,  theoretically,  offer  the  greatest  challenge  to  civil  war's  place  in  'political 
violence' discourse, or at the very least contest the boundaries of the broader field, it has 
failed to make these broader connections. 'Grievance'  on the other hand adopts what 
California Press, 1988). 
73 See: Joan Neff Gurney and Kathleen J Tierney, “Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A 
Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theory and Research,”  The Sociological Quarterly  23, no 1 
(1982):  33-47;  John  McGarry  and  Brendan  O’Leary,  Explaining  Northern  Ireland  (Oxford: 
Blackwell,  1995),  272-273,  292;  Edward  Muller,  “The  Psychology  of  Political  Protest  and 
Violence,” in Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research, ed. Ted R Gurr (New York: 
Free Press, 1980); Denis O’Hearn, “Catholic Grievances: Comments,”  The British Journal of  
Sociology 38, no 1 (1987): 94-100; Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious 
Century 1830-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).
74 See, for example: Ian Bannon, “Forward,” in Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, 
eds Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington: The World Bank, 2005), x-xi; Mats Berdal 
and David M Malone, eds.  Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars  (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner,  2000);  Lars-Erik Cederman,  Kristian Skrede  Gleditsch and Halvard Buhaug, 
Inequality,  Grievances,  and Civil  War  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  2013);  Paul 
Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War (Washington: World Bank, 2000); 
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers  
56, no 4 (2004): 563-595; Murer, “Ethnic Conflict,” 569; Patrick M Regan and Daniel Norton,  
“Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars,”  Journal of Conflict Resolution  49, no 3 
(2005):  319-336;  Anthony  Vinci,  “Greed-Grievance  Reconsidered:  The  Role  of  Power  and 
Survival in the Motivation of Armed Groups,” Civil Wars 8, no 1 (2006): 25-45.
75 Also see: Stathis Kalyvas,  The Logic of  Civil War  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006). 
76 Stathis N Kalyvas, “The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’: Action and Identity in Civil Wars,”  
Perspectives on Politics 1, no 3 (2003): 475.
77 Ibid, 475.
78 Ibid, 475.
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Kalyvas  calls  a  Schmittian approach, stressing the  political  dimension of  civil  wars 
above all.79 He argues this frame, “entails an ontology of civil wars based on abstract 
group loyalties and beliefs, whereby the political enemy becomes a private adversary 
only by prior collective and impersonal enmity.”80 
The  strong  influence  of  the  political  science  and  international  relations 
disciplines81 as well as the relative dominance of the related terrorism and security sub-
fields  within the political  violence  field  as  a  whole has  arguably contributed to  the 
favouring of 'grievance'  over 'greed'  in terms of understanding the development and 
perpetuation of political violence more broadly. Consequentially, economic explanations 
of  political  violence which engage with the 'greed'  framework (both supporting and 
challenging  it)  have  become  marginalised,  as  have  discussions  of  the  relationship 
between economic inequality (relative or absolute) and political violence. Taking into 
consideration the impact political violence has had on the history of state development 
(think  the  American  or  Algerian  revolutions)  and  international  relations  (Gavrilo 
Princip's  assassination of Franz Ferdinand set  in motion the course of events which 
would develop into World War I after all), there is indeed a great deal of temptation to 
presume political  violence is  motivated primarily by grievance.  After  all,  with most 
contemporary states (liberal democracies included) having been born out of one form of 
political violence or another (revolution, civil war, terrorism), to argue that greed is an 
equal  or  even  a  considerable  motivator  for  such  violence  is  unsettling.  Such  an 
argument  implies,  by  extension,  that  greed  has  played  a  role  in  the  state-building 
process.  For  liberal  democratic  states,  this  poses  a  direct  challenge  to  the  moral 
justifications for liberal democratic governance.82 
Unfortunately,  the  dominance  of  the  grievance-based  framework  within  the 
political violence field combined with its efforts to distinguish and distance political 
violence form other forms of violence has meant that the field has, by and large, come 
to view non-political violence through a 'greed' framework. 'Grievance' versus 'greed' 
has become an additional means through which political violence seeks to separate and 
distinguish itself from 'ordinary' or 'non-political' violence more broadly. The imposition 
of a greed framework reinforces the political/non-political violence binary and has had 
the (perhaps unintentional) effect of stripping legitimate political motivation, meaning 
and significance from non-political  violence, gang violence included. Although there 
have been some who have worked in the space between (or above the divide), collective 
violence scholars for example,83 this gulf works to subtly discourage many more from 
79 Derived from Carl Schmitt’s conception of politics as abstract and impersonal. (Carl Schmitt, 
The Concept of the Political, trans. George Scwab (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1976).)
80 Kalyvas, “The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’,” 475.
81 A fascinating perspective on the post-war disciplinisation of international relations in the United 
States is: Stanley Hoffman, “An American Social Science: International Relations,”  Daedalus  
106, no 3 (1977): 41-60. 
82 Derek  Heater,  Citizenship:  The  Civic  Ideal  in  World  History,  Politics  and  Education,  3ed  
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). 
83 For  example:  Charles  Tilly,  The  Politics  of  Collective  Violence  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University  Press,  2003);  Jeffrey  Murer,  “Understanding  Collective  Violence:  The 
Communicative and Performative Qualities of Violence in Acts of Belonging,” in International  
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considering gang violence (or political violence from the perspective of gang studies 
scholars) as an area of concern. The persistence of this gulf serves to subtly reinforce 
the perception that even if criminology, sociology, psychology84 and anthropology have 
important  contributions  to  make  in  both  fields  there  is  little  political  science  and 
international  relations  can  offer  the  study  of  gang  violence.85 If  unchallenged,  this 
misperception will only serve to ensure that the threat gang violence in Chicago poses to 
American political values and civil order will continue to be ignored. 
Returning to the relationship between the terrorism and political violence field(s) 
and government  policy  making,  it  is  important  to  clarify  here  that  the  fundamental 
disagreement between critical terrorism scholars and those whom they label 'orthodox' 
is not over whether such relationships exist. Both agree that they do. The difference of 
opinion lies is in over whether these relationships have a positive or negative impact on 
the  field  as  a  whole.  Orthodox/traditionalist  terrorism studies  scholars  have  argued 
prescriptive  policy-oriented  scholarship  represents  one  of  the  most  valuable 
contributions the field makes to broader society: what is the purpose of understanding 
such violence if the objective is not to ultimately reduce or eliminate suffering? 86 
Critical  terrorism studies scholars  take issue with  these relationships  for  two 
differing reasons. Some argue that while strong relationships with the sources of official 
power are  not  inherently problematic  and should be encouraged to a  certain extent, 
orthodox terrorism studies has been too one-sided in its approach, communicating and 
connecting with governments without building similarly robust lines of communication 
with non-state actors engaged in political violence or other affected sections of society.87 
Others  take  the  position  that  maintenance  of  close  relationships  with  government 
officials,  the  military  and  policy  makers  (particularly  advisory  and  funding 
relationships) jeopardises  the  independence,  neutrality  and integrity  of  the  scholarly 
community (something those scholars labelled 'orthodox' contest).88 
Criminal Law and Criminology,  ed. Ilias Bantekas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014), 285-315.
84 The psychology of terrorism has been an area of particular growth, stand-out works including: 
John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 2ed (London: Routledge, 2014); Martha Crenshaw, 
“The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century,” Political Psychology 21, no 2 
(2000): 405-420; Ariel Merari,  Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide  
Terrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Andrew Silke, ed,  The Psychology of  
Counter-terrorism (London: Routledge, 2011). 
85 Stathis N Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro and Tarek Masoud, “Introduction: Integrating the Study of Order, 
Conflict and Violence,” in Order, Conflict, and Violence, eds. Stathis N Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro and 
Tarek Masoud (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1-3.
86 John Horgan and Michael Boyle, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies  
on Terrorism 1, no 1 (2008): 53-55, 59-60; Leonard Weinberg and William Eubank , “Problems 
with the Critical Studies Approach to  the Study of Terrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 1, 
no 2 (2008): 188, 191-194.
87 Jereon  Gunning,  “Babies  and  Bathwaters:  Reflecting  on  the  Pitfalls  of  Critical  Terrorism 
Studies,” European Political Science 6, no 3 (2007): 239-240; Jackson, “Knowledge, Power and 
Politics in the Study of Political Terrorism,” 78. 
88 Anthony Burke, “The End of Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 1, no 1 (2008): 
37; Horgan and Boyle, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” 59; Gunning, “Babies and 
Bathwaters,” 240-241;  Jackson,  “Knowledge,  Power  and  Politics  in  the  Study  of  Political 
Terrorism,” 81.
P Stones and Provos N Ives-Allison 29
Without  becoming  embroiled  in  a  debate  over  the  merits  and  limits  of  the 
orthodox  terrorism studies  approach  (or  whether  a  true  'orthodox'  terrorism studies 
exists), when one considers that some key scholars in the field have played important 
governmental advisory roles, it is unsurprising that there exists a synchronicity between 
key  academic  and  'official'  conceptualisations  of  political  violence.89 Whether  it  is 
scholars  who  have  shaped  governmental  definitions  or  governmental  definitions 
influencing  scholars  is  less  important  here  than  the  outcome  of  this  overlap  – 
reinforcement of existing boundaries and limits that perpetually leave gang violence 
beyond the realm of 'political violence'.90 In practice, this has meant that the role of 
centuries of American political decision making (as expressed through public policy) in 
generating  the  urban  conditions  under  which  street  gang  violence  has  thrived  and 
become embedded  within  Chicago's  urban  landscape  has  been  ignored  by scholars, 
policy  makers  and  government  officials  alike.  Yet,  this  has  not  meant  that  federal 
politicians  and government  officials  have  never  spoken  out  about  gang  violence  in 
Chicago.  Recently,  both  President  Barack  Obama  and  First  Lady  Michelle  Obama 
responded  publicly  to  the  January  2013  gang-related  bystander  shooting  death  of 
majorette and honours student Hadiya Pendleton.  The 15 year-old was killed only a 
week after performing in Obama's second inauguration ceremony and with her death 
taking  place  approximately  a  mile  from the  Obama's  Hyde  Park  home,  an  official 
response was implicitly demanded, if not by the public than the media. During 2013 
First  Lady  Michelle  Obama  also  reached out  to  staff  and students  of  Harper  High 
School in nearby Englewood who had seen 27 current/recent students shot and eight 
killed  as  a  result  of  gang/gun  violence  within  a  single  13  month period.91 Yet,  the 
opportunity to use these high-profile incidents to launch gang violence in Chicago onto 
the  federal  agenda  was  lost,  President  Obama  instead  using  Pendleton's  death 
specifically as an opportunity to fan the flames of the ongoing American gun control 
debate.92 With  only two years  left  in  Obama's  second term,  there is  little  hope that 
Chicago's  first  president  will  use the  opportunity of  his  remaining time in office to 
politicise the city's endemic gang violence and mobilise the resources needed to bring 
lasting relief to his South Side neighbours. Still little hope remains an infinitely better 
prospect than none at all.
There  is  also  hope  for  change  in  the  academic  sphere.  Just  because  the 
political/non-political  violence binary appears to have become part of the woodwork 
does not mean that it must remain so. It can and must be challenged. The first step is to 
begin to see and understand both gang and paramilitary violence as violence first and 
foremost. In  order  to  find  new  ways  of  connecting  existing  knowledge  with  new 
89 Jackson, “ Knowledge, Power and Politics in the Study of Political Terrorism,” 71.
90 Gunning, “Babies and Bathwaters,” 236-237.
91 The school was also the subject of a two-part  special episode of  The American Life  entitled 
“Harper  High  School”.  (Ira  Glass,  “487:  Harper  High  School  Part  1,”  This  American  Life, 
podcast  audio,  15  February  2013,  <  http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-
archives/episode/487/harper-high-school-part-one>;  Ira  Glass,  “488:  Harper  High School  Part 
2,” This American Life, podcast audio, 22 February 2013, < http://www.thisamericanlife.org/
radio-archives/episode/488/harper-high-school-part-two>.)
92 Andrew  V  Papachristos,  Christopher  Wilderman  and  Elizabeth  Roberto,  “Tragic,  but  not 
Random:  The Social  Contagion  of  Non-fatal  Gunshot  Injuries,”  Social  Science  & Medicine 
(2014), DOI: < http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.01.056>.
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avenues  for  the  exploration  of  political  and  gang  violence,  it  is  necessary  for  this 
research to operate between the micro and the macro levels.93 An important part of this 
work  involves  pushing  against  boundaries  and  binaries,  particularly  that  of 
political/non-political violence which imposes artificial limitations on existing research.
As the meeting between Jonathan Powell94 and Birmingham’s infamous Burgers 
and  Johnsons95 depicted  in  Penny  Woolcock’s  recent  documentary  One  Mile  Away 
(2013) illustrates,  the  experience  of  attempting  to  find  a  political  solution  to 
paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland has much to offer gang violence reduction 
efforts. Yet without official support, even the incredible personal risks taken by gang 
leaders to forge peace, such as those taken on by influentials within the Burgers and 
Johnsons,  are  unlikely  to  be  lasting.  The  question  thus  becomes:  how  has  our 
understanding of violence more generally, and gang violence in particular been limited 
by the conceptual barriers between political violence and non-political violence? With 
political  violence  and gang studies  scholars  seeing the  subjects  of  their  research  as 
different beasts entirely, one important missing discussion has been the way in which 
the  words  'terrorist'  and  'gangster'  have  both  become,  in  many  instances,  mere 
pejoratives  within  public  discourse  conveying  little  useful  information  as  actor 
'categories'. 
Somewhat ironically, 'gangster' is frequently used as a pejorative term within the 
terrorism studies literature. 'Gangster' has even been used pejoratively by individuals 
engaged in political violence, who might rightly be classified as 'terrorists' themselves. 
For example, with a great deal of self-realisation, a Provisional IRA 'volunteer'96 may 
come to accept that being referred to as a 'terrorist' is a statement of fact, yet to even 
dare  compare  volunteers  with  'gangsters'  remains  a  great  insult.97 Thus,  the  type  of 
93 An examination of the relationship between individual decision making and communal violence, 
particularly in terms of political  self-sacrifice, can be found in Karin Fierke’s  Political Self-
sacrifice:  Agency,  Body  and  Emotion  in  International  Relations (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
94 Chief negotiator on behalf of the British government during the talks leading up to the  Good 
Friday Agreement. 
95 More formally, the Burger Bar Boys and Johnson Crew.
96 The term by which Provisional IRA members refer to themselves and each other, derived from 
the tradition of people's volunteer militias that developed in the period preceding World War I.  
(Charles Townshend, Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion (Toronto: Penguin, 2006), kindle loc 799-
1392.)
97 Something reflected in the approach taken by Patrick Magee, the Provisional IRA volunteer  
responsible for the 1984 Brighton bombing targeting the annual conference of the Conservative  
Party, in his truly impressive Gangsters or Guerillas? where he argues: “After a wide reading of 
this type of fiction for a doctoral thesis, the composite Irish republican to materialise was of a 
Mother Ireland-fixated psycho-killer aka a Provo Godfather, readily discernible with recourse to 
an identikit indebted to Tennial's 'Irish Frankenstein' and other images from Punch redolent of 
Victorian  racism.”  (Patrick  Magee,  Gangsters  or  Guerillas?:  Representations  of  Irish  
Republicans in 'Troubles Fiction' (Belfast: Beyond the Pale, 2001), 2.) Magee does not shy away 
from expressing his disdain for these kinds of representations, never seriously considering that 
the popular representations of gangster upon which he bases his charged opinions are as fictive 
as those of Irish republicans. Though this should not detract from the strength of this particular  
work,  there  is  also  a  lack  of  recognition  on Magee's  part  that  his  expression of  republican  
superiority to common gangsterism contributes  to a  dehumanisation of gangsters akin to the 
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comparative  work  in  which  this  thesis  engages  will  likely  draw  the  ire  of  some 
republicans  and  Northern  Irish  studies  scholars  unable  to  accept  that  an  increased 
political  consideration  of  gang  violence  does  nothing  to  diminish  the  political 
significance of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Yet, to sacrifice comparison for the sake 
of palatability to any group is to continue with the perpetuation of the artificial binary 
that has greatly hindered the response to gang violence, something which is a far less 
favourable option than unpalatability. 
Although  the  focus  thus  far  has  been  on  opening  up  the  study  of  political 
violence  to  an  exploration  of  the  possibilities  of  including  gang  violence  within  a 
broadened definitional space, there are aspects of the political violence studies approach 
that  could  strengthen gang studies as currently carried out.  Most  significantly,  gang 
studies could adopt a greater willingness to consider the self-perceptions of those who 
engage  in  community-level  street  gang  violence.  Indeed,  this  recognition  of  self-
perception has  been one of  the  most  resounding strengths of contemporary political 
violence scholarship.  Even with the rapid growth in  terrorism and political  violence 
research following 9/11, the necessity of considering (but  not necessarily accepting) 
how agents of violence understand themselves and the purpose of their actions has been 
a  rare area of some agreement between the orthodox and critical  studies schools of 
thought. The former incorporates self-perception as part of its pursuit of objectivity at a 
time  when  public  (and  scholarly)  discussion  has  become  increasingly  moralised.98 
Critical studies, while simultaneously striving for and rejecting the possibility of a 'pure' 
objectivity,  recognises the capacity of self-perception to counter the pro-state bias it 
argues has plagued much research in the field.99 
However  in  defining  ‘terrorists’,  ‘guerrillas’,  ‘rebels’,  ‘insurgents’,  ‘freedom 
fighters’ and ‘volunteers’ in contrast to ‘criminals’, ‘gangsters’ and ‘hoods’, the same 
consideration  of  self-perception  has  not  been  extended  to  those  engaged  in  'non-
political'  violence.  A great  deal of research has largely accepted that perpetrators of 
political violence see themselves not as criminals in the traditional sense, but as akin to 
soldiers. Violence, according to common self-perception, is a necessary evil required for 
the protection and defence of kin and community and the best (if not the only) means of 
overhauling a broken and corrupt political system.100 In other words, agents of political 
violence see themselves as the products of their bleak environment whose actions are 
justifiable given the injustice they face.
dehumanisation of Irish republicans/Catholics he claims the British government is engaged in.
98 Andrew Silke, “Courage in Dark Places: Reflections on Terrorist Psychology,” Social Research 
71, no 1 (2004): 177-180. 
99 Richard Jackson, “The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies,”  European Political 
Science 6, no 3 (2007): 244-251; Jeffrey A Sluka, “The Contribution of Anthropology to Critical 
Terrorism  Studies,”  in  Critical  Terrorism  Studies:  A  New  Research  Agenda,  eds.  Richard 
Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning (New York: Routledge, 2009), 143.
100 Antonio Cassese, Violence and Law in the Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity press, 1988), 74-75; 
Elizabeth Chadwick,  Self-Determination, and The International Humanitarian Law of Armed  
Conflict (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), 133; Richard English, “The Interplay 
of Non-violent and Violent Action in Northern Ireland, 1967-72,” in Civil Resistance & Power  
Politics: The Experience of Non-violent  and Violent Action from  Gandhi to the  Present,  eds. 
Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (Oxford:  Oxford University Press,  2009),  82; Silke, 
“Courage in Dark Places,” 188-189.
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Although the gang studies  field as  a whole may not  take self-perceptions as 
seriously as they could or should, among those who do (a small but not insignificant 
body of literature),101 what emerges is that many of these explanations for the use of 
violence  mirror  those  offered  by  agents  of  political  violence.  In  The  Culture  and 
Politics of Contemporary Street Gang Memoirs, Josephine Metcalf insightfully argues:
The main narrative action of these contemporary gang memoirs revolves 
around  tales  of  violence:  that  of  the  narrators  toward  other  gang 
members, and that committed against them by the state. Descriptions of 
state violence are included to rationalize and explain the behaviour of the 
narrators.  Violence is  viewed through the lens of  a  war  in which the 
system is the enemy, and as warranted because the rules of war make 
combat temporarily acceptable.102
The memoirs of gang life Metcalf uses in here study remain some of the most insightful 
pictures of gang life publicly available today. In Blue Rage, Black Redemption, Stanley 
‘Tookie’ Williams, co-founder and ex-leader of the Crips (one of the largest and most 
pervasive networks of loosely affiliated North American street gangs) argues:
Though I  cannot condone it,  much of  the violence I inflicted on my 
gang  rivals  and  other  blacks  was  an  unconscious  display  of  my 
frustration with poverty,  racism, police brutality and other systematic 
injustices routinely visited upon residents of urban black colonies such 
as South Central Los Angeles.103
“I was frustrated because I felt trapped,”104 writes Williams further on, acknowledging 
the  constraints  imposed  by  an  unjust  political  system and  the  economic  and  racial 
hierarchies  instrumental  in  upholding it.  The  sense  of  entrapment  is  one  shared  by 
Chicago’s Black Soldier,  a gang-affiliated rapper  interviewed by Geoff Harkness for 
“Gangs and Gangsta Rap in Chicago”:
If  seven  out  of  ten  rappers  are  motherfucking  gang  niggas,  that’s 
gonna come out  in the music.  Gang niggas are angry.  Most  of  the 
time, motherfuckers feel like there’s no way out. So you’re gonna get 
gangsta music from a bunch of angry gangstas: young niggas that ain’t 
got shit…105
In addition to the conflict & combat rhetoric ('soldiers' or in a 'war'), what emerges quite 
clearly is a sense of interlinked political and economic injustice.
101 Lorine  A Hughes  and  James  F  Short  Jr,  “Youth  Gangs,”  in  21st Century  Criminology:  A  
Reference Handbook, Vol 1, ed. J Mitchell Miller (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009), 65; Karen A Joe 
and Meda Chesney-Lind, “ ‘Just Every Mother’s Angel’: An Analysis of Gender and Ethnic  
Variations in Youth Gang Membership,” in  Gender and Society 9, no 4 (1995): 419, 427-428; 
Timothy  Laugher,  Real  Gangsters:  Legitimacy,  Reputation,  and  Violence  in  the  Intergang  
Environment (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2012), 3.
102 Josephine Metcalf,  The Culture and Politics of Contemporary Street Gang Memoirs (Jackson: 
University of Mississippi Press, 2012), 68.
103 Stanley Tookie Williams,  Blue Rage,  Black Redemption: A Memoir (New York: Touchstone, 
2007), 217-218.
104 Ibid, 218.
105 Geoff Harkness, “Gangs and Gangsta Rap in Chicago: A Microscenes Perspective,” Poetics 41 
(2013): 153.
P Stones and Provos N Ives-Allison 33
Although  those  engaged  in  political  violence  share  a  sense  of  injustice  and 
frustration with gang members, there remains a crucial difference. Those engaged in 
political violence (including Provisional IRA volunteers) hold firm to the belief that, no 
matter  how  difficult,  radical  change  remains  possible  and  direct  their  violence 
externally, targeting the political system with which they take issue. In contrast, agents 
of  street gang violence  can be seen as  pessimists.  They have  long given up on the 
possibility of the type of penetrating social and structural change needed to eradicate 
poverty,  racism, and other forms of social  injustice (including education inequality). 
They perceive the barriers as insurmountable and resistance as futile. Violence is thus 
inwardly directed, carried out primarily towards those who are images of themselves 
(rivals from the same or similar neighbourhoods, class stratum & racial backgrounds) as 
opposed to those with socio-political  'power'.106 With little  else to convey status and 
belonging (or even basic human dignity), affronts to hard-won respect are met with rage 
and violence becomes normalised as a response.107 In sum, where the political violence 
committed by groups such as the Provisional IRA has often been presented as an act of 
'last resort' – the desperate actions of individuals with nothing left to lose,108 this not 
only  glosses  over  the  violence  inflicted  upon  constituent  communities,109 but  also 
highlights  the  extent  of  its  own  hypocrisy.  Provisional  IRA volunteers  and  others 
engaged in  political  violence  have  something  invaluable  left  to  lose  –  hope.  Those 
involved in political violence share a hope in the possibility of a brighter future that 
gang members have lost in all but the crudest sense (success is staying alive). It is this 
hope which may just be the most important thing of all.
 
A Brief Cartography of Gang Studies
Frederic  M  Thrasher’s  The  Gang:  A  Study  of  1,  313  Gangs  in  Chicago, 
published in 1927, is widely considered to be the foundational text of the gang studies 
field.110 However, as Scott H Decker and Barrick Van Winkle point out in their carefully 
considered  historiography  of  gang  research,111 the  first  academic  work dealing  with 
106 Williams, Blue Rage, Black Redemption, 218.
107 Rob White,  Youth Gangs,Violence and Social Respect: Exploiting the Nature of Provocations  
and Punch-ups (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 8.
108 Timothy Shanahan,  The Provisional IRA and the Morality of Terrorism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1976), 105.
109 English,  Armed Struggle, 274-275; Martin McGartland, Fifty Dead Men Walking: The Heroic  
True Story of a British Secret Agent Inside the IRA (London: John Blake, 2009), 48-52.
110 Barrios, “The Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation and the Spirituality of Resistance,” 121; 
James A Desley, How Gangs Work: An Ethnography of Youth Violence: An Ethnography of Youth  
Violence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,  2013),  44;  Barry Goldson, “Youth in Crisis?,”in 
Youth in Crisis? ‘Gangs’, Territoriality and Violence, ed. Barry Goldson (London: Routledge, 
2011), 5; Daniel J Monti, “Origins and Problems of Gang Research in the United States,” in 
Gangs: The Origin and Impact of Contemporary Youth Gangs in the United States , eds. Scott 
Cummings  and  Daniel  J  Monti  (Albany:  States  University  of  New York  Press,  1993),  4-7; 
Andrew V Papachristos and David S Kirk, “Neighbourhood Effects on Street Gang Behaviour,” 
in Studying Youth Gangs, eds. James F Short and Lorine A Hughes (Lanham: AltaMira, 2006), 
63;  Martín  Sánchez-Jankowski,  Islands  in  the  Street:  Gangs  and  Urban  American  Society  
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 3; Donald J Shoemaker, Juvenile Delinquency,  
2ed (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 205.
111 Though it should be noted that the literature on Latino gangs is arguably overrepresented (with 
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youth/street gangs was in fact published almost thirty years prior.112 In “The Institutional 
Activities of American Children” published in 1898, Henry D Sheldon explores how 
young people, without adult influence or assistance develop ‘spontaneous organisations’ 
which assist in the coordination of their social lives.113 Reflecting the terminology used 
by his young research subjects, Sheldon acknowledges that 'gang' is another word for 
the type of informal predatory114 organisations that develop among young boys over the 
age of 10 (and usually under the age of 14). Though much group activity remained both 
legal and typical for boys of this age, these nascent gangs often also took part in what 
amounted to small scale robbery, vandalism and violence (brawling). Like later gangs, a 
central  function  of  these  groups  was  to  promote  camaraderie,  instilling  a  sense  of 
belonging  among  the  boys  and  helping  one  and  each  develop  a  network  of  social 
support.115 While  Sheldon's  work has  largely been forgotten,  “What  we know about 
contemporary gangs and the best ways to respond to them still is influenced by the work 
of Frederic M Thrasher.”116 As part of the Chicago School,117 Thrasher’s work invoked 
the  urban ecology theory introduced by colleagues  Robert  Ezra Park and Ernest  W 
Burgess in their  Introduction to the Science of Sociology (1921) and  The City (with 
Roderick D McKenzie,  1925).118 The Gang posits  that gangs in  the city of Chicago 
tended  to  emerge  from  environments  of  social  disorganisation  as  a  result  of,  “the 
spontaneous effort of boys to create a society for themselves where none adequate to 
their needs exits.”119 
While  Thrasher  was  the  first  to  establish  a  link  between  gangs  and 
neighbourhood  deprivation,  the  persistence  of  African  American  gangs  in  spite  of 
relative community stability120 challenge his argument that gangs were a direct product 
literature  on  African  American  gangs,  conversely,  underrepresented),  in  Decker  and  Van 
Winkle’s overview. (Scott H Decker and Barrick Van Winkle, Life in the Gang: Family, Friends,  
and Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1-20).
112 Decker and Van Winkle, Life in the Gang, 3.
113 Henry D Sheldon, “The Institutional Activities of American Children,” The American Journal of  
Psychology 9, no 4 (1898): 425-448.
114 Where 'predatory' here might be more readily understood as mischievous.
115 Ibid, 438-439.
116 Daniel J Monti, “Origins and Problems of Gang Research in the United States,” in Gangs: The 
Origins and Impact of Contemporary Youth Gangs in the United States, eds. Scott Cummings 
and Daniel J. Monti  (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1993), 4.
117 The term 'Chicago School' is used to refer to the group of scholars working within the University 
of Chicago’s Sociology Department who sought to combine theory with ethnographic fieldwork 
in the study of urban environments, specifically in their ‘home base’ of Chicago. More rarely 
known as  the  Ecological  School,  this  group  of  scholars  developed  and  advanced  an  ‘urban 
ecology’ approach  to  understanding  human  behaviour,  arguing  that  individual  behaviour  is 
profoundly shaped by both the physical environment and the social structures which inhabit it. 
(Martin Blumer,  The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and the Rise  
of Sociological Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.)
118 Robert  E  Park  and  Ernest  W Burgess,  Introduction  to  the  Science  of  Sociology  (Chicago: 
University  of  Chicago  Press,  1921);  Robert  E  Park,  Ernest  W  Burgess  and  Roderick  D 
McKenzie, The City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).
119 Thrasher, The Gang, 37. 
120 Individuals who move into the neighbourhood tend to stay in the neighbourhood for a significant 
period of time as opposed to treating residency as a stop-gap on the way to somewhere else (ex. 
the suburbs as opposed to student housing).
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of ‘transitional’ neighbourhoods in a state of deterioration with ethnic and racial groups 
replacing  and  displacing  one  another.  Though  much  gang  activity  remained  non-
delinquent and varied little from the recreational pastimes of those not involved in such 
groups,  when  gang  violence  (generally  inter-gang  fighting)  did  occur  it  generally 
developed  out  of  a  desire  to  defend  one’s  territory  against  the  threat  posed  by 
outsiders.121 However, as the gang studies field expanded, the benign nature of much 
gang activity came to be ignored as scholars increasingly focused their gaze specifically 
on  ‘delinquent’  or  ‘deviant’  activity.122 Today,  there  exists  a  greater  diversity  of 
positioning. Many continue to speak of gang activity primarily in terms of deviance, 
delinquency and crime.123 Others, critical of this approach have returned to a broader 
and more organic understanding of gangs that recognises the range and diversity of 
group behaviour.124
Although criminology retains a special place within the gangs studies field, the 
field  still  maintains  a  high  degree  of  interdisciplinarity. Anthropological  and 
sociological  field  ethnographies  comprise  one  of  the  most  established  bodies  of 
literature  within  the  field.  Martín  Sánchez-Jankowski’s  1991  Islands  in  the  Street:  
Gangs and American Urban Society remains quite probably the most ambitious of these 
projects  to  date.  Islands  in  the  Street  studies  37  gangs  of  varying sizes  and ethnic 
compositions across three cities (New York, Los Angeles and Boston) over the course of 
ten and a half years (1978-1989).125 The result is a rich text painting a valuable portrait 
of gang life across America despite,  quite understandably, sacrificing some depth of 
analysis.  Though  violence  and  other  acts  of  ‘delinquency’ are  discussed,  Sanchéz-
Jankowski takes after Thrasher in his early description of Chicago’s gangs by making it 
clear  that  when  the  lives  of  gang  members  are  considered  in  full,  participation  in 
delinquency (especially violence) occupies a small minority of most members’ time. 
John Hagedorn’s  People and Folks: Gangs, Crime and the Underclass in a Rustbelt  
City offers a compelling examination of gangs in Milwaukee following a period of rapid 
industrial decline. Quite interestingly, these gangs have often appropriated the symbols, 
121 Decker and Van Winkle, Life in the Gang, 5; Monti, “Origins and Problems of Gang Research in 
the United States,” 8-9.
122 Simon Hallsworth and Tara Young, “Working with Gangs and Other Delinquent Groups,” in 
Practical Interventions for Young People at Risk, ed. Kathryn Geldard (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 
2009),  82;  Felix M Padilla,  The Gang as an American Enterprise (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1992), 4; Andrew V Papachristos and David S Kirk, “Neighborhood Effects on 
Street  Gang Behavior,”  in  Studying Youth Gangs,  eds.  James F Short  and Lorine A Hughes 
(Oxford: AltaMira, 2006), 63-66.
123 Some of the most blatant  examples of  this approach include: G David Curry,  “Self-reported 
Gang Involvement and Officially Recorded Delinquency,” Criminology 38, no 4 (2000): 1253-
1274; Rachel A Gordon et al, “Antisocial Behavior and Youth Gang Membership: Selection and 
Socialization,”  Criminology 42, no 1 (2004): 55-88; Terence P Thornberry, Marvin D Krohn, 
Alan  J  Lizotte  and Deborah Chard-Wierschem, “The Role  of  Juvenile  Gangs in  Facilitating 
Delinquent Behavior,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 30, no 1 (1993): 55-87.
124 Padilla, The Gang as an American Enterprise, 4; Sánchez-Jankowski, Islands in the Street, 5, 21-
23; Sudhir Venkatesh, “A Note on Social Theory and the American Street Gang,” in Gangs and 
Society: Alternative Perspectives, eds. Louis Kontos, David Brotherton and Luis Barrios (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 1-11.
125 Irish American, African American,  Puerto Rican, Chicano, Dominican,  Jamaican and Central 
American. (Sánchez-Jankowski, Islands in the Street, 7, 11.)
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emblems and even names of Chicago's supergangs, though they not connected to the 
Chicago  groups  in  any meaningful  way.126 Another  key  work  in  this  vein  is  Elijah 
Anderson’s highly controversial Code of the Street, which brings the ethnographic study 
of  gangs  to  the  comparatively  (and  peculiarly)  under-researched  streets  of 
Philadelphia.127
Given  that  the  field  of  gang  studies  was  essentially  born  in  Chicago,  it  is 
surprising that there has been relatively scant ethnographic attention paid to the city’s 
gangland. The most notable studies include those by Ruth Horowitz (1983) and Felix M 
Padilla (1992) which focus on the city's Latino/Hispanic gangs.128 Over the last decade 
sociologist  Sudhir Venkatesh has built a considerable profile and sizeable readership 
with the release of ethnographic-style works built upon fieldwork originally carried out 
during the 1980s and 1990s with a 'Black Kings' set129 based in one of the Robert Taylor 
Homes  project's  high-rise  apartment  buildings. The most  significant  of  these  works 
include the books American Project (2000), Off the Books (2006) and Gang Leader for  
a Day (2008) as well as the article “An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang’s 
Finances” written with Steven D Levitt.130 As his remains the only substantial academic 
work delivering an intimate  longitudinal  picture  of  gang activity  on the South Side 
(where the P Stones are based), it would seem obvious that his purportedly landmark 
findings would feature prominently in this work. However, there are serious concerns 
around inconsistencies within his body of work131 and whether his research embodies 
126 John M Hagedorn,  People  and Folks:  Gangs,  Crime and the  Underclass  in  a Rustbelt  City 
(Chicago: Lakeview Press, 1988), 12.
127 The only other major works focusing on Philadelphia gangs remain Waln K Brown’s pioneering 
research on female gang members,  “Black Female Gangs in Philadelphia”.  (Waln K Brown, 
“Black  Female  Gangs  in  Philadelphia,”  International  Journal  of  Offender  Therapy  and  
Comparative Criminology  21, no 3 (1977): 221-228; Adrien K Wing and Christine A Willis, 
“From Theory to Praxis: Black Women, Gangs, and Critical Race Feminism,” Berkeley Journal  
of African-American Law & Policy 4, no 1 (2013): 1-15.)
128 Ruth Horowitz,  Honor and the American Dream (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1983); Padilla, The Gang as an American Enterprise.
129 The lowest and most localised component group of a street gang.
130 Sudhir  Venkatesh  and  Steven  D  Levitt,  “An  Economic  Analysis  of  a  Drug-selling  Gang’s 
Finances,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, no 3 (2000): 755-789.
131 A set of gang ledgers belonging to the 'Black Kings', the group in which Venkatesh embedded 
himself, sit at the heart of his landmark discoveries in the field of gang economics. However,  
there are some discrepancies in the story of how he came into possession of the ledgers that cast  
some doubt over the veracity of this data. While it is understandable that Venkatesh would be 
reluctant to release his source into the public domain, that there is no scanned images or itemised 
table makes it difficult to move past the surrounding inconsistencies and accept the veracity of 
the data. Thus, neither this data nor the works which rely upon it are used in this thesis despite 
their obvious relevance. In order to further clarify and justify this decision, key inconsistencies 
will be highlighted as follows. Firstly, in  Gang Leader for a Day  (Toronto: Penguin, 2008) - 
Venkatesh's memoirs of his field work in the Robert Taylor Homes - he argues that 'T-Bone', the 
Black Kings' bookkeeper gave him the ledgers. Though T-Bone doesn't reveal why he ultimately 
gave over the books, Venkatesh speculates this was an altruistic decision and that he wanted to 
increase the public's understanding of gangland. At the time of the transfer, T-Bone was under 
considerable stress from a combination of police pressure and the plan to dismantle the Robert 
Taylor  Homes.  (254-256)  Ultimately,  T-Bone would  go  on  to  die  in  prison  but  was  fondly 
remembered for his unwillingness to co-operate with the police even if doing so may have saved 
his life. (277) The data from the ledgers was used by Venkatesh in “An Economic Analysis of a  
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the type of ‘ethical scholarship’ that must be at the heart of modern social scientific 
research.132 As  a  result,  a  conscious  decision  has  been  made  not  to  engage  with 
Venkatesh’s  ethnographic  work,  though  his  cartography  of  gang  studies  theory  is 
referenced as it represents a reasonable critique of the delinquency/deviance paradigm 
not reliant upon his own fieldwork.133 
This  thesis  also  draws quite  heavily  from the  evaluative  studies  of  past  and 
present gang violence reduction efforts in Chicago. Irving A Spergel, over the course of 
a career spanning more than four decades, has been the most prolific researcher in this 
area. Seeing himself as part of the community action research tradition, Spergel’s work 
argues  for  a  bidirectional  relationship  between  theory  and  practice.  Grassroots 
interventions should be theoretically grounded, but lessons learned on the streets should 
also be used to  evaluate  theory.134 Spergel’s  earliest  work in  this  style,  Street  Gang 
Work: Theory and Practice, published in 1966 examined the Chicago Area Project's 
efficacy during the 1960s, thirty years after it was first established by Clifford Shaw of 
Drug-selling Gang's Finances”, where its origins were less fully discussed, but this article and 
the ledgers more broadly also form the basis of “Why Do Drug Dealers Still Live With their  
Moms?”, the third chapter of Steven D Levitt and Stephen J Dubner's  Freakonomics (Toronto: 
Penguin,  2006)  on  which  Venkatesh  collaborated  but  remains  uncredited.  However  in  this 
version of events the ledgers come from 'Booty' (clearly T-Bone in the later work), who turned 
the ledgers over  to Venkatesh because he feared for his life after sparking a federal indictment. 
In  stark  contrast  to  T-Bone's  fate  however,  Booty  was killed  by the  gang  for  his  suspected 
treachery. (88) While not directly related to this data, there is another important inconsistency in 
Venkatesh's work worth mentioning here, pertaining to the mother-son relationship between the 
leader of the Black Kings and his mother as presented in  Off the Books  (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2006) and Gang Leader for a Day. In Off the Books, the gang leader 'Big Cat' 
has a tumultuous relationship with the adults in his life, including his mother who was ultimately 
unable to care for him. Thus he was left with no 'real' family from an early age. (279) This is a  
far cry from the mother-son relationship experienced by the gang leader, rechristened 'JT' two 
years later in  Gang Leader for a Day. In this work, not only does JT continue to live with his 
Mother 'Ms Mae', but treats her with a great deal of respect and deference. (40, 104) In this latter  
work Venkatesh himself has a close positive relationship with Ms Mae, using her apartment to 
write up his notes and frequently indulging in her home cooking. That these works represent a 
mixture of popular non-fiction and scholarly work should be taken into consideration, but given 
the  importance  of  ethnographers'  believability  and  credibility,  these  inconsistencies  are 
particularly worrisome.
132 Gang Leader for a Day details a number of instances where ethical good practice was openly 
flouted in the gathering of research, another cause for concern. It is entirely possible, as is the 
case with much memoir, that some of the details of the data collection process were embellished 
to ensure that Gang Leader for a Day made compelling reading and that his research gathering 
was not as ‘exciting’ or murky as it is presented as being, but this would still call into question  
the reliability of Venkatesh as a scholarly ethnographer. As it is his experience as an academic 
researcher that is the subject of Gang Leader for a Day, even the argument that writing a memoir 
constitutes a personal rather than professional exercise and thus should be exempt from critical 
academic scrutiny does not hold much sway. Not directly pertinent to the material which would 
normally be under consideration for this project, his recent work on the underground economics 
of  New York City has  also come under  intense fire  from the New York chapter  of  the Sex 
Workers Outreach Project on ethical grounds. (Sex Workers Outreach Project New York City and 
Sex Workers Action New York to Joyce Plaza and Yinon Cohen, 15 October 2011, <http://swop-
nyc.org/wpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SWOP-October-15th-letter-on-venkatesh.pdf>).
133 Venkatesh, “A Note on Social Theory and the American Street Gang”.
134 Decker and Van Winkle, Life in the Gang, 9.
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the Chicago School.135 This would be followed in 1972 by his evaluation of the highly 
controversial  Youth  Manpower  Project  administered  by  the  Woodlawn  Organisation 
(TWO)  in  1968.136 In  the  1990s  and  2000s,  Spergel  would  shift  his  attention  to 
Chicago’s  Latino/Hispanic  gangs,  designing  and  evaluating  the  Little  Village  Gang 
Violence  Reduction  Project  and  basing  it  upon  his  nationally  implemented 
Comprehensive Gang Model (also known as the Spergel Model of Gang Intervention 
and Suppression).137 More recently, Wesley G Skogan, who originally made his name in 
the study of community-police relations in Chicago,138 was responsible for the National 
Institute  of  Justice-supported  independent  evaluation  of  the  CeaseFire  –  Chicago 
project.139 
'Gangsters', 'Gangstas' and Gangs: Core Debates in Gang Studies
In  spite  of  the  existence  of  a  wealth  of  research  into gang violence  and its 
reduction, “[t]here is little, if any, consensus as to what constitutes a gang and who is a 
gang member let alone what gangs do, either inside or outside the law.”140 This is a 
central problem as identified by numerous gang studies scholars and as such is worth 
addressing.141 Perhaps, part of the definitional problem within the field is related to the 
problem of  two distinct  images  of  the  gangster  evoking two different  time periods 
capturing  the  public  imagination  simultaneously,  complicating  the  perceived 
relationship between gangs and illegal activity. The first of these is the 'classic' gangster 
of yesteryear, an Al Capone or Arnold Rothstein. In the United States, the heyday of the 
classic gangster coincided with the prohibition era of the 1920s and 1930s. The ban on 
the production and sale of alcoholic drinks resulted in a flourishing black market that 
seemed to promise untold riches to all those who were willing to take on the risks of 
engaging  in  black  market  activity.142 Following  the  end  of  prohibition,  racketeering 
became the largest source of income for a number of the major organised crime groups, 
135 Steven Schlossman et al, Delinquency Prevention in South Chicago: A Fifty-Year Assessment of  
the Chicago Area Project  (Santa Monica:  RAND, 1984), 1-2;  Irving A Spergel,  Street Gang 
Work: Theory and Practice (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1966).
136 Irving  A  Spergel,  “Community  Action  Research  as  a  Political  Process,”  in  Community 
Organization: Studies in Constraint, ed. Irving A Spergel (London: Sage, 1972) 231-262.
137 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence; Irving A Spergel et al, Evaluation of the Gang Violence  
Reduction Project  in Little Village:  Final Report  Summary (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
School of Social Service Administration, 2003). 
138 Wesley G Skogan,  On the Beat: Police and Community Problem Solving  (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1999); Wesley G Skogan, Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities (New 
York:  Oxford  University  Press  USA,  2010);  Wesley  G  Skogan  and  Susan  M  Hartnett,  
Community Policing: Chicago Style (New York: Oxford University Press USA, 1999).
139 Skogan, Hartnett, Bump and Dubois, Evaluation of CeaseFire – Chicago.
140 Finn-Aage Esbensen, L Thomas Winfree Jr, Ni He and Terrance J Taylor, “Youth Gangs and 
Definitional Issues: When is a Gang a Gang and Why Does it Matter?,” Crime & Delinquency  
47, no 1 (2001): 106.
141 Barry Goldson, “Youth in Crisis?”, 8-9; Jane Wood and Emma Alleyne, “Street Gang Theory and  
Research: Where Are We Now and Where Do We Go From Here?”  Aggression and Violent  
Behavior 15, no 2 (2010): 101-102.
142 Marc Mappen, Prohibition Gangsters: The Rise and Fall of a Bad Generation (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 2013).
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including  the  infamous  Chicago  Outfit  led  by  Al  Capone.143 Illegal  gambling,144 
loansharking, robbery (of both the armed and unarmed varieties), narcotics and money 
laundering also proved lucrative, as they had in the years before prohibition. Past and 
present imaging of the classic gangster is defined by material excess. From the elaborate 
parties thrown by Jay Gatsby145 to the flash cars and tailored suits of Tony Camonte,146 
this high-stakes world appears to come with fantastic rewards. Yet, there remains an 
acute  awareness  on  the  part  of  the  classic  gangster  that  everything  is  temporary, 
including life.147
Popular  representations  of  the  classic  gangster,  especially  the ‘gangster film’ 
have developed and perpetuated the image of the gangster as an anti-hero.148 In these 
American  'classic  gangster'  films,  which  include  numerous  adaptations  of  F  Scott 
Fitzgerald’s  The  Great  Gatsby (Herbert  Brenon,  1926;  Elliot  Nugent,  1949;  Jack 
Clayton, 1974; Robert Markowitz, 2000; Baz Luhrmann, 2013), The Godfather (Francis 
Ford  Coppola,  1972),  both  versions  of  Scarface (Howard  Hughes,  1932;  Brian  de 
Palma, 1980) and Bugsy (Barry Levinson, 1991), the classic gangster is either ethnically 
or  geographically  marked  (non-Anglo-Saxon/from  the  rural  south).  These  classic 
gangsters, from poor southern, Italian, Jewish,149 Central/Eastern European or German 
families, overcome the class and racial barriers that stand before them to achieve their 
own  'American  Dream'  by  any  means  necessary.150 However  the  consequences  of 
operating outside of the law, and beyond the realm of what is considered ‘moral society’ 
ultimately creates, “an almost Shakespearian tragic figure, whose inevitable downfall 
143 Robert M Lombardo, Organized Crime in Chicago: Beyond the Mafia (Champaign: University 
of Illinois Press, 2013), 94.
144 Including  numerous  instances  of  ‘fixing’,  the  most  notable  being  the  1919  World  Series 
(baseball).  Infamous  New  York  gangster  Arnold  Rothstein  is  widely  believed  to  have 
orchestrated the fix which saw the relatively unproven Cincinnati Reds defeat the Chicago White 
Sox who had been the bookies'  strong favourites.  The incident  led to  permanent  bans for  a  
number  of  White  Sox stars  including  Shoeless  Joe  Jackson (whose  involvement  in  the  plot  
remains under dispute), Lefty Willians and Eddie Cicotte, (James Kirby, “The Year They Fixed 
the World Series,” ABA Journal 74, no 2 (1988): 65-69.)
145 F Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (Toronto: Penguin, 1950), 41-59.
146 Scarfare (Brian De Palma, 1983).
147 Ron Wilson, “The Left-Handed Form of Human Endeavour: Crime Films During the 1990s,” in 
Film Genre 2000: New Critical Essays, ed. Wheeler Winston Dixon (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2000), 152. 
148 Julia Hallam and Margaret Marshment, Realism and Popular Cinema (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2000), 88.
149 Though 'Jewish' is a religious identification as opposed to an ethnicity, it has nevertheless been 
treated as an ethnicity on screen. Jewish individuals, at least in cultural representations (and not  
dissimilar to the treatment of Muslims in popular culture today), have traditionally been denied 
the expression of a national identity or ethnicity. Thus, while many American Jews originated in  
Germany, Central & Eastern Europe and Russia, it remains impossible to specify where the roots 
of the majority of fictional Jews lay. (Jacob Neusner, “Immigration and Religion in America: The 
Experience  of  Judaism,”  in  Religion  and  Immigration:  Christian,  Jewish,  and  Muslim  
Experiences  in  the  United  States,  eds.  Yvonne  Yazbeck  Haddad,  Jane  I  Smith  and  John  L 
Esposito (Oxford: AltaMira,  2003), 106; Ross Perigoe and Mahmoud Eid,  Mission Invisible:  
Race,  Religion,  and  News  at  the  Dawn  of  the  9/11  Era  (Vancouver:  University  of  British 
Columbia Press, 2014), 62.)
150 Hallam and Marshment,  Realism and Popular Cinema, 88-89; James M O’Kane, The Crooked 
Ladder: Gangsters, Ethnicity, and the American Dream (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1992).
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was documented in near-Aristotelian terms.”151 
The classic  gangster both realises and challenges the meritocratic notion that 
anyone  can  make  it  in  America.  His  wealth  allows him to  obtain  the  symbols  and 
markers  of  status  (money,  cars,  expensive  clothing,  grandiose  accommodation).  Yet 
acceptance into the exclusive upper stratum of American society remains blocked, not 
necessarily because of the dubious morality of his lifestyle, but because, as was the case 
all  along,  his  lack  of  pedigree  and  ethnic  impurity  do  not  allow him  to  meet  the 
conditions for belonging imposed by the old-moneyed White Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
(WASP)  gatekeepers.152 The  relationship  between  the  gangster,  the  gatekeepers  and 
those who are responsible for enforcing a law written to uphold the power of the latter 
group is complex. While it has been argued that the lifestyle of the classic gangster 
embodies a lack of respect for authority,153 the lengths to which he goes to acquire the 
material  wealth  upon  which  the  American  status  system  is  largely  predicated 
undermines any claim that he is not concerned with ‘fitting in’.
Though not displacing the classic gangster entirely, from the late 1980s forwards 
a rival image of the gangster began to fight for dominance in the public image. Tony 
Camonte154 and  Vito  Corleone155 were  replaced by Doughboy156 and  Caine157 as  the 
assimilation  of  European  ethnic  groups  into  American  ‘whiteness’ left  low-income 
inner-city African Americans and Latinos at the bottom of the social hierarchy.158 In this 
image of gang life, the grandiosity of the classic gangster is replaced with the bleakness 
of 'gangsta' life in the ‘hood'. 159 Where the classic gangster image focuses on shadowy 
large-scale  operations,  the  new-look gangster  is  enmeshed  in  micro-level  operations 
carried out by small  localised networks of operatives.  Drug dealing and prostitution 
replace racketeering and illegal gambling as major revenue streams and it is an excess 
of trust as opposed to an excess of hubris which appears to pose the biggest threat to 
these contemporary ‘gangstas’.160 The world in which they operate cruelly juxtaposes 
the stark minimalism of poverty with a life of not  absolute,  but  relative access and 
excess (drink, drugs, romantic partners). The far-flung dreams of street youth are set 
against a backdrop of urban decay in a world where fifteen year-old boys rock bullet 
151 Wilson, “The Left-Handed Form of Human Endeavour,” 152.
152 Stephen J McNamee and Robert K Miller Jr, “Inheritance and Stratification,” in Inheritance and 
Wealth in America, eds. Robert K Miller Jr and Stephen J McNamee (New York: Plenum Press, 
1998), 196
153 Hallam and Marshment, Realism and Popular Cinema, 88.
154 Scarface (Howard Hawks, 1932).
155 The Godfather (Francis Ford Coppola,  1972);  The Godfather Part  II  (Francis Ford Coppola, 
1974).
156 Boyz n the Hood (John Singleton, 1991).
157 Menace II Society (Albert Hughes and Allen Hughes, 1993).
158 Karen Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks & What that Says About Race in America (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998); Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White (New 
York:  Routledge  Classics,  2009);  David  R  Roediger,  Working  Towards  Whiteness:  How 
America’s Immigrants Became White: The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs  
(New York: Basic, 2005).
159 Randall G Sheldon, Sharon K Tracy and William B Brown, Youth Gangs in American Society,  
4ed (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2013), 7-9.
160 Ibid, 152-153.
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wounds as badges of honour and baby-faced hustlers are  more concerned with how 
many dime-bags and rocks161 they can shift in an afternoon than preparing for college 
entrance  exams,  having  long  ago  rejected  the  idea  that  the  ‘conventional’ path  to 
mainstream success is open to them.162 Some may occasionally sojourn into other social 
worlds, but their lives seem unalterably embedded in the communities they call home. 
In these communities, young people,  children  even,163 will see more ‘untimely death’ 
over  the  course  of  their  short  lives  than the  overwhelming majority  of  their  fellow 
country men ever will, bar those who have served on combat duty in the armed forces.164
This  dysphoric  image  of  gang  life  is  reflected  in  films  and  television 
programmes  such  as  Boyz  n  the  Hood (John  Singleton,  1991),  Juice (Ernest  K 
Dickerson, 1992) and The Wire (David Simon, 2002-2008) or, in a British context, Top 
Boy (Ronan Bennett, 2011-present), My Brother the Devil (Sally El Hosani, 2012) and 
Ill  Manors (Ben  Drew,  2012).  Regardless  of  the  extent  to  which  these  popular 
representations of gangs and gang life are accurate or ‘authentic’, they have framed 
public, policy and even academic debates around inner-city issues from welfare reform 
to  youth  criminal  justice.165 At  the  same  time,  one  should  not  read  too  much  into 
academic and critical assessments of authenticity and accuracy when it comes to these 
representations,166 which often conflate authenticity with the degree to which images on 
screen conform to perceptions of urban life held by individuals who, by and large, are as 
likely, if not more, to spend time on safari in South Africa than in a Chicago housing 
project.167 Simultaneously, there is also the concern that in spite of the best intentions of 
161 Common units of sale for marijuana and crack cocaine respectively.
162 Jay MacLeod, Ain’t No Makin’ It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low Income Neighborhood,  
3ed (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).
163 Though there are some regional variances in the data, it is widely reported that the peak age for 
participation in street gangs is 14-15 years old. (Malcolm W Klein and Cheryl L Maxson, Street  
Gang Patterns and Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 41.) 
164 James Garbarino and Kathleen Kostelny, “What Children Can Tell Us About Living in a War 
Zone,” in  Children in a Violent Society, ed. Joy D Osofsky (New York: The Guildford Press, 
1997),  32-33;  Susan  B Neuman,  Changing  the  Odds  for  Children  at  Risk:  Seven  Essential  
Principles of  Educational Programs that Break the Cycle of  Poverty  (Westport:  Greenwood, 
2009), 129.
165 Rowland Atkinson and David Beer, “The Ivorine Tower in the City: Engaging Urban Studies 
after  The  Wire,”City 14,  no  5  (2010):  529-544;  Les  Back  et  al,  Cultural  Sociology:  An 
Introduction (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 198.
166 One particularly problematic notion of authenticity was that employed by Tiffany C Potter and 
CW Marshall who argue, “Despite the literary sophistication of The Wire, there is an authenticity 
that bleeds through the screen. Part of the reason for this is the deliberate blurring of truth and 
fiction that the creators have inscribed into the casting and characters of the series.” (Tiffany 
Potter and CW Marshall, “ ‘I Am the American Dream’: Modern Urban Tragedy and the Borders  
of Fiction,” in The Wire:  Urban Decay and American Television, eds. Tiffany Potter and CW 
Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2009), 10.) Though Potter and Marshall are able to offer a 
number of interesting insights regarding The Wire’s impact on perceptions of low-income urban 
communities, their argument that authenticity is derived from the blurring of fact and fiction is 
highly problematic in that it obscures the role show-runners play in mediating knowledge and 
grossly misrepresents the relationship between authenticity and truth. (Nicole Ives-Allison, “Irish  
Accents, Foreign Voices: Mediated Agency and Authenticity in  In the Name of the Father and 
Fifty Dead Men Walking,” Journal of Terrorism Studies 4, no 1 (2013): 43-63).
167 It should be noted that although they may not constitute a majority in terms of overall numbers,  
many of the most respected academic commentators on inner city and race issues are from low 
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those  responsible  for  the  creation  of  these  representations,  the  focus  on  drugs  and 
violence for dramatic purposes gives further strength to prevailing stereotypes of hood 
life, further exoticising and distancing these communities from wider society.168
     There is also a significant amount of confusion and disagreement over the nature 
of the contemporary gang.169 It is largely agreed that the term ‘gang’ has been used to 
refer to two rather different organisational archetypes, the first more loosely-organised 
and territorially based groups with a younger 'gangsta' membership drawn from local 
low-income/working-class  neighbourhoods.  The second refers  to  larger,  more tightly 
regimented groups committed  to  scalable  illegal  enterprise  (the  type  of organisation 
which a classic gangster might lead). The extent to which these two types overlap or 
bleed into one another in reality is much less clear, though there does appear to be some 
consensus around the existence of a degree of upward mobility between the first and 
second type.170 It is also agreed that smaller, more loosely organised groups tend to rely 
upon  larger  (increasingly  international)  criminal  organisations  for  their  ‘product’ 
supply.171 The Eurogang research programme has done some exceptional work on these 
links,172 yet it continues to be an issue that is chronically under-explored within the gang 
income  (urban  or  rural)  minority  backgrounds  including  Michael  Eric  Dyson,  Todd  Boyd, 
William Julius  Wilson  and  Henry  Louis  Gates  Jr.  Still,  the  American  academy as  a  whole 
remains overwhelmingly white, middle (or upper) class in origin and (in many faculties) male.  
While it is not the case at all that academics should be restricted to speaking of people who are 
similar demographically to themselves, when making claims about ‘truth’ and ‘authenticity’ one 
does need to be careful about whose truth one’s perspective reflects. (Walter R Allen, “The Black 
Academic: Faculty Status Among African Americans in US Higher Education,” The Journal of  
Negro  Education 69,  no  1-2  (2000):  112-127;  Mark  Chesler,  Amanda  Lewis  and  James 
Crowfoot,  Challenging  Racism  in  Higher  Education:  Promoting  Justice  (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 144-145; Sharon L Fries-Britt, “Under-representation in the Academy 
and the Institutional Climate for Faculty Diversity,” Journal of the Professoriate 5, no 1 (2011): 
1-33;  Claudia  Leeb,  Working-Class  Women  in  Elite  Academia:  A  Philosophical  Inquiry 
(Brussels:  Peter  Lang,  2004),  16-17;  Caroline  Sotello  Viernes  Turner,  “Women  of  Color  in 
Academe: Living with Multiple Marginality,” The Journal of Higher Education 73, no 1 (2002): 
78-79.)
168 Liam Kennedy and Stephen Shapiro, “Introduction: All the Pieces Matter,” in The Wire: Race,  
Class  and Genre,  eds.  Liam Kennedy and Stephen Shapiro  (Ann Arbor:  The University  of 
Michigan Press, 2012), 2; James S Williams, “The Lost Boys of Baltimore: Beauty and Desire in 
the Hood,” Film Quarterly 62, no 2 (2008): 58-63.
169 Esbensen, Winfree, He and Taylor, “Youth Gangs and Definitional Issues,” 106; Hallsworth and 
Young, “Gang Talk and Gang Talkers: A Critique,” 177.
170 For those ‘successful’ in low-level drug dealing and criminal activity there are opportunities to 
advance one’s career by engaging in higher-level distribution and related activities, an attractive 
proposition  for  those  who  perceive  themselves  as  excluded  from  mainstream  economic 
opportunities. (John Pitts, “Mercenary Territory: Are Youth Gangs Really a Problem?” in Youth 
in Crisis? ‘Gangs’, Territoriality and Violence, ed. Barry Goldson (London: Routledge, 2001), 
171.)
171 Elaine Cassel and Douglas A Bernstein, Criminal Behavior, 2ed (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, 
2007), 161-162; Joan Serra Hoffman, Lyndee Knox and Robert Cohen, “What We Know About 
the Causes and  Nature  of  Youth Violence,”  in  Beyond Suppression: Global  Perspectives on  
Youth  Violence,  eds.  Joan  Serra  Hoffman,  Lyndee  Knox  and  Robert  Cohen (Westport: 
Greenwood Publishing, 2011), 20-22.; Alan Wright, Organized Crime (Portland: Willan, 2006), 
38.
172 Finn-Aage  Esbensen  and  Cheryl  L Maxson,  eds.  Youth  Gangs  in  International  Perspective:  
Results from the Eurogang Program of Research (London: Springer, 2011).
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studies literature. 
Some have sought to deal with this conceptual complexity by dismantling or 
otherwise avoiding the use of the term ‘gang’ altogether, but this comes with its own set 
of challenges and drawbacks. As Barry Goldson writes:
Indeed  semantic  slippages  between  terms  such  as  ‘peer  group’, 
‘informal  peer  group  network’,  ‘fluid  and  transitional  youth  group 
formation’, ‘street-based group’, ‘delinquent peer group’, ‘delinquent 
youth  group’,  'gang’,  ‘criminal  gang’,  ‘organised  criminal  group’, 
‘organised crime network,’ and ‘crime firm’ obfuscate meaning, create 
confusion, produce contrasting and contradictory findings and impede 
coherent analysis.173
Thus  whether  'gang'  has  been  used  as  an  ‘all-purpose’  term  or  highly  specific 
terminology has been employed instead, the lack of conceptual clarity within the gang 
studies  field  has  presented  a  number  of  problems  for  researchers.  As  with  other 
definitional debates, such as the one encircling ‘terrorism’, there is the concern that, 
“Indeed, in many ways,  gang  seems to be not an indicative term (e.g.,  a denotative 
noun) at all but an expressive term (e.g., a connotative expletive) uttered either when 
certain emotions are evoked or in order to evoke such emotions in others.”174 
As previously argued, the word ‘gang’ has, undeniably, been applied by policy-
makers, government officials, law enforcement and even some academic researchers in 
pejorative ways.175 However, there does not exist a more suitable (or clearly defined) 
term, especially when one takes into consideration the size and strength of the  gang 
studies literature. For the purposes of this research, the most suitable definition of gang 
is, “any durable, street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal activity is 
part of its group identity.”176 Taken from the Eurogang project’s consensus definition of 
the ‘street gang’ this definition highlights the importance of space and place to gangs 
and gang members.177 Though this definition has been problematised on the basis that 
embedded within it is a connection between gangs and illegal activity,178 this criticism is 
slightly unfair. The Eurogang definition does claim participation in illegal activity as a 
distinguishing feature of gangs, however, it also recognises that these activities are only 
a  part, and not even necessarily the most important part, of gang life. The result is a 
definition that is both broad and robust, allowing for critical reflection on the connection  
between gangs and delinquency/deviancy.
173 Goldson, “Youth in Crisis?,” 9.
174 Richard A Ball and G David Curry, “The Logic of Definition in Criminology: Purposes and 
Methods for Defining ‘Gangs’,” Criminology 33, no 2 (1995): 231.
175 John Pitts, “Mercenary Territory,” 162.
176 Finn-Aage  Esbensen  and  Cheryl  L  Maxson,  “The  Eurogang  Programme  of  Research  and 
Multimethod  Comparative  Gang  Research:  Introduction,”  in  Youth  Gangs  in  International  
Perspective: Results from the Eurogang Program of Research,  eds.  Finn-Aage Esbensen and 
Cheryl L Maxson (London: Springer, 2011), 5.
177 Ibid, 2-5.
178 Hallsworth and Young, “Gang Talk and Gang Talkers,”185-186.
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The Opportunities, Limits and Nomenclature of Northern Irish Studies
As a small, relatively isolated region of the United Kingdom with a population 
of under two million there was, in proportion to its perceived importance,  relatively 
little literature focusing specifically on Northern Ireland before the Troubles broke out 
in 1968.179 However, the Troubles would generate a tremendous amount of scholarly 
attention for this previously under-explored region.180 The first major political attitudes 
survey  to  include  questions  around  the  legitimacy  of  the  existing  constitutional 
arrangement was carried out by Richard Rose in 1968, coinciding with the rise of the 
civil rights movement in Northern Ireland.181 His results, however, were not published 
widely  until  1971’s  Governing  Without  Consensus hit  the  shelves.182 Others  would 
quickly follow Rose (though few of these initial studies would match his intellectual 
rigour) once the situation on the streets of Belfast and Derry began to draw significant 
media attention, becoming a regular feature on the evening news through much of the 
English-speaking world. By 1983 the Social Sciences Bibliography of Northern Ireland 
listed  over  5,000  published  items  on  the  region  and  its  conflict,  with  John  Whyte 
predicting that by the time he wrote his  evaluative  survey of the field in 1991, the 
scholarly literature may have totalled as much as 9,000 pieces.183 
In spite of his valiant efforts, the speed with which scholarly writing was being 
produced  and  published  at  the  time  of  his  writing  Interpreting  Northern  Ireland 
prompted Whyte to write, “There was so much coming out that it was beyond the scope 
of one researcher to keep up with the literature.”184 Thus, it comes as little surprise that it 
would be Whyte who would assert that, taking its size into account, Northern Ireland is 
perhaps the most heavily researched region of the world.185 This is  a  point  of view 
commented  upon by Paul  Arthur  and Keith Jeffery who argue,  “One of  the  clichés 
concerning  the  Northern  Ireland  problem  contends  that  if  all  the  publications,  the 
explanations, the analyses and the solutions were put side by side they would span the 
circumference of the world,”186 while at the same time positing that in spite of this, for 
many the conflict remains obscure. To even begin to study Northern Ireland involves a 
commitment to wade through a mountainous volume of literature which is growing by 
the  day,  with  much  containing  insights  immediately  recognisable  as  useful. 
Unsurprisingly,  in  sub-fields  such  as  community  relations,  peace-building,  conflict 
transformation and state responses to domestic terrorism, efforts to engage with cutting 
edge research beyond existing work on the region are often necessarily limited.187
179 Although,  as  is  argued  by  John Whyte,  there  were  some exceptions  to  this  general  pattern 
including Emrys Jones’ A Social Geography of Belfast (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960) 
and The Northern Ireland Problem: A Study in Group Relations by Denis P Bartlett and Charles 
Frederick  Carter  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1962).  (Whyte, Interpreting  Northern  
Ireland, 3-5.)
180 McGarry and O’Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland, 4.
181 Dooley, Black and Green; Prince, Northern Ireland’s '68.
182 Rose, Governing Without Consensus.
183 Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland, viii.
184 Ibid, ix.
185 Ibid, viii.
186 Paul Arthur and Keith Jeffery, Northern Ireland since 1968 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 1.
187 Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict  
and Emancipation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13.
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 Northern Ireland frequently continues to be treated as 'a place apart' in much of 
this  literature,188 though there have  been an increasing  number of  works  that  do an 
excellent job of integrating lessons from or about Northern Ireland into debates around 
broader  non-region  specific  concerns,  illustrating  it  is  possible  to  strike  a  balance 
between introspection and external engagement. For example, Siobhán McAlister, Phil 
Scraton and Deena Haydon’s contribution to Barry Goldson’s Youth in Crisis? Gangs,  
Territoriality  and  Violence  examines  the  class  dynamics  of  youth  territoriality  in 
Northern Ireland and builds a bridge between Northern Irish studies and one of the key 
concerns in  the gang studies literature.189 Urban Segregation  and the Welfare State:  
Inequality and Exclusion in Western Cities, edited by Sako Musterd and Wim Ostendorf, 
includes an excellent  chapter on Belfast  by geographer Frederick W Boal  (and also 
includes a chapter on Chicago by Jerome L Kaufman).190 By embedding his discussion 
of  sectarian  segregation  in  Belfast  in  contemporary  urban  sociology  and  by 
incorporating elements of its marginality discourse, Boal illustrates that urban divisions 
in Northern Ireland are as much a matter of class as religion.191 Additionally, there are 
numerous  examples  of  deep  interdisciplinary  work  focusing  on  representations  of 
Northern Ireland and the conflict within the context of representational politics more 
broadly.192 Yet  these  works  remain  exceptions  rather  than  the  rule.  For  research  on 
Northern Ireland to avoid stagnation and buck the current trend of increasing solipsism, 
a better balance between deep introspection and innovative externally-directed research 
is needed, something  this thesis aspires to contribute to the field.
The Nomenclature of Northern Irish Studies
As Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd argue, “A study on Northern Ireland always 
requires reference to nomenclature,”193 for, “Unfortunately a neutral terminology is not 
available and choices must be made.”194 This is an aspect of writing on Northern Ireland 
from  which  this  work  makes  no  attempt  to  remove  itself.  There  are  a  number  of 
188 John Cash, “Squaring Some Vicious Circles: Transforming the Political in Northern Ireland,” in 
Consociatonal Theory: McGarry, O’Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict, ed. Rupert Taylor 
(New York: Routledge, 2010), 237; George Boyce, “Culture and Politics inn Northern Ireland,” 
in  Culture and Politics in Northern Ireland: 1960-1990, ed. Eamonn Hughes (Milton Keynes: 
Open University Press, 1993), 13.
189 Siobhán  McAlister,  Phil  Scraton  and  Deena  Haydon,  “Place,  Territory  and  Young  People’s 
Identity in the ‘New’ Northern Ireland,” in Youth in Crisis? Gangs, Territoriality and Violence, 
ed. Barry Goldson (New York: Routledge, 2011), 89-109. 
190 Jerome L Kaufman, “Chicago: Segregation and the New Urban Poverty,” in Urban Segregation 
and the Welfare State: Inequality and Exclusion in Western Cities, eds. Sako Musterd and Wim 
Ostendorf (New York: Routledge, 1998), 45-63.
191 Frederick W Boal, “Exclusion and Inclusion: Segregation and Deprivation in Belfast,” in Urban 
Segregation  and  the  Welfare  State:  Inequality  and  Exclusion  in  Western  Cities,  eds.  Sako 
Musterd and Wim Ostendorf (New York: Routledge, 1998), 94-109.
192 John Hill,  Cinema and Northern Ireland (London: British Film Institute, 2006); Aaron Kelly, 
The Thriller and Northern Ireland since 1969: Utterly  Resigned Terror  (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2005);  Martin  McLoone,  “Traditions  of  Representation:  Political  Violence  and  the  Myth  of 
Atavism,” in  Terrorism, Media, Liberation, ed. David J Slocum (Newark: Rutgers University 
Press, 2005), 209-231; Tom Maguire, Making Theatre in Northern Ireland: Through and Beyond  
the Troubles (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2006).
193 Ruane and Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland, xiv.
194 Ibid, xv.
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geographical terms in particular which have, over time, become firmly embedded within 
the sectarian language of Northern Ireland. The result is that everyday conversations 
with  strangers  on  street  corners  from  Belfast  to  Ballinamallard  are  peppered  with 
decisions of word choice where carelessness can risk causing offence or provocation. 
For example, discussion of spending one’s weekend in ‘Londonderry’ is likely to raise 
more than a few suspicious eyebrows outside the Divis Flats at the start of the almost 
entirely Catholic Lower Falls Road. The same can be said for referring to Northern 
Ireland as ‘the six counties’ while walking down the near-exclusively Protestant Sandy 
Row.195 For  academic  writing  to  mean  something,  not  simply  to  the  academic 
community but to the people of Northern Ireland, it is important that the words used to 
describe the land, its society and its people be considered carefully. As much as reckless 
terminological usage is distracting and weakens the analytical strength of scholarship on 
Northern Ireland, to the people about whom these works are written, such carelessness 
is disrespectful and demonstrates a lack of interest in taking seriously the identification 
markers that matter considerably to so many. 
At a local level, the names Londonderry and Derry are both commonly used to 
refer to Northern Ireland’s second city, with their simultaneous usage indicative of the 
extent  of  sectarian  division.  ‘Derry’,  an  Anglicisation  of  the  Irish  ‘Daire’,  was  the 
original name of the settlement, with the prefix ‘London-‘ added in the drawing up of 
the city’s Royal Charter signed by King James. Until the 1960s, Derry was the name 
most commonly used by members of both communities, however as sectarian politics 
intensified  at  the  end  of  the  decade,  many  Protestants  began  to  refer  to  the  city 
exclusively by its legal name. Catholics, on the other hand, continued to refer to the city 
by its ancient name. Since the end of the Troubles both names have been used together 
as ‘Derry/Londonderry or ‘Derry ~ Londonderry’ in some official  circles and in the 
promotion of large scale events such as BBC Radio 1’s Big Weekend (2012) and UK 
City of Culture 2013. Yet, the use of both names has not gained traction among the 
people of Northern Ireland (or the city specifically), being a bit awkward and bulky 
whether  spoken  or  written.  With  the  Catholic  majority  in  the  city  and  increasing 
numbers of Protestants (Loyalist and unionist politicians being notable exceptions) now 
comfortable using Derry, that will be the name employed throughout this research both 
for brevity and to mirror language use within the region.196
The various political positions in Northern Ireland reflect disagreement over the 
optimal constitutional relationship between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
While both unionists and loyalists support the current constitutional arrangement which 
positions Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom (though it operates 
with a considerable amount of autonomy), they differ in both the beneficiary of their 
allegiance  and  the  lengths  to  which  they  are  willing  to  go  to  defend  the  current 
195 This is, at least partially, related to the practice of ‘telling’ in Northern Irish society that readily  
establishes on which side of the sectarian divide an individual falls on first encounter. (Frank 
Burton, “Ideological Social Relations in Northern Ireland,” The British Journal of Sociology 30, 
no 1 (1979): 61-80.)
196 Vincent  Quinn,  "On  the  Borders  of  Allegiance:  Identity  Politics  in  Ulster,"  in  De-centring  
Sexualities: Politics and Representations Beyond the Metropolis,  eds. Richard Phillips, Diane 
Watt  & David  Shuttleton (New York:  Routledge,  2000),  257-258;  John Whyte,  Interpreting 
Northern Ireland, xi.
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constitutional arrangement. Loyalists, almost exclusively Protestant, are loyal to ‘Queen 
and  constitution’,  with  only  conditional  loyalty  granted  to  the  government  and  its 
supporting state institutions.197 As long as the state ensures that religious rights (defined 
in  Protestant  terms)  and  civil  freedoms (specifically  around  loyalist/British  cultural 
expression) are protected and supported, loyalist paramilitary organisations such as the 
Ulster Defence Association/ Ulster Freedom Fighters198 and Ulster Volunteer Force are 
prepared to engage in violence ‘on its behalf’ (though any claim that the state has been 
grateful for this ‘assistance’ is dubious at best).199 When the interests of the state and, 
more  specifically,  the  government  are  seen  to  betray  loyalist  values,  violence  and 
disorder  can  be directed at  official  institutions.200 The 2012/2013 flag protests  are  a 
recent example of this. Following Belfast City Council’s December 2012 vote to reduce 
the number of days on which the Union Jack would fly over Belfast City Hall (bringing 
local policy in line with that of the Northern Ireland Assembly and central government 
guidance) loyalist protests erupted throughout the city. On a number of occasions, these 
protests escalated into full-blown riots.201 Unionist politics by contrast eschews extra-
judicial violence. Allegiance tends to lie in the constitutional link and active governance 
relationship between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
While the unionist and loyalist political parties attract predominantly Protestant 
support, nationalist and republican parties receive the overwhelming majority of their 
support from Catholics. Both nationalists and republicans aspire to a united Ireland, but 
where nationalists remain committed to achieving reunification/independence through 
exclusively constitutional means, republicans believe that a free, independent and united 
Ireland must be won by any means necessary including the use of violence. Another 
significant  difference  between  the  two  political  traditions  is  their  position  on  the 
political spectrum. Official nationalists are generally considered to be more conservative  
in their politics, republicans have elected to present themselves as left-leaning.202 
197 Jennifer Todd, “Two Traditions in Unionist Political Culture,” in Irish Political Studies Reader:  
Key Contributions, eds. Conor McGrath and Eoin O’Malley (New York: Routledge, 2008), 109-
110.
198 Because the Ulster  Defence Association remained legal  throughout most of  the Troubles,  its 
paramilitary violence was carried out under the banner of the Ulster Freedom Fighters so as to 
avoid the main group joining the rest of the loyalist and republican paramilitary organisations on 
the proscribed organisations list.
199 Some of the most exhaustive examinations of loyalist paramilitary groups include: Steve Bruce, 
The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992); Colin Crawford, Inside the UDA: Volunteers and Violence (London: Pluto Press, 2003); 
Gallagher,  After the Peace; James W McAuley and Graham Spencer,  Ulster Loyalism and the  
Good Friday Agreement: History, Identity and Change (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); 
Peter  Shirlow and  Mark  McGovern,  Who Are  “The  People”? Unionism,  Protestantism and  
Loyalism in Northern Ireland (London: Pluto Press, 1997); Ian S Wood, God, Guns and Ulster:  
A History of Loyalist Paramilitaries (London: Caxton Editions, 2004); Ian S Wood,  Crimes of  
Loyalty: A History of the UDA (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006). 
200 Brian  McIlroy,  Shooting  to  Kill:  Filmmaking  and  the  “Troubles”  in  Northern  Ireland  
(Richmond: Stevenson Press, 2001), 20-23; Lee A Smithey,  Unionists, Loyalists, and Conflict  
Transformation in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 23-24.
201 Adrian Guelke, “Northern Ireland’s Flag Crisis and the Enduring Legacy of the Settler-Native 
Divide,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 20, no 1 (2014): 139-141.
202 McIlroy,  Shooting to  Kill, 19;  Smithey,  Unionists,  Loyalists,  and Conflict  Transformation in  
Northern Ireland, 23-24; Jon Tonge,  Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, 2ed (New York: 
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Controversially, this work will use religious rather than political labels to refer to 
the two groups on either side of Northern Ireland’s sectarian divide. This is for two 
reasons.  Firstly,  religious labels,  though referring to  a broader  group of  people,  can 
nevertheless be considered to be more precise than political or ethnic labels. Secondly, it 
is with religious terminology that the people of Northern Ireland most frequently refer to 
themselves  and  others.  Though  a  great  deal  of  scholarship  maps  out  residential 
segregation in Northern Ireland according to political terminology and labels areas as 
‘unionist’ or ‘nationalist’ (or just as commonly ‘republican’ or ‘loyalist’), these terms do 
not accurately reflect the nature of segregation.203 It is true that Catholics in Northern 
Ireland largely support the idea of a united Ireland (reflected in their  overwhelming 
support  for  nationalist  and  republican  political  parties)  and  it  is  also  the  case  that 
unionist and loyalist parties are almost exclusively supported by Protestants, but the 
interchangeable use of political and religious terms is highly problematic.204 Even in the 
most  religiously  homogeneous  neighbourhoods,  political  support  is  divided.  In 
neighbourhoods  that  are  almost  exclusively  Catholic,  political  support  is  still  split 
between the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party,205 Sinn Féin206 (the political 
branch of the Provisional republican movement) and, albeit to a much lesser extent, the 
non-sectarian Alliance Party.207 Protestant political support is distributed between Ulster 
Routledge, 2002), 67-69.
203 For example: Aoileann Ni Éigeartaigh, “Northern Ireland: Space, Identity and Performance,” in 
Transcultural Areas, ed. Wolfgang Berg (Heidelberg: Springer, 2011), 46; Heather Hamill, The 
Hoods: Crime and Punishment in Belfast (Princeton: Princeton University Press,  2011); Neil 
Jarman,  Material Conflicts: Parades and Visual Displays in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Berg, 
1997);  Kathleen  A Cavanaugh,  “Interpretations  of  Political  Violence  in  Ethnically  Divided 
Societies,”  Terrorism  & Political  Violence 9,  no  3  (1997):  33-54;  Rachel  Monaghan,  “The 
Return of  'Captain  Moonlight':  Informal  Justice  in  Northern  Ireland,” Studies  in  Conflict  & 
Terrorism 25  (2002):  41-56;  Liam  O'Dowd  and  Milena  Komarova,  “Contesting  Territorial 
Fixity? A Case Study of Regeneration Belfast,”  Urban Studies 48, no 10 (2011): 2116; Peter 
Shirlow  and  Brendan  Murtagh,  “Capacity-building,  Representation  and  Intra-community 
Conflict,” Urban Studies 41, no 1 (2004): 57-70.
204 Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland, 18.
205 For further reading on the SDLP please see: Ian McAllister,  The Northern Ireland Social and  
Democratic and Labour Party: Political Opposition in a Divided Society (London: Macmillan, 
1977);  Gerard Murray,  John Hume and the SDLP: Impact and Survival in  Northern Ireland 
(Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1999); Gerard Murray and Jon Tonge, Sinn Féin and the SDLP:  
From Alienation to Participation (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
206 Provisional Sinn Féin was born in 1970 out of the same split that created the Provisional Irish 
Republican movement, a descendent of the party of the same name founded by Arthur Griffith in  
1905.  Literature  dealing  directly  with  Sinn  Féin  (as  opposed  to  the  IRA/Provisional  IRA) 
includes: Kevin Bean,  The New Politics of Sinn Féin (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 
2007); Agnès Maillot, New Sinn Féin: Republicanism After the IRA (London: Routledge, 2004); 
Murray and Tonge,  Sinn Féin and the SDLP; and Eoin Ó Brion,  Sinn Féin and the Politics of  
Left Republicanism (London: Pluto Press, 2009).
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Ireland. Though it has members and supporters of both Catholic and Protestant background (and 
others who prefer to remain ‘non-aligned’), it was initially founded by liberal unionists in 1970 
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Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party,208 with the Alliance Party also getting 
a small, but significant, share of the vote. 
As support  for  these  parties  has  fluctuated  over  time,  even within  the  same 
neighbourhoods, it can not reasonably be asserted that even where a given party has 
enjoyed (or currently enjoys) a great deal of support in an area, the neighbourhood’s 
electoral habits are its defining feature. Ethnic terminology, such as ‘Irish’ or ‘British’ 
has never held much currency in terms of describing local geography. Besides, ascribing 
Protestants in Northern Ireland a single national identity is a much more complicated 
endeavour  than  with  Catholics  who  largely  self-identify  as  Irish  and  referring  to  a 
specific  neighbourhood  as  ‘British/Ulster/Northern  Irish/Anglo-Irish/slightly  Irish’ 
would complicate things considerably.209 Thus, while there is consensus that Northern 
Ireland is a divided society, neither the existing political nor national/ethnic terminology 
is up to the task of adequately representing these divisions.
It  is best  then to take one’s cue from how people talk about  themselves and 
others in Northern Ireland, which is with religious labels. When a small child in one of 
Belfast  or  Derry's  homogeneous  working-class  neighbourhoods  wishes  to  ascertain 
whether a new face is part of his or her collective 'us' or a distant and threatening 'them', 
the newcomer will be asked whether they are 'a Protestant' or 'a Catholic', or just as 
likely, a 'hun' or 'taig' despite the continued pejorative connotations of both words. This 
is a reality recognised by Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd who argue: 
Religion more than ethnic or historical origin or politics or identity is 
the  mark  of  community  membership.  It  is  religion  which  sorts  into 
communities, even though the overt communal conflict is much more 
about economics, politics or identity than theology. That it why, when 
two people meet  in Northern Ireland,  the first  priority is  to establish 
each  other's  religion,  and  why  it  is  important  not  simply  to  know 
whether a person is nationalist or unionist but whether he or she is a 
Catholic  or  a  Protestant  nationalist  or  unionist.  In  each  case,  the 
difference is profound.210
Indeed whether a Catholic man votes for the Ulster Unionist Party matters little if he is 
cornered by a loyalist mob in the back allies of a Protestant neighbourhood, for those 
looking to attack will  not  stop long enough to ascertain his  voting history. Political 
allegiance means relatively little in a world where every readily accessible identifying 
feature is coded along sectarian lines – name, address, primary school attended, football 
tops,  and  brand  of  stadium  pants.  Thus,  while  Richard  Rose  has  argued  that  the 
pervasiveness of sectarian politics means religious labels carry as much political weight 
Z of the Northern Ireland Conflict (Lanham: Scarecrow, 2008), 19.)
208 For more information on unionist politics, please refer to: Feargal Cochrane,  Unionist Politics  
and the Politics of Unionism Since the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 2ed (Cork: Cork University Press, 
2001);  Christopher  Farrington,  Ulster  Unionism and the  Peace  Process  in  Northern  Ireland 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Henry Patterson and Eric Kaufmann,  Unionism and 
Orangeism in  Northern  Ireland since  1945:  The Decline  of  the  Loyal  Family  (Manchester: 
Manchester  University  Press,  2007);  and  Graham Walker,  A History  of  the  Ulster  Unionist  
Party: Protest, Pragmatism and Pessimism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).
209 Rose, Governing Without Consensus, 207-208; Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland, 67-71.
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as 'left' and 'right' do in societies where politics are driven primarily by socio-economic 
issues,211 in reality Northern Ireland's religious labels are much heavier. Nonetheless, 
appropriate terminology will continue to be used when referring to specific political or 
ethnic groups.
Conclusion
As illustrated in the introduction to this work both gang violence in the United 
States and low intensity civil conflict in Northern Ireland have most profoundly affected 
low-income  urban  neighbourhoods  comprised  largely  of  ethnic  minorities.  In  both 
cases,  this  group violence  is  carried out  predominately by young males with  socio-
economic and ethnic backgrounds reflective of their communities. The United States 
and United Kingdom alike are liberal democratic states and global economic leaders 
who have historically embraced capitalism. The United Kingdom may have a stronger 
welfare state, yet both are among the most domestically unequal economically advanced 
societies.  Still  there  has  not  yet  been  any  serious  comparative  work addressing  the 
similarities between Northern Irish paramilitary and American street gang violence. This  
chapter  has  argued  that  the  major  barrier  to  such  comparative  work  has  been  the 
existence of a binary division between 'political' and 'non-political' violence within the 
existing group violence scholarship. Political and gang violence scholars alike are keen 
to  establish  the  distinctiveness  of  'their'  type  of  violence.  However  an  increasing 
reluctance to discuss the criminal aspects of political violence has distanced the study of 
this  type  of  group  violence  from  that  dedicated  to  understanding  other  forms  of 
violence, including gang violence.  With political  violence scholars claiming political 
motivations,  aspirations  and implications as the  hallmarks of 'political  violence',  the 
political meaning and significance of gang violence (and all forms of group violence 
which do not fit the 'political violence' definition) has been denied. The dominance of 
criminology, sociology and anthropology in the gang studies field, combined with the 
paucity  of  political  science  involvement,  has  meant  that  despite  its  interdisciplinary 
nature,  mounting  a  campaign  for  the  politicisation  of  gang  violence  or  even  a 
recognition of its political dimension, has not been seen as a major priority. In shedding 
light  on  the  existence  and  problems  of  the  political/non-political  violence  binary  it 
becomes  possible  to  challenge  its  unspoken  dominance,  which  is  the  aim  of  the 
remaining chapters. 
The political/non-political violence binary contributes to the lack of meaningful 
high-level politicised response to endemic gang violence in Chicago and its recognition 
as  a  threat  to  life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness  by  subtly  discouraging  a 
reframing of the issue. It also plays a more active role where scholars are involved in 
making or advising on policy that reinforces an apolitical view of gang violence. The 
next chapter will explore the origins of mismatched response in greater detail. It focuses 
on how the historic under-politicisation of race in America has made it difficult, nigh 
impossible,  for  African  American  street  gangs  to  present  themselves  as  legitimate 
political agents while the political significance accorded to all mobilisation along the 
sectarian divide in Northern Ireland has created a situation where the Provisional IRA 
could hardly avoid political consideration. The extent to which Northern Irish society is 
211 Rose, Governing Without Consensus, 113-114.
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comparatively  and  absolutely  politicised  can  be  seen  in  both  the  discussion  of 
appropriate nomenclature above and the need for such a discussion in the first place, 
something for which there is no gang studies equivalent.
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Chapter 2
The Emergence and Reproduction of Politicised and Depoliticised 
Difference: The Legacies of Sectarianism & Nationalism in Northern 
Ireland and Race in the United States
It is in understanding how the major historically-rooted cleavages in Northern 
Irish and American society have been accorded or denied political significance that we 
can begin to understand how levels of gang violence in the city of Chicago exceeding 
those experienced in  Northern Ireland during the Troubles have failed to  generate  a 
similarly robust state-level response. Furthermore, in understanding how the 'response 
gap'  has  emerged  and sustained itself  over  time,  it  becomes  easier  to  see  how the 
prevailing  'community  intervention'  and  'legalistic  suppression'  approaches  to  gang 
violence  reduction  in  Chicago  (and  the  United  States  more  broadly)  have  failed  to 
escape major scrutiny and true reform in the face of their limited efficacy. This chapter 
will explore how sectarianism and nationalism together created a political context in 
which the sheer existence of the Provisional IRA represented a salient political threat 
requiring state response. It argues that while the shape and intensity of this response was 
determined by the intensity and targeting of its violence, the fact of response in itself 
was not. Even though a good deal of Provisional IRA violence did not take the form of 
externally directed 'political violence' as we have come to understand the term,212 there 
was very little the group could do to avoid generating a state response. In rather stark 
contrast, the absence of a similarly politicised backdrop in Chicago has meant that, even 
at  greater  levels  of  intensity,  the  group  violence  carried  out  by  the  city's  African 
American supergangs has failed to capture a political  response befitting the scale of 
damage  caused  to  both  individual  and  community  life  in  the  city's  most  socio-
economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods. 
Race is the most recognisable and potent source of social division in the United 
States  and  the  handling  of  race  issues  has  had  a  profound  affect  on  how  African 
American street gangs have been 'handled' by official bodies. Further, race issues have 
often become an important source of political contention. However, the near whole-sale 
exclusion of African Americans from the public and political sphere until the emergence 
of the civil rights movement in the 1950s has meant that historically these tensions have 
212 According to available Sutton Index data, the Provisional IRA was responsible for 510 civilian 
deaths, the vast majority occurring in Northern Ireland. Although this pales in comparison to the 
1,009 members of the British security service whose deaths the organisation was responsible for 
(453 being members of the British Army), one 'collateral damage' death for every two 'combat'  
deaths  is  not  exactly  a  glowing  argument  on  behalf  of  a  militaristic  justification  for  the 
Provisional IRA's violence. During the conflict, loyalist paramilitaries were responsible for 877 
civilian deaths,  the overwhelming majority  Catholic  civilians.  Although the Provisional IRA 
does not bear responsibility for these deaths, their targeted attacks against British security forces 
(particularly the localised Ulster Defence Regiment and the police (Royal Ulster Constabulary)), 
prompted  retaliatory  attacks  from loyalist  paramilitary  groups  who,  in  aligning  themselves 
conditionally with the British state, saw any security service deaths as a hit to 'their side' and a 
step closer to the dreaded united Ireland. Thus, not only did the Provisional IRA actively engage 
in violence leading to numerous civilian deaths, they also played an important role in the overall  
escalation  of  community-level  conflict. (Malcolm Sutton,  “Sutton  Index  of  Deaths,”  CAIN 
(Conflict Archive on the Internet), accessed 27 July 2014.)
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played themselves out in the economic and community (neighbourhood composition; 
crime;  'neighbourly'  conduct)  spheres  with  our  understanding  of  the  meaning  and 
significance of gang violence greatly informed by this positioning.
Chicago's supergangs emerged in the midst of civil rights mobilisation across the 
American south. Southern blacks banded together in unprecedented numbers during this 
period to demand full legal equality, dismantle the system of local 'Jim Crow' legislation 
that supported southern racial segregation, and ensure equal access to public space. It 
was the first,  and remains the only, significant political mass mobilisation of African 
Americans in the history of the United States. Quite crucially however, the civil rights 
movement began to dwindle in size and strength as it moved northward into Chicago 
where de jure segregation had long been replaced by de facto segregation and the latter 
proved a much tricker force to overcome. Both the broad political mobilisation of the 
civil rights movement and the violent mobilisation of the 'supergang' street gangs lacked 
precedence  in  African  American  history.  Still,  the  emergent  African  American  (and 
Hispanic/Latino)  supergangs  would  quickly  surpass  those  studied  by  Thrasher  and 
contemporaries in both lethality and involvement in illegal operations.213 
However, the situation of these groups within a class-focused version of urban 
history has led to a failure to recognise the way in which the long history of American 
racial inequality's has contributed to the inappropriate depoliticisation of gang violence, 
reinforcing the perception of gang violence in Chicago as a local rather than a national  
issue and as an economic and social problem as opposed to a political one. Over the last 
half century, Chicago's gangs have together claimed thousands of lives and the liberty of 
many of the city's most socio-economically marginalised residents. Their violence has 
seriously  undermined  the  idea  that  the  American  state  is  willing  and/or  capable  of 
protecting  the  'universal'  and  'inalienable'  rights  to  'life  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of 
happiness'  the  Declaration  of  Independence  claims  it  was  founded  to  secure.  This 
therefore begs the question of whether the liberal democratic state stable can truly be 
considered stable when it repeatedly fails to live up to its end of the social contract.
The Politics of Group Violence in Ireland and Post-partition Northern Ireland 
The limits of the Protestant Reformation in Ireland during the 16th century in 
combination with the ‘colonising’ aspects of Scottish settlement in Ulster in the 17th 
would mean that by the time of the emergence of modern nationalism in Ulster, political 
mobilisation  across  the  sectarian  divide  was  already  a  difficult  and  complicated 
endeavour. Nevertheless, the failure of early republicans to secure wide cross-sectarian 
support would lead to the classification of Irish republicanism as a violent and Catholic 
form of  political  mobilisation.  This mapping of  nationalist  political  expression onto 
sectarian difference would most significantly impact political  life in Ulster, the most 
religiously heterogenous part of Ireland. The creation of Northern Ireland as a distinct 
administrative unit within the UK on the basis of these sectarian politics during the Irish 
War of Independence generated a zero-sum sectarian political landscape in the region 
wherein any ‘gains’ (real or perceived) secured by one side of the sectarian divide came 
to be read as an equivalent ‘loss’ for the other. With each change in the balance, the 
213 Cooley, “ 'Stones Run It'.”
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constitution was reinforced or undermined depending on who believed themselves as 
victorious.214 In such an environment the emergence of the Provisional IRA as a militant 
republican organisation would affect the power balance immediately and before it even 
had the chance to conduct its first action.
Divide or Conquer: The Development and Entrenchment of the Sectarian Cleavage  
in Irish Society (Mid-16th Century to Late-18th Century)
Before it is possible to speak of the development of the sectarian cleavage in 
Ireland or Northern Ireland, it is first worth defining 'sectarianism'. For some, the term 
sectarianism,  which  has  its  roots  in  Irish  history,215 has  become  synonymous  with 
religious bigotry and hatred.216 Though the term has always spoken to the frequently 
acrimonious  nature  of  Catholic-Protestant  relations  on  the  island,  there  is  a  greater 
degree of nuance than the common perception belies. This is perhaps best captured in 
the definition offered by Robbie McVeigh who argues, “Sectarianism in Ireland is that 
changing set of ideas and practices, including, crucially, acts of violence, which serves 
to  construct  and  reproduce  the  difference  between,  and  unequal  status  of,  Irish 
Protestants  and  Catholics.”217 Quite  crucially,  sectarianism  is  non-theological  in 
nature.218 Theological  differences  do  assume  some  importance,  particularly  among 
religious  fundamentalists,  but  even  in  the  period  between  the  beginning  of  the 
Reformation in the mid-16th century and the emergence of modern Irish nationalism in 
the mid-to-late 18th century, it was the political organisation of religion that assumed 
primary  significance.219 More  simply  put,  Protestant  objections  to  Catholicism  are 
rooted in issues with papal (foreign) authority to a much larger degree than they are in 
animosity  towards  the  specific  theological  claims  made  by  the  principle  of 
transubstantiation or devotion to the Virgin Mary.
The experience of Ireland during and following the Reformation is reflective of 
the fact that the Reformation in England was born out of perceived political necessity as 
opposed  to  major  theological  difference,  differentiating  itself  in  this  way  from  the 
214 Lee A. Smithey, “Conflict Transformation, Cultural Innovation, and Loyalist Identity in Northern 
Ireland,” in Culture and Belonging in Divided Societies: Contestation and Symbolic Landscapes, 
ed. Marc Howard Ross (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 86-87.
215 Though it has since been used in reference to religious and ethnic divisions in other parts of the  
world,  particularly  in  Lebanon.  (Paul  WT  Kingston,  Reproducing  Sectarianism:  Advocacy  
Networks and the Politics of Civil Society in Postwar Lebanon (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2013); Max Weiss, In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shi'ism, and the Making of  
Modern Lebanon (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).
216 Alan  Ford,  “Living  Together,  Living  Apart:  Sectarianism in  Early  Modern  Ireland,”  in  The 
Origins  of  Sectarianism  in  Early  Modern  Ireland,  eds.  Alan  Ford  and  John  McCafferty 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 2; Dierdre Heenan and Derek Birrell,  Social  
Work in Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2011), 23.
217 Robbie McVeigh, “Cherishing the Children of the Nation Unequally: Sectarianism in Ireland,” in 
Irish Society: Sociological Perspectives, eds. Patrick Clancy, Kathleen Lynch, Sheelagh Drudy 
and Liam O'Dowd (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1995), 643.
218 Ibid, 643-644.
219 English, Irish Freedom, 56; Jonathan Tonge, Northern Ireland (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 
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Reformation on the continent.220 This lack of theological animosity is something which 
can be seen in the extremely close parallels between Catholic and 'high church' Anglican  
theology and practice. The Reformation in Ireland was carried out only half-heartedly, 
providing  a  fertile  breeding  ground  for  future  disagreement,  distrust  and 
discrimination.221 As in England, the early Reformation project in Ireland was carried 
out as part of a project aimed at strengthening the authority of the monarchy who had 
assumed the position of head of the official church. In other words, church-building was 
to play a crucial role in the process of state-building. 
With tension brewing between the formerly close King Henry VIII of England 
(then Lord of Ireland) and the Roman Catholic Church following Pope Clement's refusal 
(or restricted theological ability) to annul Henry VIII's marriage to Catharine of Aragon, 
the Church in England incrementally separated from the Roman Catholic Church during 
the early 1530s,222 resulting in full official separation in 1534. Though these changes, by 
virtue of the political and governance relationship between England and Ireland during 
this period, came into immediate effect in Ireland, the Irish Reformation really began 
with the 1536 Irish parliamentary declaration of Henry VIII as supreme head of the 
Church in Ireland.223 As English political authority in Ireland was largely restricted to 
Dublin and the immediate surrounding area, known as 'the pale',224 “declarative statutes 
could  only  represent  the  start  of  what  needed to  be  a  wider  and longer  process  of 
actually  implementing  change  on  the  ground  –  a  process  which  did  not  occur  in 
Ireland.”225 
If  English authority did not effectively permeate within Irish society when it 
came to governance matters, a warm welcome for its Reformation, especially where 
local ties to the church were particularly strong,226 could hardly have been expected. As 
Alan Ford writes: 
The essential problem which dogged the reformation throughout the 
sixteenth century and after was inherent in its very inception: it was 
conceived in England and imposed upon Ireland as an exercise in 
dynastic politics.  The legislation passed by the Pale parliament in 
1536 had little direct relevance to Irish needs or demands, nor did it  
take into account the various ways in which conditions in Ireland 
220 English, Irish Freedom, 48.
221 The Reformation in Ireland has attracted a considerable amount of scholarly attention. Some of 
the richest works in the area include: Elizabeth Boran and Crawford Gribben, eds,  Enforcing 
Reformation in Ireland and Scotland, 1550-1700 (Aldershot:  Ashgate,  2006);  Robert  Dudley 
Edwards,  Church and State  in  Tudor  Ireland (Dublin:  Talbot  Press,  1935);  Alan  Ford,  The 
Protestant Reformation in Ireland, 1590-1641, 2ed (Bern: Peter Lang, 1987); Henry A Jeffries, 
The Irish Church and the Tudor Reformations (Dublin: Four Courts, 2010); Samantha A Meigs, 
The  Reformations  in  Ireland:  Tradition  and  Confessionalism,  1400-1690 (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan,  1997);  James  Murray,  Enforcing  the  English  Reformation  in  Ireland:  Clerical  
Resistance and Political Conflict in the Diocese of Dublin, 1534-1590 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).
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differed from those in England.227
The specific roots of the failure of the Reformation to gain popular support in the Pale 
and beyond, whether it was the socio-psychological connection of the medieval Catholic  
church to 'the Gaelic world'228 or a matter of clergy income and resource paucity,229 are 
less important than its implications on political relations throughout Ireland. The failure 
of the native population to embrace the new state church added an additional dimension 
of  disloyalty  to  English  perceptions  (shared  by  some  Anglo-Irish  leaders)  of  the 
cultural/moral  inferiority  of  the  native  Irish.230 Where  the  head of  the  official  state 
church also stands as the head of state (the monarch),  a lack of religious allegiance 
simultaneously represents a lack of political allegiance and vice versa. Any time where a  
sizeable portion of the population who is to be governed refuses allegiance actively or 
passively,  this  becomes  a  problem for  the  governing regime.  At a  time when there 
existed a fear that an attack might be launched upon England with Papal support by one 
or more of its Catholic rivals (namely France and Spain), this constituted a threat to 
state security as well. The strategic threat a Catholic Ireland presented at a time when 
war between European states was commonplace made the religious divide an important 
(if  not  central)  policy  issue for  the  British state  in  its  governance  relationship with 
Ireland.
By the early 17th century, it  had become clear that the haphazard approach to 
Reformation in  Ireland which relied upon willing the native Irish to adopt  the state 
church of their own accord was failing to yield the hoped for (or expected) results.231 
Even the faint  glimmers of hope for the conversion of  the 'Old English'232 that  had 
appeared during the mid-Elizabethan era had largely vanished.233 Yet, the matter really 
could not be left unaddressed, especially in the wake of the Anglo-Spanish War and the 
assistance provided by Spain to Gaelic Chieftains during the Nine Years War (1594-
1603). Plantation, a form of punitive colonisation on lands seized from defeated rebel 
Chieftains and (more rarely) Old English landlords, emerged as a political strategy for 
increasing  British  control  in  Ireland  in  the  mid-16th century.  In  bringing  increasing 
numbers of British settlers to Ireland, it was hoped that plantation might also help to 
modernise the religious beliefs of local natives. The end of the Nine Years War and the 
defeat  of Hugh O'Neill,  Earl  of Tyrone (the most  powerful  Chieftain in  the ancient 
province of Ulster) provided the opportunity for plantation on a far greater scale than 
had occurred previously. 234 What became known as the 'Plantation of Ulster', began at a 
227 Ford,The Protestant Reformation in Ireland, 1590-1641, 9.
228 Meigs, The Reformations in Ireland.
229 Stephen Ellis,  “Economic Problems of the Church: Why the Reformation Failed in Ireland,” 
Journal of Ecclesiastical History 41, no 2 (1990): 239-265.
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McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 4.
231 English, Irish Freedom, 54.
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in In Search of Ireland: A Cultural Geography , ed. Brian Graham (New York: Routledge 1997), 
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time when the King of England and King of Scotland were one in the same (James I) 
and  differed  from  early  plantation  efforts  in  that  it  consisted  of  major  waves  of 
immigration from Scotland. 
The concentration of new arrivals in Ulster would,  irrevocably, give Ulster a 
more heterogeneous religious composition than the rest of the island. Where previous 
plantation  efforts  brought  Anglican  English  settlers  into  Ireland,  most  notably  in 
Munster, Ulster's mostly Scottish settlers were largely Presbyterian and other forms of 
Dissenter (non-Anglican Protestant), a reflection of the fact that the Presbyterian church 
had  established  itself  as  the  official  church  of  Scotland  in  the  late  16 th century.235 
Financial incentives, specifically free or very inexpensive land, also managed to attract 
Scots from across the class spectrum, a change from previous waves of migration which 
tended to bring middle and upper class English to Ireland. Critically, those new arrivals 
without family wealth depended wholly upon their ability to generate wealth from their 
particular allotment for survival. The need to secure tenancies/labour from the native 
population brought native Irish Catholic and settler Scottish (or 'Ulster Scots') into close 
contact  and  positioned  them  in  complex  and  dynamic  dependence/rivalry 
relationships.236 The  experience  of  Ulster  indicates  that  it  was  not  immune  to  the 
tendency of rapid demographic change (specifically a relatively homogenous influx of 
newcomers) to generate intergroup conflict.237 Tensions frequently flared, and at times 
violence  ensued.  The  worst  of  this  violence  came  during  the  1641-1642  rebellions 
which started as a push against the British government by an alliance of Catholic Old 
English238 and  native  Irish  before  descending  into  brutal  sectarian/ethnic  conflict.239 
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Rather  than  forcing  the  government  to  meaningfully  address  the  grievances  and 
insecurity  of  the  native  population,  the  rebellions  instead  deepened  mistrust  and 
reinforced the perception of the Catholic native population as fundamentally disloyal.
In the late 17th century penal laws were introduced in Ireland (similar to those in 
operation in England), with the hope that by restricting opportunities for Catholic and 
Dissenter participation in political and economic life conversion would ensue, in turn 
reducing the potential  for unrest  at  the grassroots level.240 These laws sent the clear 
message that Catholics and Dissenters alike were second-class citizens, if 'true' citizens 
at all, and reinforced the position of the 'Anglo-Irish' (Old English/New English who 
accepted the official church) at the top of Ireland's socio-economic hierarchy. There may  
have been some genuine concern for the state of the souls of those who failed to accept 
the truth of the official church,241 but these policies should be seen as  political  rather 
than  theological  in  nature.242 As opposed to  serving as  a  robust  and comprehensive 
policy framework,  “The Penal Laws were a rather muddled and complex set of anti-
Catholic  restrictions  which  had  been  enacted  by  the  Irish  parliament  in  piecemeal 
fashion.”243 Anyone wishing to serve in political office, the armed forces, much of the 
civil service or in other high profile positions (professor, attorney, chancellor, school 
master, etc.) was required to take an Oath of Supremacy (if not also the 'Declaration 
Against Transubstantiation') swearing allegiance to the monarch as head of the state 
church.244 Catholics were also barred from sending their children abroad to be educated 
in  the  faith,  possessing  weapons  (including guns,  pistols  and swords),  holding long 
leases (more than 31 years), inheriting land from Protestants, buying new land/taking 
out mortgages and (from 1727) voting in Parliamentary elections.245 The  Banishment  
Act of  1697  ordered  all  Catholic  clergy  out  of  Ireland  and  neither  Catholics  nor 
dissenters could enjoy the benefits of legally-recognised marriages.246 
It is difficult to dispute the severity of these restrictions by the letter of the law, 
however the limited power (or will) to enforce these laws in Ireland meant they failed to 
achieve  full  suppressive  or  conversionary  effect,  even  if  they  were  enforced  more 
regularly during times of unrest.247 Recognising their limited efficacy, most of the penal 
laws were in fact revoked before the turn of the 19th century, having been relaxed in the 
latter half of the 18th century.248 Where the penal laws perhaps had their greatest impact 
was,  rather  counter-productively,  in  strengthening  the  solidarity  and  resolve  of  the 
Catholic population, as they found themselves bound together by a shared experience of 
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exclusion and injustice under British rule.249 
Like  the  government  itself,  the  law  also  came  to  be  seen  as  foreign  and 
exclusionary. It was punitive on the basis of identity rather than behaviour and thus 
something  which  could  not  be  trusted  to  protect  Catholic  inhabitants,  even  if 
Catholicism itself was not illegal. Where, “Generally, a lack of trust leads to a lack of 
respect,”250 this had an impact on relations between the local native population and those  
responsible for upholding and enforcing the law, including the local settler population. 251 
Rather than lessening over time, this sense of distrust was allowed to ferment, especially 
among Catholics in post-partition Northern Ireland. This notion of the law as something 
imposed  upon  a  reluctant  minority  Catholic  population  is  raised  on  a  number  of 
occasions  by  interview  respondents  included  in  Robert  White's  Provisional  Irish 
Republicans: An Oral and Interpretive History.252 In reflecting on the Divis Street riots 
of 1963/1964, one respondent recalled, “... there was a terrible lot of people injured and 
I remember my mother and my father being –and my mother especially– being terrified. 
And most other mothers in the area being terrified at the RUC running about.”253 
Republicanism:  Mapping  New  Languages  of  Political  Expression  onto  the  Old  
Sectarian Divide
To understand the impact that the emergence of republicanism had on the Irish 
political landscape at the end of the 18th century, it is first necessary to understand what 
precisely is meant by the term 'nationalism'. In turn, any understanding of nationalism 
rests  upon  how  one  defines  the  nation  and  it  is  with  this  that  our  discussion  of 
republicanism begins.  Benedict  Anderson  has  provided  what  is,  arguably,  the  most 
widely-recognised conceptualisation of the nation: “an imagined political community – 
and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”254 He continues, “It is imagined 
because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of  
their  communion.”255 Because  of  the  contrasts  between  Anderson and contemporary 
Ernest  Gellner's  competing  visions  of  nationalism,256 attempts  to  reconcile  their 
definitions  of  'nation'  have  become  coloured.  However,  there  is  much  offered  by 
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Gellner's understanding of the nation. Unlike Anderson, Gellner refuses to provide a 
formal definition, seeing it as an unfruitfully difficult enterprise.257 Instead he outlines 
the space in which to develop his theory of the nation.
Gellner first captures the cultural basis of the nation writing: “Two men are of 
the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a 
system  of  ideas  and  signs  and  associations  and  ways  of  behaving  and 
communicating.”258 Secondly he emphasises its co-operative nature:
Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as 
belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations 
are the artefact of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities. A mere 
category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a 
given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of 
the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other 
in virtue of their shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each 
other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the 
other  shared  attributes,  whatever  they  might  be,  which  separate  that 
category from non-members.259
Both the Gellnerian and Andersonian conceptions of the nation emphasise that nations 
are built on a sense of mutual recognition – whether two co-nationals are personally 
known to each other or not they are bound together and responsible to/for one another 
through the nation.
Nationalism  concerns  one's  ideological  relationship  with  the  nation.  An 
important principle, if not the most important principle, of modern nationalism is that of 
congruence between national and state borders with Gellner writing: “Nationalism is 
primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be 
congruent... a theory of political legitimacy.”260 The related principle of national self-
determination holds that nations have the right to choose for themselves how they are to 
be governed and it has generally been assumed that governance in a single-nation state 
will yield the best results for the nation.261 However, it has been a rather rare occurrence 
where the boundaries of nations and states have perfectly aligned and it is in the pursuit 
of boundary reconciliation that nationalism becomes actionable.262 This reconciliation 
process  is  often  neither  simple  nor  peaceful.  Richard  English  argues  nationalism, 
“involves  struggle [emphasis  original]:  activity,  movement,  collective  mobilization, 
sometimes  a  pragmatic  striving  for  goals  and certainly  a  commitment  to  necessary 
change.”263 Arjun Appadurai takes the idea of struggle even further writing, “In plainer 
terms, nationalism involves the willingness to kill – or die – for the good of a plainly 
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artificial collective form.”264 As previously alluded two there are two main nationalist 
traditions  in  Ireland  (constitutional  and  republican)  dedicated  to  the  pursuit  of  an 
independent and self-governing state. 
Although  in  Ireland  nationalism  and  the  (immediate  or  ultimate)  pursuit  of 
independent  statehood  have  generally  been  intertwined,  the  18th and  19th century 
parliamentary  nationalists  are  an  important  exception,  instead  seeing  greater  local 
political autonomy within the United Kingdom was the way forward for the Irish nation. 
In the 18th and 19th centuries, both the Irish Patriot Party (led first by Hentry Grattan, 
later by Henry Flood) and the Irish Parliamentary Party advocated for local devolution, 
but  not  separation  from Great  Britain.  However,  the  extent  to  which  these  groups 
represent 'true' nationalism has been debated within the literature. Both Richard English 
and Jon O'Beirne Ranelagh have put forward a compelling case for the nationalism of 
these groups. The Patriots shared a concern for territorial (Irish) identity and a belief 
that it was important to act for the good of 'the nation' as opposed to merely one's own 
political  group and its  interests.  There  was  also an  emphasis  on  political  liberty  in 
keeping with the Enlightenment thinking of the period.265 Others, including Jacqueline 
Hill  and  Seán  Connolly,  have  argued  the  opposite  positing  that  this  parliamentary 
nationalism might best be considered patriotism rather than nationalism in keeping with 
the  self-labelling  of  these  groups.266 There  is  also  the  issue  of  how  the  Catholic 
population and its exclusion from formal politics was dealt with by the Patriot Party in 
particular. Despite constituting the overwhelming majority of the Irish population, Flood  
was quite resistant  to  Grattan's hope for the full  inclusion of Catholics.267 Thus,  the 
question of whether any movement willing to politically exclude the vast majority of 
'the nation' can really qualify as nationalist arises.  It is beyond doubt leaders such as 
Grattan  and,  more  importantly  Charles  Stuart  Parnell  (long-time  leader  of  the  Irish 
Parliamentary Party) have had an effect on subsequent separatist nationalist thinking, 
but these early parliamentary nationalists did not share in the aspiration for total Irish 
independence from Britain that is the defining feature of Irish nationalism today. 
The first major separatist nationalist group in Ireland was the Society of United 
Irishmen founded in the autumn of 1791 by a small network of liberal thinking, middle-
class,  Protestants  (mostly  Presbyterians)  in  Belfast.268 The  group,  inspired  by  the 
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political radicalism of the time and the American Revolution in particular sought not 
just Irish independence, but the creation of a democratic republic.269 For the past two 
centuries, the United Irishmen have been exalted as an example of how revolutionary 
Irish nationalist activity need not be sectarian in nature.270 Those who see the group as 
non-sectarian point to Tone's aspiration to, “unite the whole people of Ireland, to abolish 
the memory of all past dissensions, and to substitute the common name of Irishman in 
place  of  the  denominations  of  Protestant,  Catholic,  Dissenter.”271 Yet,  the  reality  is 
significantly  more  complex  this  image  belies.272 Indeed,  only  a  few lines  after  this 
statement of aspiration in United Irishmen leader Wolfe Tone's biography he admits that 
at the time of the publication of his political pamphlet, “An Argument on Behalf of the 
Catholics of Ireland” he had not yet made the acquaintance of a single Catholic.273 As 
the  United  Irishmen  transitioned  from  a  'club'  working  for  reform  and  Catholic 
emancipation  into  a  revolutionary  organisation,  the  group  understood  it  needed  to 
expand its support base if it wanted to really impact the shape of the nation. In doing so 
an alliance was forged with the Defenders.274 
In stark contrast to the leadership of the United Irishmen, the Defenders were a 
loose-network  of  secret  societies  peopled  by  agrarian  Catholics. Initially  set  up  by 
individual  communities  to  defend  Catholic  homes  from  night-raids  by  Protestant 
agrarian secret societies such as the Peep O'Day Boys and their Orange Boys offshoot 
(especially in Armagh, now part of Northern Ireland), the Defenders eventually came to 
model  Protestant  fraternal  organisations  such  as  the  Freemasons  and  were  strongly 
sectarian in both their outlook and violence.275 The Defenders were not the first choice 
for  an  ally,  but  the  Volunteers  who  the  United  Irishmen  may have  been  better  off 
partnering with had been banned in March 1793. Gaining the support of the Protestant 
militias, even before taking the decision to align themselves with the Defenders would 
have been extremely difficult  given their  animosity towards  the Catholic  population 
who would have, by nearly any measure, had the most to gain from a new political order 
rooted in equality.276 Ideologically, the Defenders did share with the United Irishmen an 
affinity for French-style republicanism and its revolutionary principles.277 Nevertheless, 
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the alliance with the Defenders would come with a heavy cost to the United Irishmen, 
seriously  undermining  their  genuine  non-sectarian  and  communalist  aspirations 
stymying the extent to which they were able to inspire a revolution among the general 
population as a whole. 
The autonomy with which the Defenders operated at the local level meant that in 
the execution of the United Irishmen-organised 1798 rebellion some local operations 
quickly  descended  into  sectarian  violence.278 Though  both  Protestant  and  Catholic 
groups participated in the violence, the massacres of Protestant civilians would stick in 
the mind of the Protestant population of Ulster for centuries to come.279 From this point 
forward  for  Protestants  republicanism  represented  a  serious  threat  not  just  to  the 
political  stability of the region (or the island as a  whole)  but their  lives as well.  If  
Catholics were rebellious, violent and untrustworthy by nature, republicans were even 
more so. But the covert nature of republican organisation meant that it was difficult to 
tell the difference between a republican, a sympathiser and an 'ordinary' Catholic. As 
popular politics began to develop throughout the 19th century, these fears, threats and the 
sectarian cleavage from which they emerged ascribed 'natural'  (if  imperfect)  modern 
political positions to both sides of the sectarian divide in Ulster, further complicating the 
boundaries  between  republicans,  supporters,  sympathisers  and  those  who  wished  to 
remain uninvolved. The Catholic population, who already conceived of themselves as 
Irish,  were  seen  as  the  natural  support  base  for  popular  nationalism  and  violent 
republicanism alike. With more to lose from possible independence than ever before, the  
Protestant  population  became increasingly invested in  maintaining  the  constitutional 
arrangement of the newly established United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.
The industrialisation and urbanisation of Ulster, Belfast in particular, during the 
19th  century  would  see  Ulster's  distinctiveness  from  the  rest  of  Ireland  grow 
considerably.  This  helped further  entrench the  politics  of  sectarian difference  in  the 
debate  over  the  relationship  between  Ireland  and  Britain.  In  1800  Belfast  had  a 
population  of  a  mere  20,000  but,  in  keeping  with  other  Victorian  industrial  cities 
(Manchester/Salford, Glasgow, Liverpool) it grew exponentially over the course of the 
century.280 By  1900  the  population  had  grown  17  and  a  half  times  over,  reaching 
350,000  and  overtaking  Dublin  as  the  most  populous  city  in  Ireland.281 Though 
Catholics remained excluded from prime positions in the largely Protestant (Dissenter) 
owned industrial enterprises, large numbers came to the city as labourers. This Catholic 
migration would change the composition of Belfast considerably. Where the city had 
been only 10% Catholic at the start of the century, Catholics represented approximately 
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one-third of the population by its close.282 The worsening economic conditions in much 
of  the  rest  of the Ireland, including severe crop failures,  encouraged massive  urban 
migration. Belfast was by no means the only (or even the most common) recipient of 
Irish Catholics looking for an opportunity to better their lives and escape the worst of 
the Great Famine that raged mid-century. Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester and London 
all  received large numbers of Irish immigrants as did the United States and Canada 
(then still a British colony, but it was on the verge of requesting partial independence to 
be granted without bloodshed). 
However the long history of sectarian tension in the north-east of Ireland created 
a  tension not  replicated  elsewhere.  It  has  been argued that  in  the  latter  half  of  the 
century sectarian violence was endemic,283 a  function of the growing pains of rapid 
social and economic change exacerbated by a resurgence in militant Irish republicanism 
in the form of the Young Irelanders and Irish Republican Brotherhood.284 The organised 
push for home rule from southern parliamentary nationalists was an additional pressing 
concern. Having lost the quasi-independent Parliament of Ireland with the Act of Union 
(1801),  Charles  Stuart  Parnell's  Irish  Parliamentary  Party  focused  its  activism  on 
pressuring the parliament in Westminster to devolve power to a local democratically 
elected parliament. His efforts were successful in convincing the Liberal Prime Minister 
William Gladstone to table the issue in Westminster.285 Though the first Home Rule Bill, 
(introduced  in  1886)  was  defeated,  it  sparked  serious  sectarian  violence  in  Ulster. 
Protestants feared that, “ 'home rule' in Ireland would prove to be 'Rome Rule',” 286 as it 
was clear the Catholic majority could no longer be denied formal political participation. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the Protestant reaction to the bill – keeping in mind it was 
introduced  into  the  British  Parliament  by  the  British  Prime  Minister  following  the 
advocacy of a Protestant (albeit Irish) politician - might strike some as peculiar, a matter 
addressed head-on by Charles Townshend: 
Looking back, a century on, it may seem hard to grasp why Home 
Rule unleashed such passionate hostility. It was a cautious measure of 
devolution,  and the degree of  independence it  offered Ireland was 
distinctly  limited.  (Ireland  would  not  have  defensive  forces,  for 
instance, or the power to levy customs duties.) For Gladstone and his 
Liberal  successors,  its  central  purpose  and  justification  was  to 
strengthen the Union – not break it – by reducing Irish discontent to a 
282 Boal, “Integration and Division,” 151.
283 Sean Farrell, Rituals and Riots (The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 136.
284 For further reading on militant republicanism/'the fenian movement' in Ireland and elsewhere in 
the 19th century please see: Boyce, Nationalism in Ireland,182-186; English, Irish Freedom, 172-
231;  Foster,  Modern  Ireland,  1600-1972,  390-405;  Brian  Jenkins,  The  Fenian  Problem: 
Insurgency and Terrorism in a Liberal State 1858-1874 (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University 
Press, 2008) ; MJ Kelly, The Fenian Ideal and Irish Nationalism (Rochester: Boydell & Brewer, 
2006); Owen McGee,  The IRB: The Irish Republican Brotherhood, form the Land League to  
Sinn Féin (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007);  Leon Ó Brion,  Revolutionary Underground: The 
Story of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, 1858-1924  (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1976); and 
Niall Whelehan, The Dynamiters: Irish Nationalism and Political Violence in the Wider World,  
1867-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
285 Paul Bew, Enigma: A New Life of Charles Stewart Parnell  (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2011); 
Francis Stewart Leland Lyons, Charles Stewart Parnell (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1973).
286 United Kingdom, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., vol 207 (1871), 1542.
P Stones and Provos N Ives-Allison 66
manageable level. It was presented as heralding a wider scheme of 
devolution which would give the rest of the regions of the UK similar 
autonomous powers, so eliminating the sense of Irish 'exceptionalism' 
that had unbalanced British politics and the Union itself.287
But, as Belfast's economy grew so too did its distance from local Irish politics, 288 its 
fortunes tied more to Britain and its empire than Dublin or Sligo.289 Between the very 
real fear that Home Rule in any form would ultimately lead to complete independence 
(in turn leading to the loss of religious freedoms) and the economic argument for strong 
integration with Britain, the prospect of a devolved Parliament in Dublin held no appeal 
for many Protestants, irregardless of who was responsible for advocating on its behalf. 
Sectarian violence, historically a largely rural and/or working-class phenomenon, may 
not have been carried out by those with the greatest direct economic interests in the 
region, but it served unionist interests nonetheless.
The defeat of a second attempt at Home Rule, the Government of Ireland Bill  
1893, in the House of Lords (the upper house of the UK parliament) heightened the 
stakes. Though not from Ulster nor, quite probably, a fan of its political culture, 290 pre-
eminent unionist politician Edward Carson, saw that his best opportunity for ensuring 
the  defeat  of  future  home  rule  efforts  lay in  the  mobilisation  of  Ulster's  Protestant 
majority behind the unionist cause. The Ulster Covenant, signed by 471,414 men and 
women, was intended to serve as a message to the British government that any attempt 
to impose Home Rule would be met with major resistance, a threat backed up by the 
mobilisation of between 90,000 and 100,000 men initially called Ulster Volunteers, later 
the Ulster Volunteer Force.291 Unsurprisingly, sectarian tensions reached fever pitch in 
the lead up to the introduction of the third legislative attempt at  home rule,  known 
formally as the Government of Ireland Act, 1914.292 But the outbreak of The Great War 
would put the implementation of the newly passed law on the back-burner until 1919, 
by which time Ireland was in the midst of a full-blown war of independence with the 
original Irish Republican Army leading the revolutionary republican charge. 
The Easter Rising,  initiated on the 24 April 1916, was organised by the Irish 
Republican  Brotherhood  and  carried  out  by  a  group  comprised  of:  a  rebellious 
subsection of the Irish Volunteers (led by Patrick Pearse); the Irish Citizen Army (under 
James Connelly); and Cumann na mBan (Winifred Carney and Constance Markiewicz 
playing a key role).293 Considered on its own, it was a failure. The republic the rebels so 
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boldly  declared  on  Easter  Monday  failed  to  materialise  when  the  Irish  public  was 
uninterested  in  seizing  their  supposed  new-found  independence  by  joining  the 
revolution.294 However, frustration with the number of casualties and damage caused by 
the  Easter  Rising,  followed by outrage  over  the  execution  of  Pearse  and  Connolly, 
would turn the tide of public opinion more decidedly against the British (outside the 
Protestant-majority area of Ulster), paving the way for the events which evolved into the 
War of Independence. 
In the 1918 General Election, the republican Sinn Féin party won 73 of Ireland's 
105 seats in the House of Commons in spite of the fact  that many party members, 
including a significant number of those elected, were serving prison sentences related to 
their rebellious activity. In January the 27 available elected Sinn Féin representatives 
(who refused to accept their seats in Westminster) declared the first meeting of a new 
legislative assembly for Ireland – the Dáil Éireann. The Dáil issued its own 'Declaration 
of Independence',  ratified the 'Proclamation of Independence'  read during the Easter 
Rising and declared itself the new government of Ireland. Elsewhere, two armed police 
officers (members of the Royal Irish Constabulary) were killed in a Tipperary attack by 
independently-minded  Irish  Volunteers,  triggering  the  Irish  War  of  Independence. 
During the early stages of the fighting the Irish Volunteers were adopted as the official 
force  of  the  Republic  by  the  Dáil.295 Though  they  retained  the  name  Óglaigh  na 
hÉireann in Irish, the group was rechristened the Irish Republican Army in the English 
language.296 
The War of Independence also gave rise to Northern Ireland as a political and 
legal entity. As opposed to the rest of Ireland where fighting was largely between the 
IRA and British forces, the differential  composition and history of the Ulster meant 
violence there took on a sectarian quality. There were relatively few republican attacks 
in Belfast during the War of Independence. This did not stop unionists from exacting 
revenge against the Catholic minority as a whole for southern republican attacks, but it 
did delay the escalation of conflict in the region.297 In 1920, the IRA stepped up attacks 
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in Ulster. These attacks, which they claimed would inflict economic damage on Britain, 
frequently  took  the  form of  burning  out  'big  houses'  and  businesses  owned  by the 
Protestant elite. Simultaneously, tens of thousands of returning soldiers were less than 
pleased  to  return  home  from the  battlefields  only  to  find  Catholics  and  'left-wing' 
Protestants (only marginally less disloyal) doing their jobs on their assembly lines and 
factory floors. Catholics and left-wing Protestants were forced out of the factories  en 
masse  and widespread rioting ensued generating the most intense period of sectarian 
violence the region had seen up to that point.298 Just as importantly it would help to 
create the pattern of violence the contemporary Troubles would follow, with Richard 
English writing:
Here, in the birth-period of Northern Ireland, was the recognisable 
pattern  of  Ulster's  sectarian  war:  responsive  sequences  of  killing 
destroyed  inter-communal  trust,  as  one  side's  outrage  prompted 
vicious retaliation in the struggle between loyalists and republicans. 
And  behind  all  this,  nationalist  Ireland  refused  to  recognise  the 
legitimacy  of  Northern  Ireland,  while  unionist  Ulster  ignored  the 
depth or justness of nationalist disaffection from the new state.299
The  early  'Troubles'  in  Northern  Ireland  would  last  until  1922,  by  which  time  the 
political landscape of the island had changed tremendously. 
While the British government was very much keen to find a quick resolution to 
the Irish War of Independence, it understood northern unionists would not quietly accept 
the unqualified Home Rule most likely to appease republicans. Even if the UVF revival 
following World War I was not nearly as successful as the unionist leadership might 
have hoped, unionist  military capacity needed to be taken into consideration as they 
threatened  to  escalate  the  conflict  in  new  directions.  The  result  was  an  imperfect 
compromise:  two  sets  of  Home  Rule  institutions  for  a  partitioned  Ireland.  The 
Government of Ireland Act (1920) proposed two regional parliaments, one covering the 
26 southern and easternmost counties with strong Catholic majorities (Southern Ireland) 
and the  other  (Northern Ireland)  for  the  six  north-easternmost  counties  where  there 
existed (overall)  a  clear  Protestant  majority  (Antrim, Armagh,  Tyrone,  Londonderry, 
Down and Fermanagh).300 The bill, approved on 11 November 1920, was accepted by 
northern Unionists who quickly moved to establish their devolved government and the 
Parliament  of  Northern  Ireland  was  inaugurated  in  June  1921.  The Government  of  
Ireland Act did not  find similar  favour among IRA volunteers now resolute in their 
pursuit of total unqualified independence and so the War of Independence raged on in 
the south of the island. Though the Anglo-Irish Treaty that brought the war to a close a 
year later would require similar compromises, it  ultimately proved more palatable to 
most  republicans.  The  treaty,  quite  importantly,  gave  the  six-counties  of  Northern 
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Ireland the right to opt out of the Irish Free State and operate under the conditions set 
out in the Government of Ireland Act, which its new government promptly exercised. 
Zero Sum Politics: Northern Ireland, the Provisional IRA and State Response
The establishment  of  Northern Ireland as  a  distinct  legal  and political  entity 
might  reasonably  be  considered  the  pinnacle  of  sectarian  politicking.  Although  the 
demographic trajectory of the time made it appear as though the Protestant majority had 
been secured almost in perpetuity, the unionist majority could not rest on its laurels. 
Catholics still constituted about one-third of the Northern Irish population and stuck in a 
state not of their own choosing, cut off from family, friends and co-religionists in the 
rest  of  Ireland,  they  had  plenty  of  reason  to bemoan  the  new  arrangement.  After 
centuries of tension and conflict, unionists and militant loyalists remained hypervigilant 
when it came to the ever-present threat of republicanism within their borders. If the IRA 
had been able to defeat the mighty British Army and secure the independence of 26 
counties, surely they had the potential to at least make a push for the independence of 
Northern Ireland. The refusal of Irish republicans to accept the legitimacy of the border 
and the claim to 'the whole of Ireland' included in the southern state's  Bunreacht na 
hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland) did little to reassure northern unionists of the stability 
of  Northern  Ireland.  Still,  after  the  violence  of  1920-1922,  life  in  Northern  Ireland 
became  relatively  peaceful  as  the  Catholic  minority  settled  into  the  new  political 
arrangement.301 
A lack  of  active  violent  resistance  did  not  necessarily  mean  support  for  the 
regime.  Most  Catholics  continued  to  harbour  long-term  aspirations  for  Irish 
reunification,  even  if  the  overwhelming  majority  only  supported  peaceful  political 
means of achieving this end. Constitutional nationalist politics emerged in the north as 
result  of  this  sentiment  and  established  itself  as  a  moderate  alternative  to  violent 
republicanism.  However  the  development  of  constitutional  nationalist  politics  only 
served to further reinforce the perception of the Catholic minority as disloyal and a 
persistent threat to the union. Yet, the unionist party was also unwilling to really open 
itself up to the minority population,  perceiving Catholics as beyond political  reason. 
Furthermore,  so long as sectarian politics prevailed,  there was no need to  appeal  to 
Catholics  as  potential  supporters  in  order  to  secure  a  clear  democratic  majority. 
Unsurprisingly, the Catholic minority became increasingly politically marginalised and 
distanced from both unionism and its Northern Irish governance more broadly. This 
301 The Republic of Ireland, still finding its feed economically, had a much less generous welfare  
state than that available in Northern Ireland. Therefore, even though the latter was not on-par 
with what was available on mainland Britain, working-class Catholics in Northern Ireland fared 
better materially than the working class of the Republic of Ireland. For those with very little,  
these marginal differences had a significant impact, much more so than for those at the top of the 
socio-economic ladder. As neither sectarian nor state violence was not an immediate concern 
during this period, the principle of political equality could be considered something of a luxury 
by many working-class  Catholics.  (Nicole  McEwan and Richard  Perry,  “Devolution and the 
Preservation of the United Kingdom Welfare State,” in The Territorial Politics of Welfare, eds. 
Nicola McEwen and Luis Moreno (London: Routledge, 2005) 46-47; Eileen Reilly, “Modern 
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Irish in the United States, eds. JJ Lee and Marion R Casey (New York: New York University 
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sense  of  disconnection  was  exacerbated  by  nationalist  abstentionism which  left  the 
Catholic minority without any voice in the regional parliament at Stormont.
The expansion of the welfare state in post-war Northern Ireland had the peculiar 
effect of increasing opportunities for discrimination in some areas (the negative impact 
of gerrymandering grew alongside the power of local councils),302 while decreasing it in 
others,  most  notably  access  to  tertiary  education.303 Catholics,  having  long  suffered 
much higher rates of unemployment,  and thus disproportionately represented among 
those at the bottom of Northern Ireland's socio-economic ladder, benefited greatly from 
the expansion of the welfare state, including increased provision in the way of public 
housing and unemployment benefits.304 At the same time, the welfare state established in 
the rest of Britain was not imported wholesale into Northern Ireland. Its basic tenants 
remained, but the Unionist government retained the right to adapt policy to reflect local 
political  circumstances  (essentially  maintaining  the  existing  balance  of  power  by 
suppressing Catholic political advancement).305 Nevertheless, by the 1960s the post-war 
education  reforms  began  to  yield  a  new  problem:  an  expanded  well-educated  and 
articulate  Catholic  middle class keenly aware of not only the second-class status of 
Catholics  in  Northern  Ireland  but  social  injustice  more  broadly  (including  in  an 
international context).306 
Many of those who would go on to become leaders in the Northern Irish civil 
rights movement (1967-1972)307 were part of this upwardly mobile educated Catholic 
working-class  including  (but  not  limited  to)  Bernadette  Devlin,308 John  Hume,309 
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Michael Farrell,310 and Eamonn McCann.311 Aspirationally cross-sectarian but largely 
Catholic in composition and support, the civil rights movement nevertheless differed 
greatly from previous nationalist and republican agitation by first and foremost framing 
its demands as British rights for British citizens. If the constitutional arrangement could 
not be altered, the important thing was to ensure that the full rights, opportunities and 
benefits  of  British  citizenship  were  extended  equally  to  all,  regardless  of  religion. 
Although it  would have  been very  difficult  at  the time for  loyalist  groups,  or  even 
mainstream unionist politicians, to know to what degree active nationalists/republicans 
were involved in civil rights agitation,312 the fact of Catholic mobilisation in itself sent 
alarm bells. 
The failure of socio-economic 'spectrum' politics to take hold in Northern Ireland 
meant  that  any  political  demands,  however  reasonable,  spoke  to  the  instability  of 
constitutional relationship between the region and the rest of Britain thereby indirectly 
challenging state legitimacy.313 With persistent pressure from hard-line loyalists ready to 
take  matters  into  their  own  hands  should  the  government  be  deemed  too  'soft'  in 
responding to the republican threat, anything less than a robust response, regardless of 
the scale of the actual republican threat, was unthinkable. This was especially the case 
when one considers that, unlike the Catholic minority, loyalists represented an important 
constituency for unionist politicians who relied on their electoral support to secure a 
Protestant/unionist majority along sectarian lines. With tensions mounting, the sense of 
increasing threat on both sides led to the battening down of the proverbial  hatches, 
intensifying  the  salience  of  in-/out-group  identities  and  renewing  both  in-group 
solidarity and out-group suspicion.314
As  previously  alluded  to,  similar  to  the  United  Irishmen,  the  civil  rights 
movement  attempted  to  appeal  to  a  cross-sectarian  audience.  However,  given  the 
entrenchment of sectarian loyalism within the region's Protestant working-class urban 
communities, those Protestants most likely to benefit from the civil rights movements 
were also the most suspicious of its motives. For a working-class Protestant residing in 
a traditional working-class neighbourhood taking up a civil rights placard on a weekend 
march was an act of betrayal. To do so would not only show a friendly allegiance with 
the 'other', but (more importantly) display a willingness to contribute to their political 
advancement. In this zero-sum political environment any advancement on the part of the 
Catholic population represented a 'loss' to the Protestant community as a whole,315 even 
if many of the demands of the civil rights movement (when implemented) had the effect 
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of  substantially  improving  the  material  and  political  conditions  of  many  individual 
working-class Protestant families.
The state,  represented on the ground by an overwhelmingly Protestant police 
force316 and the near-exclusively Protestant 'B Specials' (developed out of the remains of 
the old Ulster Volunteer Force after their return home from World War I), played an 
important part in escalating violence. It was the loyalist proto-paramilitary groups which 
emerged at the cusp of the Troubles however, who held the decisive hand during this 
period. The threat of violence that hung over each civil rights demonstration, with the 
probability that it would spill over into serious civil disorder and sectarian violence if 
left unchecked, necessitated a heavy police presence at civil rights demonstrations. The 
pre-existing tension between the Catholic population and the RUC (something of which 
loyalist  groups  would  have  been all  too  aware)  served  to  heighten  overall  political 
tensions. Civil rights marchers refused to relent, even in the face of loyalist threats and 
armed police presence. Protestant groups stepped up their counter-protests. In the end 
the police came down with a heavy hand upon the marchers who were, in marching 
illegally against bans on civil marches and demonstrations, insubordinate.317 
This  violence  led  to  greater  civil  disorder  and  unrest  amongst  the  general 
Catholic population, particularly in the working-class urban communities most engaged 
in the civil rights movement. These neighbourhoods also happened to be those most 
historically  prone to  rioting and sectarian conflict.  During the summer of  1969 this 
downward spiral of protest, violence and disorder gained such momentum that it grew 
well beyond the control of the local security services who were themselves perceived, 
by the minority population at least, to be actively contributing to the problem. There is 
little  disputing  that  the  Royal  Ulster  Constabulary  failed  to  prevent  Catholic 
neighbourhoods from coming under attack by loyalist mobs.318 More worryingly, there 
is  also  evidence  that  in  some  cases  members  of  the  security  services  actively 
participated  in  offensive  violence  against  Catholic  civilians  ('Battle  of  the  Bogside' 
(Derry), burning of Bombay Street (Belfast).319 Hardly likely given the fractures within 
and limited armaments of the republican movement at the time, loyalists nevertheless 
believed that a full-scale republican rebellion was imminent and responded according to 
the perceived threat.  With violence begetting further violence, it  appeared as though 
there was no ready end in  sight  to  the civil  disorder in Belfast  and Derry.320 James 
316 The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was the main police force in Northern Ireland from 1922 
until 2000 at which point it was significantly reformed and rechristened the Police Service of 
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support  from the  Catholic  minority.  (Graham Ellison  and  Jim  Smyth,  The  Crowned  Harp:  
Policing  Northern Ireland (London:  Pluto  Press,  2000);  Aogán  Mulchay,  Policing  Northern  
Ireland: Conflict, Legitimacy and Reform (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2006).)
317 Ronald John Weitzer, Policing Under Fire: Ethnic Conflict and Police-Community Relations in  
Northern Ireland (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 60.
318 Joanne  Klein,  “The  Failure  of  Force:  Policing  Terrorism  in  Northern  Ireland,”  in  Uniform 
Behavior: Police Localism and National Politics, ed. Stacy K McGoldrick and Andrea McArdle 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 97.
319 A particularly compelling and detailed account of Derry during this period is: Ó Dochartaigh, 
From Civil Rights to Armalites.
320 Simon Prince, Belfast and Derry in Revolt: A New History of the Start of the Troubles (Dublin: 
Irish Academic Press, 2011).
P Stones and Provos N Ives-Allison 73
Chichester-Clark, then Unionist Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, had little choice but 
to prepare himself  to issue a request to central  government  for military aid.321 After 
taking the necessary (and escalatory) step of calling out the controversial B Specials, his 
request, formally issued on 14 August 1969, was swiftly granted, ultimately changing 
the course of the conflict.322 
The Provisional IRA: Emergence and Response
It  is  often  forgotten  that  the  arrival  of  the  British  military  preceded  the 
emergence of the Provisional IRA and the formal schism in the republican movement 
out of which it emerged. The Irish Republican Army developed from a subsection of the 
Irish Volunteers and was first active during the War of Independence, suffering their first 
serious schism in the wake of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Many former IRA went on to join 
the  forces  of  the  newly-established Irish  Free  State.  Others,  opposed to  the  treaty's 
conditions  and limitations,  continued to  fight  for  full  independence during the Irish 
Civil  War.  It  was  this  latter  group who carried  the  title  of  'Irish Republican  Army' 
forward and from which,  eventually, the Provisional IRA would descend. Where the 
border, and the existence of a separate Northern Irish statelet continued to serve as a 
bone  of  republican  contention  in  the  decades  following  the  Irish  Civil  War,  the 
continued existence of the IRA represented an ongoing concern for state stability in both 
parts  of the now divided island. As such,  the IRA was proscribed in both Northern 
Ireland (the United Kingdom) and the Republic of Ireland. Driven underground, the 
conspiratorial  character  of  the  post-civil  war  republican  movement  affected  its 
recruitment and ability to disseminate its political  platform.323 Unsurprisingly,  it  was 
family and personal connections that were largely responsible for bringing subsequent 
generations of republicans into the movement, or at least this was the case among those 
who eventually moved into the Provisional republican movement post-split.324 Although 
one might be forgiven for presuming northern Catholic marginalisation would foster 
broader support for the republican movement in the years following partition, support 
actually waned considerably with the failed 'Border Campaign' of the 1950s biting hard 
what  little  support  was  left.325 By  the  time  civil  disorder  erupted  on  the  streets  of 
Northern Ireland,  the  IRA was no longer an active  military  threat.  They lacked the 
necessary  resources  to  provide  adequate  local  defence  let  alone  stage  any  sort  of 
significant  revolution.  But  in  the  face  of  heavy  loyalist  violence  and  state 
aggression/inaction, the Catholic population had nowhere else to turn in the hope of 
securing some sort of armed protection.
Not explicitly, widely or immediately admitted, the diminished military capacity 
of  the  republican  movement  was  well  understood by Cathal  Goulding  who led  the 
republican movement in the period leading up to the 1969 split.326 Although it would be 
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a difficult  pill  for many of the hard-line/cradle republicans to swallow, by the early 
1960s the Irish Republican Army's militarism was ineffective, if not counter-productive 
given  the  distance  between  the  group  and  the  broader  population.327 Goulding  saw 
politicisation  (without  the  full  renunciation  of  violence)  as  the  best  opportunity  to 
breathe new life into the organisation and attract the wider support needed to ensure the 
movement's continued ability to pursue its ultimate aims. By 1968-1969, it was clear 
that the 'Gouldingites', as Goulding's supporters came to be known, comprised the clear 
majority  of republicans in  the movement,  the hard-liners having lost  their  battle  for 
control. 
However  all  hope was not  lost  for those  who sought  to stay true to  a  more 
militarist  vision  of  republicanism,  the  situation  in  Northern  Ireland  presenting  an 
opportunity to strike an alliance with northern republicans enraged and embarrassed by 
the  IRA's  unwillingness  (or  inability)  to  adequately  protect  and  defend  Catholic 
communities under siege.328 Internal tensions within the republican movement would 
come to a head in December 1969 at the General Army Convention after the assembly 
accepted  two  resolutions  (flexibility  on  abstentionism;  support  for  international 
socialism) which would irrevocably shift the movement father to the left and further 
down the path to politicisation. Dissenters, some of whom walked out of the convention, 
held a meeting across the street where the foundations of the Provisional IRA were laid. 
The newly-established movement agreed the initial priority should be the provision of 
defence to Northern Catholics, with southern hard-liners acutely aware of the potential 
for destabilisation of the Northern Irish statelet that came with persistent civil unrest in 
Northern Ireland.329 Further, where IRA had come to stand for 'I Ran Away' in the minds 
of many Northern Catholics, defence was seen as the most important means of regaining 
the trust and (with time) support of Northern Ireland's Catholic minority.330 With support 
and instability, the leadership of the Provisional IRA truly believed they could force a 
British withdrawal from the region paving the way for reunification.
With continuing sectarian and state violence compounded by routine harassment 
form the security forces, solidarity was high among Northern Ireland's Catholics. In the 
years immediately following the republican schism when both Official and Provisional 
IRA violence was still primarily defensive, this translated into support for republican 
paramilitaries, with the Provisional IRA going to great lengths to present itself as the 
most capable community defender. However, this did not mean that the Provisional IRA 
was  particularly  successful  as  a  community  defence  organisation. In  fact,  the 
Provisional IRA likely increased the amount of violence visited upon Northern Irish 
Catholics.331 As Timothy Shanahan quite passionately writes:
What evidence is there that the IRA provided an effective defensive 
shield for Catholics,  either  at  the outbreak of the Northern Ireland 
327 John F Morrison, The Origins and Rise of Dissident Irish Republicanism: The Role and Impact  
of Organizational Splits (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 44.
328 White, Provisional Irish Republicans, 51-54.
329 Bowyer Bell, The IRA, 80.
330 Rekawk, Irish Republican Terrorism and Politics, 12.
331 English, Armed Struggle, 174-174; O'Doherty, The Trouble with Guns, 72;  Charles Townshend, 
Ireland: The Twentieth Century (London: Arnold, 1999), 208.
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conflict or over the decades to follow? Clearly the pre-split IRA did 
not  prevent  loyalist  mobs  from  attacking  peaceful  civil  rights 
marchers  in  October  1968,  or  from  destroying  Catholic 
neighbourhoods in Belfast in August 1969. The Provisional IRA did 
not prevent the British army from ransacking Catholic homes during 
the Falls Road curfew in July 1970; nor did it resist the imposition of 
internment without trial throughout the Six Counties in August 1971; 
nor did it take up defensive positions when British paratroopers began 
killing unarmed civil rights demonstrators in Derry in January 1972. 
Ironically,  although the incidents  just  mentioned  loom large  in  the 
standard republican narrative, in none of them did the IRA provide 
effective defence. Indeed, in the first three years of the Provisional 
IRA's existence, 171 Catholic civilians were killed by loyalists or by 
the security forces, the very people from whom the Provisional IRA 
claimed to be providing effective protection for Catholics.332
But, the Provisional IRA (and the Official IRA too, albeit to a lesser extent)333 were at 
least seen to be doing something and throughout Northern Irish history perceptions have 
often mattered more than reality in terms of determining group behaviour. 
The focus of the Provisional IRA on defence and rearmament during its first year  
of existence is evidenced by the fact that offensive operations were not sanctioned by 
the  organisation  until  January  1971.  The  first  British  Army death  would  come just 
weeks later.334 However, from the summer of 1970 forwards, an increase in Catholic 
working-class hostility towards the British military presence in Northern Ireland meant 
that a shift towards offensive operations was not out of sight for the Provisional IRA's 
leadership. Although the significance of this early chronology is often underplayed in 
the  literature,  it  illustrates  just  how detached  state  response  was  from the  scale  of 
Provisional  IRA  violence  and  actual  threat,  all  of  the  most  oppressive  response 
measures instituted prior to the Provisional IRA's development of a successful offensive 
campaign. Just as crucially, and contradicting the common republican caricature of the 
British  government  as  the  evil  oppressors,  the  most  oppressive  counter-terrorism 
measures were put in place before the central government of the United Kingdom seized 
full control of Northern Ireland and its rapidly deteriorating security situation in 1972.
Together and individually, the Falls Curfew and the introduction of internment 
(Operation Demetrius) were measures taken with the intent of destabilising, weakening 
and  quelling  republican  activity.  However  the  way  in  which  these  measures  were 
applied would prove decisive in terms of increasing the animosity between the Catholic 
population  and  the  British  military  who were,  at  the  time,  operating  essentially  on 
instructions  from Stormont  filtered  through central  government.  Aside  from Bloody 
Sunday, these two measures, the effects of which were felt as heavily by non-involved 
Catholics  as  republicans  themselves,  would  ultimately  counter-productively  increase 
332 Shanahan, The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Morality of Terrorism, 25.
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support  for  republican  paramilitaries  among  Northern  Irish  Catholics  with  the 
Provisional IRA the key beneficiary.335 
The Falls Curfew lasted for 36 hours from 3 July to 5 July 1970. After loyalist  
marches on 27 June ended in violence, the state wanted to ensure such violence would 
not  be  readily  repeated.  Thus,  a  weapons  search  was  launched  in  the  Catholic 
community of the Lower Falls Road, an Official IRA stronghold. The search prompted 
riots,  far  from unusual  at  this  time.  The  riots  escalated  in  severity  as  the  Officials 
became involved, keen to keep the Army out so as to prevent their weaponry (already in 
short supply) from being seized. At 10 pm an indefinite curfew was announced for the 
area, covering 3,000 homes. Anyone found on the street would be immediately arrested, 
however the announcement failed to stop either the rioting or, more troublingly, the 
exchange of gunfire in the area. Yet, the Army managed to seal it off in order to begin 
door-to-door weapons searches and seizures.336 The curfew lasted for 36 hours until 
women and children from nearby communities broke it by marching foodstuffs into the 
affected area. Sensing a public relations disaster, the military did not follow through on 
its threat of arresting those in violation of the curfew.337 
During the curfew, the Army did uncover and seize what was (considering the 
size of the area) a rather remarkable amount of weaponry, including over 100 firearms, 
21,000 rounds of ammunition and 250 kg plus of explosive materials.338 For both the 
Army and the unionist  government in Northern Ireland, the size of the haul in itself was 
evidence of the merit  of the operation.  Still,  (rather unsurprisingly) many Catholics, 
especially those of the Lower Falls,  were outraged. For the majority  who had done 
nothing wrong, they saw their liberty promptly suspended and the damage caused to 
many homes during the searches presented a serious financial hardship to working-class 
(including unemployed) Catholics who could ill-afford the cost of repairs. If there had 
been  any  hope left  among  the  Catholic  population  that  the  British  Army might  be 
impartial  and  professional  in  their  dealings  with  them,  this  illusion  was  promptly 
shattered by these events. 
Internment (arrest and detention without charge) was made possible through the 
permanence  of  the  Civil  Authorities  (Special  Powers)  Act  (Northern  Ireland)  1957, 
initially enacted in 1922 as temporary measures designed to allow the Northern Irish 
government  to  maintain  civil  order  during  its  tempestuous  state-building  years. 
Internment has a long history in Ireland. It was used during the War of Independence 
and on both  sides  of  the  border  during  the  Irish  Civil  War.  It  was  reintroduced  in 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in 1938 and 1939 respectively during the 
Second World War and again in the late 1950s/early 1960s to deal with the IRA's border 
campaign.339 During  the  Troubles  however,  internment  was  an  exclusively  Northern 
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Irish phenomenon, reintroduced by Northern Irish Prime Minister Brian Faulkner on 5 
August 1971 with the reluctant and passive approval of central government. Four days 
later, at the crack of dawn, the British Army began to sweep through Catholic working 
class neighbourhoods on the hunt for 450 republicans named on a list prepared by the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary.340 
The intelligence provided to the military was quite poor and although the army 
succeeded in  rounding  up 342 suspected republicans  in  the  first  24  hours  after  the 
launch of Operation Demetrius, fewer than 100 were actually volunteers or affiliates of 
the Provisional or Official IRA.341 The RUC's intelligence was outdated and incomplete 
(multiple persons in the same area with the same name), while on the republican side 
the leadership who expected their names would be on the list used the four days' notice 
to make themselves scare before they could be captured. Accompanying the outrage 
caused by the internment of many wholly innocent individuals was anger amongst the 
Catholic  population  over  the  total  one-sidedness  of  the  operation.  Although  loyalist 
violence had been as incendiary as republican violence, and indeed in the immediate 
run-up to internment it was loyalist groups responsible for inciting much of the worst 
violence there were untouched by the raids.342 In fact the first internment of loyalists did 
not  come until  February  1973,  a  full  18  months  after  it  was  first  introduced  in  a 
Troubles context.
Unfortunately, this sense of injustice begat outrage which would create further 
violence and disorder with widespread rioting, violence, and a surge of recruits flowing 
into the Provisional IRA.343 The increased support provided the organisation with the 
capacity  needed  to  mount  an  offensive  campaign  on  a  scale  previously  almost 
unimaginable.Thus,  the  re-introduction  of  internment  ultimately  represented  a 
tremendous  'own  goal'  on  the  part  of  British  counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism 
efforts in Northern Ireland.344 Still, the most spectacular own goal on the part of the 
British government would come a year later with the killings of 13 unarmed Catholic 
civilians (and a 17 year-old boy who may or may not have been armed) during an anti-
internment march in Derry on Sunday 30 January 1972 (also known as Bloody Sunday) 
and  initial  attempts  to  'whitewash'  the  incident  with  the  hastily  commissioned  and 
carried out Widgery Tribunal. Bloody Sunday, and subsequent government response o 
the  events  of  that  day,  would  prompt  the  largest  surge  of  support  for  republican 
paramilitaries and violence against the British state experienced over the entire course 
of the thirty year conflict.345 
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In the existing literature on the Troubles, there has been much consideration of 
how the Falls Curfew and internment together contributed to the further development of 
the  conflict.346 For  the  purposes  of  this  research  however,  it  is  more  important  to 
understand  why republican violence, or the threat of republican violence elicited the 
strength  and  type  of  state  response  that  it  did.  This  can  help  to  explain  why state 
reaction in Northern Ireland was comparatively far stronger than the American federal 
response to endemic gang violence in the city of Chicago (and other major American 
cities).  Critically,  what  emerges  here  is  a  disconnection  between  levels  of  actual 
republican violence and response. Simply put, at  least  in the early and most violent 
years of the Troubles it was not republican violence (terrorism) that was responsible for 
prompting state response but perceptions of the threat posed by republicanism as an 
organising  philosophy.  The  fact  of  actual  violence  provided  justification  for  the 
profound infringements of basic civil and political rights long taken for granted on the 
British mainland that the Falls Curfew, internment and Bloody Sunday represented, but 
state response spoke more to the existence of republicanism and its potential for inciting 
civi  disorder and violence among the loyalist population than the scale of the threat 
itself.  How  else  to  explain  a  response  strategy  that  had  begun  before  the  formal 
emergence of conflict, years before the Provisional IRA had fired a bullet or planted a 
bomb or even existed? It was the  perception held by loyalists and hard-line unionists 
that the civil rights movement was little more than a republican front movement which 
set in motion the chain of events which would evolve directly into the modern Troubles. 
Given  the  involvement  of  leading  nationalists  and  republicans  in  the  civil  rights 
movement, this misperception might be understandable, however that does not change 
its implications. There was no way for fledgling loyalist groups in the mid-1960s to 
understand the full extent of the IRA's internal troubles as republicans themselves were 
hardly likely to broadcast their woes. 
Hard-line southern republicans nostalgic for the days when the IRA was able to 
display some military prowess could not have created the Provisional IRA, one of the 
most significant violent political organisations of the twentieth century, on their own. 
The  IRA  as  a  whole  was  ill-equipped  to  launch  a  revolution  and  this  insular, 
conspiratorial, militant subset was even weaker. As argued by Richard English, “It is 
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important to stress that the new [Provisional] IRA were generated by northern realities: 
they would have come into being regardless of southern [Irish government] support.”347 
This argument, made within the context of a discussion of the limited (but important) 
financial and arms smuggling support the fledgling Provisionals received from certain 
individuals within the Irish government, holds true for the situation more generally. 
Moving beyond English's argument, it is possible to claim that, while certainly 
not single-handedly responsible for the Troubles as a whole, it was the early informal 
loyalist  groupings which developed over the course of the 1960s around individuals 
such as Rev Ian Paisley and Gusty Spence (founder of the modern Ulster Volunteer 
Force) who dreamed the Provisional IRA into existence. Loyalist violence and the threat 
thereof, logical only within the distorted perceptual framework created by centuries of 
highly-politicised sectarian division, necessitated active response on the part of the state 
before republicanism could re-establish itself militarily thereby weakening the state and 
increasing loyalist violence. Thus, whether or not republicans were at the time actually 
engaged  in  violence  against  loyalist  groups  or  the  state  (which  loyalists  believed 
themselves responsible for protecting) the existence of republicanism as an organising 
political  ideology was  capable  of  triggering  loyalist  violence  and  disorder  based  of 
dynamic  threat  perceptions  constructed  by  fear  and  based  on  limited  intelligence. 
Therefore, bringing conflict and violence down to a manageable level meant managing 
perceptions  as  well  as  realities,  especially  in  the  early  years  of  the  conflict.  It  is 
indisputable that Provisional IRA violence,  when it  did begin to occur,  demanded a 
swift response. Indeed, looking at the conflict as a whole, it can be argued that the size 
and shape of PIRA violence shaped the scale and intensity of state response, especially 
after  the  implementation of  direct  rule  in  1972.  However,  this  does  not  change the 
reality that the  fact of response in itself  was not  dependent on the scale, or even the 
actuality, of Provisional IRA violence. This seriously challenges the notion that state 
response to violence in liberal democratic states is rooted in a clear understanding of 
actual  violence levels or threat (as measured primarily by loss of life) and highlights 
how framing can matter more than reality. 
Race in America
If  political  ascription is  a  recurring theme in the  history of sectarianism and 
nationalism in Northern Ireland, the same might be said for political denial in the case 
of race in the United States. The early, sustained and reinforced politicisation of the 
sectarian  divide  in  Ireland,  and  the  extent  to  which  it  became  embedded  in  the 
governance  structure  of  Northern  Ireland,  meant  any  act  of  political  contestation 
affected the sectarian balance of power and any act of sectarian contestation threatened 
the political balance of power. In this environment, the Provisional IRA as a militant 
republican orientation could not escape becoming inscribed with sectarian and political 
meaning as republicanism itself had long become enmeshed in the history of violent 
Catholic contestation and resistance. The Provisionals embraced and even played upon 
the political  significance attributed to  the group in state response.  Yet  this does not 
change the reality that it was in the political framing rather than direct impact that the 
nature of the threat was determined and response was generated. 
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From the time of slavery through to the emergence of the contemporary civil 
rights  movement,  African  Americans  have  largely  been  denied  the  opportunity  to 
participate in the realm of formal politics. Therefore, for much of American history the 
political  significance  of  race  issues  has  been  determined  exclusively  by  white 
Americans.  With  African  Americans  excluded  from  the  formal  political  sphere  it 
became easy to frame race relations and racial inequality as economic and community 
concerns (slaveowner/slave relations; competition for jobs; crime; local unemployment) 
and thus part of the 'private sphere' rather than a matter of national importance. This 
framing has in turn deprived race issues of the language of political contestation. The 
civil rights movement  succeeded in challenging this denial and carved out a place for 
African American voices in the realm of formal politics, seemingly eliminating the need 
for  political  mobilisation  along  its  perimeter.  But  the  legal  equality  (equality  of 
treatment) achieved by the civil  rights movement has not  translated into equality of 
opportunity or equality of condition.  De jure (by force of law) segregation and racial 
equality may be a remnant of the past, but de facto (in fact) segregation and inequality, 
is alive and well. 
Chicago's  African  American  supergangs  emerged  on  the  cusp  of  the  1960s 
around the same times as the civil rights movement was reaching its peak in the south. 
Although the civil rights movement promised improvements in the lives of  all  black 
Americans,  those  who  joined  Chicago's  gangs,  along  with  most  northern  blacks, 
understood very early on that the de facto segregation that prevailed in the north would 
be left largely untouched by a movement focused on legal equality. Many of those who 
populated the fledgling supergangs came from families who had migrated north during 
the  Second  Great  Migration  and  understood  acutely  how  deeply  ingrained  racial 
inequality had become within America's supposedly open social structure. These gangs 
would benefit from the increasing marginalisation and alienation of low income black 
inner-city youth in the 'post-racial' era by offering their own alternative version of the 
'American Dream'. Much of the violence carried out by these gangs would differ little 
from the Provisional IRA’s involvement in community violence (tit-for-tat or retaliatory 
killings, execution of 'traitors', punishment beatings), but the absence of a tradition of 
violent black political contestation meant that these groups went undifferentiated from 
the city's early 'ethnic' white street gangs. 
This lack of political framing does not change the reality that Chicago's African 
American street gangs emerged as a result of the impact of decades of economic and 
social policy that enforced upon black Americans a second-class citizenship. It also does 
not change the fact that the scale of violence carried out by these groups would greatly 
restrict the ability of many of Chicago's inner-city residents to realise their American 
rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. It has however affected the federal 
government's willingness to take a leadership role in responding boldly to the politics 
and political  implications of gang violence,  something that has led to persistence of 
ineffective strategies largely developed to deal with the small, mostly non-violent and 
largely transitory youth gangs of the 1920s and 1930s. This is not to say the efforts to 
reduce  gang  violence,  particularly  those  carried  out  by  coalitions  of  community 
organisations and academic researchers have not been well-intentioned, simply that they 
have been thus far inadequate and ineffective. They have failed to fully consider how 
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the perpetuation of racial inequality and its evolution from full-blown 'white' dominance 
to  de jure  segregation/inequality and finally to  de facto  segregation have contributed 
greatly to African American gang violence's intractability.  
The subject of race comes up time and time again in the American gang studies 
literature. In fact it  would be difficult to find an example of American gang studies 
literature that makes no mention of race in some way. However the politics, or more 
appropriately,  the  political  history  of  race  are  given  short  shrift,  especially  when 
compared with the extensive consideration of  the role  of  history in  the research on 
Northern Ireland. Within the gang studies literature, it is perhaps Robert J Durán's Gang 
Life in Two Cities: An Insider's Journey that most blatantly attempts to buck this trend. 
He argues, “An  analysis of race and ethnic relations is essential to understanding gangs. 
I argue that if one wants to learn about gangs, one should first learn the history of race 
and  ethnic  relations  in  the  community  of  interest  and  explore  how  contemporary 
patterns maintain this inequality.”348 However his work focuses on local ethnic relations, 
local history and the local politics of race, with his emphasis on a grassroots approach 
to gang violence reduction reinforcing the relegation of gang violence to the level of 
community concern. 
What remains missing is an understanding that while gang violence (in Chicago) 
is very much embroiled in local neighbourhood and inter-personal dynamics, it has been 
born out of a national history of race, presents a national political concern requiring a 
federal-level response and is a threat to the principles upon which the American state 
was founded – essentially an integration of the macro- and meso- levels of analysis. As 
chapter 4 will illustrate in greater detail, the federal government should not declare a 
'war on gangs',349 but the threat does warrant serious high-level political consideration 
and  most  importantly  a  commitment  of  financial  and  (most  importantly)  human 
resources that only the federal government can provide. This is not to say there is no 
hope that the type of grassroots approach Durán advocates for will not or cannot work in 
Denver,  Colorado or Ogden, Utah, simply that it  does not make sense in a Chicago 
context  where levels  and entrenchment  of  gang violence are  such that  the  situation 
clearly remains beyond local (community or police) control.
Absent from the Public Sphere: Slavery and the Origins of Racial Division
The truth of how the first African Americans arrived on American shores has 
never been a mystery. Unlike Scottish Protestants who were encouraged to migrate to 
Ulster  through  British  government  policy,350 there  existed  no  formal  state  policy 
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explicitly encouraging slavery. However, as slavery proved itself to be an effective and 
economical solution to labour shortages on southern plantations,  its popularity  grew 
immensely. Approximately half a million African men, women and (far more rarely) 
children  would  be  shipped  across  the  Atlantic  to  meet  British  colonist  demand  for 
labour in the south's growing plantation economy from mid-17th century forwards.351 
Through  natural  reproduction  and  inter-colony  trade,  the  slave  population  would 
eventually reach approximately four million by the 1850s.352 At the precipice of the 
American Civil War in 1860, slaves represented a third of the population of the south.353 
However,  they were not counted in the official  population statistics of the time,  for 
slaves  were  not  persons  but  property or  'human chattel'.354 The  differences  between 
slaves and other property (slaves could be punished, wheelbarrows could not) would go 
on to inform the abolitionist debate. Yet, without personhood these human beings were 
denied not only the rights to life,  liberty and the pursuit of happiness set out in the 
Declaration of Independence, but inclusion in 'the people' for whom the government 
bore the responsibility of ensuring these 'inalienable' rights.
While  the  southern  economy  was  heavily  dependent  on  slave  labour,  the 
comparatively  advanced  industrialisation  of  the  north  and  its  success  in  recruiting 
European immigrants to fill labour shortages meant that while slavery existed, it was 
neither common nor essential. During and following the American Revolutionary War 
(or War of Independence), slavery and its abolition would emerge as a political issue 
and a source of tension between the southern and northern states. In spite of its framing 
as a moral scourge and morally unjustifiable, slavery was, above all, a proxy issue in the 
negotiation of the national balance of power during the early years of the union. In the 
early  19th century  slavery  remained  the  most  visible  divide  between  northern  and 
southern  states,  the  former  having  abolished  slavery  one  by  each  in  the  decades 
immediately  following  independence.355 Over  the  course  of  the  early  19th century 
slavery came to stand, at least for northern politicians, intellectuals and moral crusaders, 
as the most flagrant example of southern moral and intellectual inferiority.356 The north 
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353 Mary Lethert Wingerd,  North Country: The Making of Minnesota (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010), 175.
354 Randolph  B Campbell,  “Human Chattels:  The  Laws of  Slavery  in  Texas,”  in The  Laws  of  
Slavery in Texas: Historical Documents and Essays, ed. Randolph B Campbell, comps. William 
S Pugsley and Marilyn P Duncan (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 2010), 1-2.
355 Leon F Litwack, North of  Slavery:  The Negro in the Free States,  1790-1860  (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1985), 3.
356 Eric  H Walther,  “Slavery,  Race,  and  Culture,”  in  The American  Civil  War:  A Handbook of  
Literature and Research, ed. Steven E Woodworth (Westport: Greenwood, 1996), 126; Robert C 
Smith,  Conservatism  and  Racism:  And  Why  in  America  they  are  the  Same  (Albany:  State 
University Press of New York, 2010), 33.
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struck its first victory over the south when participation in the slave trade was made 
illegal nation-wide in 1808, and the push for full national abolition and emancipation 
grew  substantially  from  that  point  forward.  The  prospect  of  national  abolition  and 
emancipation presented the opportunity to claim not only a moral victory over the south,  
but a chance to ensure the dominance of northern culture and political sensibilities in the  
new state at a time when tension between the north and south was relatively  high. 
As nice as it  would be to think that the northern adoption of a pro-abolition 
stance was rooted in a genuine desire to improve the conditions of life for American 
blacks and fully integrate them into society, this does not appear to be the case even in 
looking beyond the  usefulness  of  pro-abolitionism in the  on-going north-south state 
rivalry.  Pressure  to  abolish  slavery  certainly  did  not  translate  into  a  willingness  to 
relinquish attitudes of racial superiority. After the abolition of slavery, the north found 
new  ways  to  embed  white  racial  supremacy  subtly  and  not-so-subtly  within  the 
economic and social order through widespread discrimination in the labour market and 
public/social  life  (housing,  education,  middle-class  social  societies  and  friendly 
associations). This set the template for the system of  de facto  segregation and racial 
inequality that has persevered beyond the victories of the civil rights movement.357 Just 
as importantly, in the lead-up to and immediate aftermath of emancipation there seemed 
to be little rush in extending full citizenship and voting rights to the African American 
population. In spite of their 'free' status, blacks therefore continued to lack a voice in the 
public sphere and in formal politics more specifically. Although there were a number of 
important and highly influential blacks active in the abolitionist movement, Frederick 
Douglass the most obvious example,358 they still lacked direct access to the political 
decision making processes that led to emancipation and abolition.359 
The Civil War was instrumental in paving the way to emancipation, but contrary 
to popular perception, it was not fought over the issues of slavery. At its heart was a 
battle  over  the  relative  position  of  the  northern  and  southern  states  and,  more 
importantly, the freedom with which the southern states should be able to operate going 
forward as the balance of power tipped decidedly against them. The lack of thought as 
to what would happen to the newly-emancipated  after their freedom has been secured 
serves as additional evidence here. At the same time it should not be forgotten that while  
not the primary consideration in the lead-up to war, emancipation would still change the 
history of American race relations profoundly and irrevocably. 
357 Litwack, North of Slavery.
358 Frederick Douglass,  Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass an American Slave  (Boston: 
The Anti-slavery Office, 1845); Frederick Douglass, The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass  
from 1817 to 1882 (London: Christian Age Office, 1882).
359 Other  key  black  abolitionists  (north  and  south)  included:  Ellen  and  William Craft  (fugitive 
slaves); Thomas Dalton (free man); John Parker; and Harriet Tubman. Much writing on black 
abolitionists  does  not  share  the  same  pessimism  of  the  overall  political  impact  of  these 
undoubtedly courageous and inspirational individuals presented here. Key works include: RJM 
Blackett,  Building an Antislavery Wall: Black Americans in the Atlantic Abolitionist Movement 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983); William Craft and Ellen Craft, Running 
a Thousand Miles for Freedom, or The Escape of William and Ellen Craft from Slavery (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999 [1860]); Benjamin Quarles,  Black Abolitionists 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); Shirley J Yee, Black Women Abolitionists: A Study in  
Activism 1828-1860 (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee, 1992). 
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The  decision  on  the  part  of  Abraham  Lincoln  to  issue  the  Emancipation  
Proclamation of 1863 was the result of tremendous generalised political pressure faced 
by the President.360 Yet, it is also possible to argue that this political pressure would have 
been bearable had there not existed an immediate need to bolster the fighting power in 
the Union Army. This view is supported by the importance placed on the incorporation 
of African Americans (specifically newly-freed slaves) into the Union Army within the 
Proclamation  itself.  If  less integral,  surely this measure could have been introduced 
separately, at a later date.361 Emancipation however, did not immediately beget formal 
abolition.  Slavery was abolished at the end of the Civil War with the addition of the 
Thirteenth  Amendment  to  the  United  States  Constitution:  “Neither  slavery  nor 
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have 
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.” 
New-found freedom for these former slaves was bittersweet as, “[t]he war left 
slaves with nothing but their freedom.”362 The economy was ill-equipped to deal with 
the  transition from slave  labour  to  waged labour and many former slaves ended up 
working on the same or similar plantations to the ones on which they had previously 
been enslaved. The establishment of the Freedmen's Bureau, though inadequate to deal 
with the full gamut of challenges faced by introducing more than 4 million new wage-
workers into the southern economy, was able to assist former slaves in using their new 
(limited)  bargaining power to improve their  working conditions.363 Nevertheless,  the 
reconstruction years would yield some definite improvements in the legal and political 
position of blacks. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1868)  
granted free men and freedmen alike citizenship rights thereby finally including black 
Americans as part of the 'people'.
With the ratification of the  Fifteenth Amendment  on 3 February 1870 blacks 
gained the legal right to participate in federal politics through the extension of the vote. 
Later  that  month  Hiram  Rhodes  Revels  became  the  first  African  American 
congressperson  when  elected  as  Senator  for  Mississippi.  Such  a  flurry  of  activity 
inspired a great deal of hope that, for the first time, African Americans would be able to 
conquer racial inequality and participate fully in political life. However, early African 
American  success  in  electoral  politics  was  a  short  lived  and  entirely  southern 
phenomenon.364 It would quickly come up against an elaborate system of Jim Crow laws 
360 There had been limited emancipation attempts made prior to this by individual Union generals,  
but Lincoln quickly ended them, believing emancipation as a constitutional issue. Yet, reaction to  
Lincoln's curtailment of limited emancipation put additional pressure on the President to issue 
national  emancipation, even  if  it  was still  something he personally was uncomfortable with. 
(Edna  Greene  Medford,  “Imagined  Promises,  Bitter  Realities:  African  Americans  and  the 
Meaning of the Emancipation Proclamation,” in The Emancipation Proclamation: Three Views  
by Harold Holzer, Edna Greene Medford and Frank J Williams (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2006), 11-13.)
361 Ran Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 147.
362 Alfred L Brophy, Reparations: Pro & Con (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 25.
363 Clayborne Carson, Emma J Lapsansky-Werner, and Gary B Nash, The Struggle for Freedom: A 
History of African Americans (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2007), 256.
364 The first northerner to be elected to congress was Oscar Stanton De Priest who represented the  
1st Congressional  District  of  Illinois  (covering  part  of  Chicago's  South  Side  and  The  Loop 
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that set the bar for political participation much higher for African Americans than most 
could possibly reach (for example through literacy and documentation requirements in 
areas where it was known former slaves had neither the opportunity to learn to read nor 
official  papers).  Drastically reducing the group of potential  African American voters 
made it nigh on impossible for African American candidates to get elected. Jim Crow 
laws, guided by a federal acceptance of 'separate but equal' as adequate for guaranteeing 
basic citizenship rights and civil liberties, would come to define the south in the post-
civil war era and beyond.365 
The rigidity of segregation in the Jim Crow south did allow for the development 
of an African American middle class and small black elite comprised mainly of those in 
the service professions (medicine and education) and capitalists who met the material 
needs of their black community (a process that had already been occurring in northern 
industrial centres).366 However, for the vast majority of blacks life continued to be both 
difficult  and  dangerous.  Even  decades  after  emancipation,  access  to  economic  and 
educational opportunities was generally poor. This was particularly the case in the rural 
areas many African Americans continued to call home. White supremacist organisations 
such as the Ku Klux Klan (first and second incarnation) and locally-organised mobs 
routinely  engaged  in  racially-motivated  attacks  including  lynchings.367 As  the  19th 
century  rolled  into  the  20th,  agricultural  mechanisation  further  reduced  employment 
opportunities for those with low skills and education.
Onwards and Upwards: Northern Migration and Civil Rights
The harsh conditions of life in the rural South prompted millions of blacks to 
move  towards  the  'promised  lands'  of  the  cities  and  the  north  where  they believed 
Neighbourhood) from 1929 until 1935 (the only black congressperson during his time in office). 
This fact is not merely interesting, but can also be seen as an indication that the 'racial equality' 
mantra espoused by the northern states was very much one based on legal and social  equality 
relative to the south.
365 Detailed information on the use and effect of Jim Crow laws in the Southern United States can 
be found in: Catherine A Barnes, Journey from Jim Crow: The Segregation of Southern Transit  
(New York:  Columbia  University  Press,  1983);  Adam Fairclough,  “  ‘Being  in  the  Field  of 
Education and Also Being A Negro… Seems… Tragic’: Black Teachers in the Jim Crow South,” 
The Journal of American History 87, no 1 (2000): 65-91; Adam Fairclough, Teaching Equality:  
Black  Schools  in  the  Age  of  Jim  Crow (Athens:  University  of  Georgia  Press,  2001);  and 
Kimberly S Johnson, Reforming Jim Crow: Southern Politics and State in the Age Before Brown 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
366 Leslie Brown, Upbuilding Black Durham: Gender, Class, and Black Community Development in  
the  Jim  Crow  South  (Chapel  Hill:  University  of  North  Carolina  Press,  2008),  249-284; 
Fairclough, “ 'Being in the Field of Education and Also Being a Negro... Seems... Tragic',” 65-
91; Thomas J Ward,  Black Physicians in the Jim Crow South  (Little Rock: The University of 
Arkansas Press, 2010).
367 James  Allen,  Without  Sanctuary:  Lynching Photography in  America  (Santa Fe:  Twin Palms, 
2000); David Mark Chalmers, Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan (Durham: 
Duke University Press,1981); Wyn Craig Wade, The Fiery Cross: The Ku Klux Klan in America  
(Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1998);  Amy  Louise  Wood,  Lynching  and  Spectacle:  
Witnessing Racial Violence in America, 1890-1940  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2009).
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opportunities would be greater and more colour-blind.368 During the first  half of the 
twentieth century more than 6 million African Americans moved to southern cities and 
the northern states (most settling in its industrial  cities)  during two major migration 
waves.  The First Great Migration, coinciding with World War I or The Great War in 
Europe, was the smaller of the two. During this period as many blacks moved to the 
southern cities as moved north,369 but even still  Chicago's black population doubled. 
These  rapid  demographic  changes  and the  tensions  they  generated  would  prompt  a 
major race riot in 1919.370 Thus, if the new Chicagoans had expected to receive a warm 
welcome in the north, they would have been sorely disappointed. Migration did, at least 
theoretically, increase access to new economic opportunities in the Northern industrial 
economy, however they were often temporary and exploitative in nature. 
Life in the north also offered an escape from the system of de jure segregation 
and racial inequality that prevailed in the pre-civil rights south, but it did not mean an 
escape from segregation altogether. This is something any African American seeking to 
buy a house in Chicago would quickly find. Housing open to African Americans was in 
short  supply  and  housing  conditions  were  often  both  cramped  and  dangerous. 
Restrictive  covenants  championed  by  'neighbourhood  associations'  (often  with  the 
backing of large institutions such as the University of Chicago) consisted of, “contracts 
signed by white homeowners who agreed neither to sell nor rent to blacks.”371 They 
closed off many middle-class areas to all African Americans, regardless of income, and 
put further pressure on 'the black belt' as it came to be known.372 A lack of access to 
traditional  financing  routes  made  homeownership  an  unrealistic  dream  for  many, 
including  those  with  stable  incomes.373 The  severe  overcrowding  in  housing  led  to 
similar problems in the public schools serving Chicago's growing black communities. 
Double- or even triple-shifts were brought in by the public school system to cope with 
the  strain  jeopardising  the  education  of  those  already  disadvantaged  by  race  and 
(generally) class, while leaving scores of young people on the streets all day with little 
to occupy them.374
The Second Great Migration, prompted by new industrial opportunities in the 
post-war  consumerist  era,  lasted  until  1970.375 More  than  with  the  previous  wave, 
368 Alfredteen Harrison, “Preface,”  Black Exodus: The Great Migration from the American South,  
ed. Alfredteen Harrison (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1991), vi-viii.
369 Earl  Lewis,  “Expectations,  Economic  Opportunities  and  Life  in  the  Industrial  Age:  Black 
Migration to Norfolk, Virginia, 1910-1945,” in The Great Migration in Historical Perspective:  
New Dimensions of Race, Class & Gender,  ed. Joe William Trotter, Jr. (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1991), 22-23.
370 James  R  Grossman,  Land  of  Hope:  Chicago  Black  Southerners  and  the  Great  Migration 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Mary Pattillo, Black on the Block: The Politics of  
Race and Class in the City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 31
371 Dominic A Pacyga, Chicago: A Biography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 225.
372 Pattillo, Black on the Block, 33.
373 Dan Immergluck, Credit to the Community: Community Reinvestment and Fair Lending Policy  
in the United States (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 2004), 87.
374 St Clair Drake and Horace R Clayton,  Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern  
City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 70, 202.
375 James N Gregory, “The Second Great Migration: A Historical Overview,” in African American 
Urban History since World War II, eds. Kenneth L Kusmer and Joe W Trotter (Chicago: The 
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migration concentrated on the northern industrial  centres,  something that put further 
strain on already tense race relations in Chicago.376 Though in some neighbourhoods the 
efficacy of the covenants had begun to wane in the face of demand, others, including 
Woodlawn remained closed to African Americans until the 1948 Supreme Court ruling 
in Shelly v Kraemer rendered racial covenants were legally unenforceable.377 The ruling 
could not have come at a more critical time. Although the Second Migration had less of 
an impact on the overall racial composition of Chicago than the first, it far outstripped 
the latter in sheer numerical impact. The city's African American population swelled by 
more than half a million persons between 1940 and 1960. The elimination of racial 
covenants may have eased the problem of housing availability, but did nothing about the 
dire housing conditions in many of these neighbourhoods.378 At the same time, inner-
city neighbourhoods were becoming increasingly black. 'White flight'  to the suburbs 
meant that low and middle income neighbourhoods in Chicago were increasingly filled 
by African American and (as a result of different migration patterns) latino families. 
Unsurprisingly, the local economy had difficulty absorbing the massive influx of 
low-skilled and unskilled labour. Though opportunities were still comparatively better 
in the south (where the need for labour was increasingly shrinking), many were left on 
the outside looking in at the glory years of the American industrial economy. At the 
same time, the expansion of the welfare state and public housing provision (the result of 
the Housing Act of 1949 developed as part of Truman's 'Fair Deal') created a situation 
whereby those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder had a measure of government 
support but few opportunities for self-sufficiency (let alone social mobility). Though the 
concentration of  ethnic minorities  and poverty in  the  city  of  Chicago was certainly 
nothing new, it was during this period that the modern conditions of 'hood' life would 
establish themselves,  with Arnold Hirsch arguing, “Out of the chaos [of the second 
migration and postwar expansion/restructuring of the welfare state] emerged the second 
ghetto, an entity now distinguished by government support and sanction.”379
The American civil rights movement that began in the mid-1950s was initially, 
and in its most potent years, a southern phenomenon. Nevertheless, it represented the 
first  and (to-date) only major mass political  mobilisation of African Americans.380 It 
University of Chicago Press,  2009), 19-38; Arnold R Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race  
& Housing in Chicago 1940-1960 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 1-39; Patillo, 
Black on the Block, 30-63.
376 Davarian  L Baldwin,  Chicago's  New Negroes:  Modernity:  The  Great  Migration,  and  Black  
Urban Life (Raleigh:  The University  of  North Carolina  Press,  2007);  Lois  Benjamin,  Three 
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Rowman & Littlefield,  2007),  18;  James R Grossman, “The White Man's Union: The Great 
Migration  and  the  Resonance  of  Race  and  Class  in  Chicago,  1916-1922,”  in  The  Great  
Migration in Historical Perspective: New Dimensions of Race, Class & Gender, ed. Joe William 
Trotter  Jr  (Bloomington:  Indiana  University  Press,  1991),  83-105;  Blyden  Jackson, 
“Introduction: A Street of Dreams,” in  Black Exodus: The Great Migration from the American  
South, ed. Alfredteen Harrison (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1991), xi-xviii.
377 Richard  RW  Brooks  and  Carol  M  Rose,  Saving  the  Neighbourhood:  Racially  Restrictive  
Covenants, Law and Social Norms (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).
378 Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, 16-17.
379 Ibid, xvii.
380 Key literature  on the  American  civil  rights  movement  includes:  Taylor  Branch,  Parting  the  
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began  with  the  goal  of  dismantling  the  system  of  Jim  Crow  segregation  that  had 
relegated African Americans to second-class citizenship since the reconstruction era, yet 
it  also  changed the shape  and language of  race  relations  in  the  United States  more 
broadly.  The United States Supreme Court ruling in  Brown v Board of Education  in 
1954 determined that,  “in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate but 
equal'  has  no  place.  Separate  educational  facilities  are  inherently  unequal,”381 
kickstarting  desegregation  in  education,  transportation  and  public  facilities  (parks, 
washrooms, drinking fountains, etc.). However, the process of moving from segregation 
to  integration could  not  be  achieved overnight.  It  was  long,  arduous  and too  often 
violent.382 Indeed, a full decade after Brown v Board of Education, the slow progress on 
integration would prompt the enactment of  The Civil Rights Act (1964). In a way not 
dissimilar to loyalist mobilisation in the face of Northern Irish calls for civil rights, it  
was the counter-mobilisation of those opposed to integration (known as the 'massive 
resistance') that complicated the process considerably.383 Unlike in Northern Ireland, the 
stakes in this context, both nationally and internationally, were too high and the threat of 
civil war too low to give in to Southern dissent. With the United States locked in a cold 
war with the Soviet Union, southern racial discrimination provided ready fodder for the 
Soviet  propaganda  machine  and  was  becoming  a  source  of  increasing  international 
scrutiny.384
In the north, this dismantling of de jure segregation had a negligible impact on 
the prevailing system of de facto segregation.385  De facto segregation intertwined race 
and class so wholly that racial inequalities had become self-reproducing within the class 
system, eliminating the need for legislative reinforcement.386 Once the major legislative 
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reforms had taken place, the southern civil rights movement became increasingly aware 
of the force of  de facto segregation in the north and turned its attentions to national 
mobilisation (starting with Chicago). But as difficult and bloody the battle was in the 
south, as blacks and their supporters were frequently subject to intimidatory violence, 
the relegation of northern inequality to the private sphere,  where it  was beyond the 
direct control of the government, created a much murkier (if comparatively bloodless) 
battlefield in which the 'enemy' was disparate, hidden or both. The shift in the priorities 
of the civil rights movement from legally-supported discrimination and segregation to 
pervasive  yet  unofficial  residential  segregation  would,  as  James  Ralph  argues, 
ultimately weaken support for the civil rights movement.387 Yet, it cannot be denied that 
without  the  efforts  of  the  Chicago Freedom Movement388 it  is  unlikely  that  helpful 
measures such as the Fair Housing Act (1968) (precluding  discrimination in the sale, 
rental  and financing of housing) would have been passed.389 Even still,  the ultimate 
impact of this measure would prove limited as new workarounds such as redlining and 
steering (not covered by the act) became more widespread.390 
The civil  rights movement did however  prompt  a change in  the language of 
discrimination in Chicago and across the United States. With it no longer legally or 
socially acceptable to discriminate on the basis of race, the language of class, culture 
and crime replaced the language of race in establishing boundaries of inclusion and 
exclusion. This change was facilitated by an unspoken broad-cultural understanding of 
the  relationship  between  race  &  income/socio-economic  status  and  the  perceived 
relationship between socio-economic status & crime.391 Euphemisms such as 'a rough 
neighbourhood' replaced formal demographic descriptors yet still conveyed a wealth of 
information – such neighbourhoods were/are predominately black/Latino with average 
incomes lower than the city median, crime rates much substantially higher than average 
and public schools of questionable quality ('underperforming').
Though the impact of the civil  rights movement is  measured by, and largely 
limited  to,  the  creation  of  legislative  measures  granting  legal  and  formal  political 
equality, the movement uniquely rallied black Americans around a common cause.392 It 
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387 James Ralph, Northern Protest: Martin Luther King Jr, Chicago and the Civil Rights Movement  
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also put race issues at  the centre of political  debate for the first  time in  American 
history. No longer were they a mere proxy for other political concerns. The civil rights 
movement fostered a genuine interest in extending full membership in the state (and its 
full  protections)  to  all  American  citizens  without  significant  ulterior  motives.  The 
promise of civil rights was the promise that no longer would African Americans have to 
live under a government that refused them a role in its composition and alteration. The 
question thus becomes how did African American street gangs emerging in this highly 
politicised environment escape becoming a political issue. 
Where  four-hundred  years  of  Irish  and  Northern  Irish  history  and  the  very 
structure of the body politic itself conspired to ensure that the Provisional IRA was 
readily and immediately coded as political, two and a half centuries of American history 
conspired to ensure these gangs were not, with geography contributing in an immediate 
sense. Chicago's street gangs and the civil rights movement were both reactions to racial 
inequalities supported and perpetuated by centuries of government action and inaction 
on race issues in an America where the status of African Americans had been imposed 
upon  them  by  successive  white  governments  from  which  they  were  formally  and 
informally excluded. Yet, African American street gangs in Chicago were far removed 
both geographically  and politically from the civil  rights movement.  The civil  rights 
movement was still very much a southern affair when the Vice Lords and Blackstone 
Rangers (Almighty Black P Stone Nation) first began to make their presence felt on the 
West and South sides respectively. 
There  were  attempts  to  integrate  Chicago's  street  gangs  into  the  civil  rights 
movement  as  it  expanded into  Chicago,  though the gangs remained skeptical  of  its 
ideology and potential. Collaboration remained ad hoc and on the gangs' terms. The 
'hope gap'  between  agents  of  political  violence  and gang violence  presented  in  the 
previous chapter can also be seen between civil rights activists and Chicago's supergang 
pioneers.  The southern civil  rights movement, and its black middle-class SCLC and 
NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) leadership393 
genuinely believed that legal and political equality, by removing the formal barriers to 
access (education, employment, public spaces), would lead to racial equality through 
equality of opportunity.394 For the black middle-class and elites, the perception of the 
particular constraints and opportunities they themselves faced proved accurate. They, 
their children395 and the small minority who managed to overcome the tremendous odds 
against them in the face of educational and socio-economic disadvantages396 were able 
3.
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to compete and advance within 'post-racial' American society because of the security 
provided by legal and basic political equality.397 Unfortunately, for the vast majority of 
African Americans the 'new tomorrow' ushered in by the civil rights movement was not 
nearly as bright. 
Even  before  the  civil  rights  movement  faded  away,  those  who founded  and 
flocked to Chicago's emerging supergangs in their earliest years instinctively knew not 
to believe the grandiose promises made by the civil rights movement. After all, these 
were the children of the disappointed and disillusioned who gave in to the promise of 
the north during the Second Great Migration. They keenly understood that unbolting the 
door  to  prosperity  made little difference without  the tools to  prise  it  open and step 
through. Their parents had made tremendous sacrifices, leaving behind their rural roots 
and  families,  accepting  whatever  work  was  available  even  if  pay  and  working 
conditions were worse than that offered to white employees, and suppressing parts of 
their culture found objectionable by the majority population, yet they gained little from 
playing 'the white man's game'. Therefore, rather unsurprisingly, even as the civil rights 
movement  expanded  northward  theoretically  offering  supergang  members  the 
opportunity to fully politicise  (and thus move away from violence),  ideological  and 
practical skepticism prevented these groups from fully giving in to the southern civil 
rights movement's idea of a united peaceful political front.
One area of particular discomfort was over the way in which civil rights leaders 
presented themselves culturally – they seemed to be begging for a place at the white 
man's table398 at a time when inner-city African Americans in both the north and the 
west were starting to really question why they would to break bread with him at all.399 
Quite  logically,  though  gang  members,  and  even  gangs  themselves,  flirted  with 
participation in  the civil  rights movement,  the bulk of their  energy was focused on 
improving their own material conditions of life and that of their families. Still seeing 
themselves as locked out of prime legitimate opportunities illegal activity became an 
increasingly  attractive  way  to  meet  these  material  needs  as  black  organisations 
displaced white organised crime in running vice markets and racketeering rings in inner 
city neighbourhoods.400 
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The black power movement  held greater  appeal  among Chicago's  gangs and 
gang members during the mid-to-late 1960s, better capturing the cynicism and rage of 
black youth in the inner city. However, the gangs had only tenuous relationships with 
the  major  black  nationalist  and  black  power  organisations,  the  Black  Panthers  in 
particular. Therefore, as local law enforcement and politicians were faced with decisions 
about how to classify the city's growing street gangs, there was little in the way of 
concrete evidence to convince them that they were not simply a more lethal evolution of 
the delinquent gangs that had populated inner city ethnic neighbourhoods since the top 
of the century. While there was no precedent for the type of mass African American 
political mobilisation that the civil rights movement represented, it is also important to 
keep in mind that neither had their been a history of African American group violence in  
the city. 
The Almighty P Stone Nation: Street Gangs and 'Domestic Terrorism' 
The Almighty P Stone Nation was one of the first African American supergangs 
to  emerge  in  Chicago  and  at  55  years  old  is  one  of  the  oldest  active  street  gang 
organisations in the United States. It experienced its heyday in the late 1960s and early 
1970s when it could claim to be the largest of street gang network in the city. There are 
two factors that make the Almighty P Stone Nation a particularly interesting case study 
in terms of trying to further our understanding of political threat and response. First and 
foremost, the Stones, at least during the period lasting from the mid-1960s through the 
mid-1980s, was the most explicitly political of Chicago's street gangs. They flirted with 
involvement  in  the civil  rights movement through the Chicago Freedom Movement, 
including  meeting  with  Martin  Luther  King  Jr  himself,401 before  integrating  black 
nationalist  and black  power  ideology and style  into the  'nation'  (bringing the group 
briefly into contact with the Black Panthers).402 Although a number of Chicago's gangs 
would experiment  with Afro-centric Islam, none would adopt  it  as fully as a quasi-
religious and political organising philosophy, the main branch of the Stones going as far 
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as reinventing themselves as the El Rukns.403 Secondly, as a result of the connections 
they forged with civil rights, black power and radical Islamic groups (regardless of how 
tentative these connections proved to be), the Stones were able to attract more attention 
as a political threat at the federal level than any other Chicago gang. 
With the release of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's COINTELPRO papers 
on 'black extremist'  organisations it has been discovered that the group's relationship 
with the Black Panthers had been a source of federal concern in the late 1960s.404 In the 
1980s the El Rukn faction of the Stones received the distinction of becoming the first 
(and only) African American street gang organisation to be convicted of conspiracy to 
commit  domestic  terrorism  (state  sponsored  terrorism  no  less).  Yet,  in  both  cases 
'political' attention came independently from the destructiveness of the group, a product 
of organisational relationships and government  perceptions of how partnerships might 
develop as opposed to levels of actual violence and destruction for which the group was 
responsible.  Otherwise  put,  concern  was  a  product  of  regime  self-preservation 
(perceived threat to state structures) rather than any real commitment to the fundamental 
principles of  American  statehood the governance  regime was established to  protect. 
Thus,  the  Almighty  P Stones  provide  the  best  demonstration  of  the  level  of  wilful 
ignorance  shown  by  successive  federal  governments  to  the  very  real threat  to  life, 
liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness  posed  by  gang  violence,  with  the  federal 
government abdicating its responsibility to protect the universal and inalienable of all 
Americans regardless of race, income or neighbourhood of residence.
Natalie Y Moore and Lance Williams'  The Almighty P Stone Nation: The Rise  
and Fall of an American Street Gang remains not only the most significant work on the 
Almighty P Stones Nation to date, but the most in-depth historical profile of any of 
Chicago's supergangs. Though this work does draw upon The Almighty P Stone Nation  
quite heavily in terms of factual detail, it is possible to argue that in concentrating on the 
'golden years' of the late 1960s and El Rukn period, Moore and Williams paint a picture 
of the organisation far more cohesive than it ever truly was. As much as Jeff Fort was 
able to wield a considerable (and uncompromising) amount of power within the main 
body of  the  organisation,  there  has  always been a  significant  amount  of  grassroots 
autonomy in its operations. Although leaving the main body of the group came at a cost, 
but  it  was  one  many  individual  sets  or  clusters  found  bearable,  especially  as  it 
reinvented  itself  as  the El  Rukns.  At  the  same time,  while  Moore and Williams do 
engage in a discussion of the facts around the Stones' more politicised activities and the 
domestic terrorism convictions, these episodes are used as part of a larger conversation 
about the overall internal power dynamic, specifically the influence of Jeff Fort who 
they present as the mastermind group's ideological shifts. In order to understand the 
broader significance of the Stones' political involvements and flirtations, it is necessary 
to  move  beyond  Fort  alone  and  into  a  consideration  of  the  group's  political 
distinctiveness  both  from  other  gangs  and  the  political  groups  with  whom  they 
interacted.  It  is  in  this  space  where  it  becomes  possible  to  better  understand  the 
determining role played by framing in state response. 
403 Moore and Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 21; 
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By mid-1959, the Vice Lords were already solidifying their presence on the West 
Side, but on the South Side African American street gangs were still generally quite 
small and geographically limited – more like the ethnic gangs of the 1930s and 1940s 
than  the  supergangs  which  were  to  follow.  As  alluded  to  in  the  first  chapter,  the 
Blackstone Rangers would develop from a merger of two of these smaller informal 
neighbourhood groups. Jeff Fort, who had moved to Chicago from Mississippi with his 
parents only a few years earlier, led a small group of boys known as the 'Blackstone 
Rangers'. Fort was only 13 years old, but his crew proved a real challenge for their  
Woodlawn rivals 'the Harper Boys', a small crew led by Bull Hairston (then aged 15) 
with  whom  they  would  frequently  brawl.405 Both  Hairston  and  Fort  had  personal 
connections with Leonard Calloway, co-founder and leader of the Vice Lords. Hairston 
and Calloway were  first  cousins  while  Calloway had often provided refuge  for  the 
young Fort when tensions with his parents flared.406 
The peak of the group's power from the mid-1960s through mid-1970s coincided 
with its flirtation with the civil rights movement and adoption of black power ideology 
(including a brief involvement with the Black Panther Party). The flurry of grassroots 
political activity in inner city Chicago taking place at the same time meant that, to a 
certain extent, engagement with the era's black politics was almost unavoidable given 
the deep relationships gang members and their families had with these neighbourhoods. 
In Woodlawn (the epicentre of Blackstone Ranger activity) the Saul Alinsky inspired 
Woodlawn  Organisation  (TWO)407 and  affiliate  groups  were  actively  encouraging 
residents to take greater leadership in their communities in order so as to take back the 
power from (mostly white) outsiders and elites. Groups engaged in grassroots politics 
found it useful to have gangs like the Stones on board both for the practical assistance 
they could provide (ready pools of between dozens and hundreds of volunteers) and to 
minimise the risk of 'disruption' from the gangs.408 
When,  in  1965,  Dr  Martin  Luther  King  Jr's  Southern  Christian  Leadership 
Conference  looked  to  bring  its  brand  of  (non-violent)  direct  action  northwards  to 
Chicago, the Stones made it very clear they wanted to be involved.409 But it was quickly 
405 Moore and Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 7 19, 21-22.
406 Ibid, 7, 21-22.
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realised that the relationship was not going to fly as  the SCLC and Stones were quite 
far apart in their views on the acceptability, practicality and necessity of violence. Yet, 
in spite of their differences, a number of Stones became actively involved in SCLC's 
work where they were particularly well suited to the role of march steward.410 For Adam 
Fairclough, the inability of the SCLC to turn the Stones into non-violent civil rights 
devotees is seen as an indication of the group's lack of genuine political interest.411 This 
is more than a little unfair to the Stones as it's a terribly large leap to go from arguing 
that the Stones were unwilling to accept the programme of non-violent political activism 
espoused by the SCLC to claiming that this is somehow evidence that the Stones did not 
hold any genuine political  aspirations.  The Stones  may not  have been as politically 
articulate as King, but their interest in willingly engaging in thoughtful discussion and 
debate indicates a depth of commitment to political thinking and engagement.
One  should  be  cautious  of  overstating  the  'pro-social'  orientation  of  the 
Blackstone  Rangers  in  the  late  1960s,  for  it  was  at  this  time  that  the  Stones  (first  
individually, then as a group) became more involved in the illegal economy including 
extortion/'protection'  rackets,  illegal  gambling,  prostitution  and  the  growing  drug 
trade.412 The negative impact of these activities on community life may have equalled, if 
not surpassed in magnitude, the positive contribution made by the group's community 
building efforts. But this is not a matter of one cancelling the other out, nor are their 
nefarious activities proof that the Stones' never had any genuine political aspirations. 
Although the Stones' involvement in the Youth Manpower Project (administered by the 
Woodlawn Organisation)  can be best described as an unmitigated disaster,  even this 
project began with a genuine commitment to improving the employment prospects of 
black inner city youth.413 As it turned out, the gang did exploit the program at every 
available  opportunity.  However,  the  available  information  on  the  Youth  Manpower 
Project leaves open the possibility that the Stones lost faith in the ability of the program 
to  deliver  results  as  a  result  of  the  poor  administration  and  training  provided  and 
decided to take what they could from it, rather than the intending to defraud the program 
from the outset.
It was during the late 1960s that the Stones' relationship with the 'black power' 
movement grew and a relationship with the Black Panther Party began to develop.414 
The Stones adopted red, green and black as their official colours inspired by the Pan-
African flag used by Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association and 
African Communities League.415 They were drawn to the Panther's focus on economic 
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inequality, confrontational politics and unapologetic acceptance of their blackness. The 
Stones' relationship with the Panthers was a source of concern for the FBI who had long 
been  concerned  by  the  activities  of  the  Black  Panther  Party,  a  group  which  used 
revolutionary language and advocated  for  the  use of  force  to  overthrow the  federal 
government.416 Given the Stones' man and firepower at the time, the development of a 
fruitful alliance between the groups threatened to strengthen the Panthers in Chicago 
and their potential for serious violence considerably. The FBI responded by trying to 
sow the seeds of distrust between the two groups. The Chicago office of the FBI sent 
fictitious letters to Fort and Panther leader Fred Hampton warning each leader that the 
other organisation had ordered a hit out on him.417 These efforts would prove ineffective 
and unnecessary. Not only did neither side believe the letters, but by the time they had 
been  received a  mutual  decision  to  end the  relationship  before  it  got  too  deep had 
already been made. Both the Stones and the Panthers were unwilling to sacrifice the 
amount  of  autonomy  (or  power  and  control)  needed  to  make  a  truly  meaningful 
partnership work. The Stones were already suffering from an internal leadership battle 
between Fort and Hairston, and a deepened relationship with the Panthers ran the risk of 
stymying  Fort's  push  for  total  leadership  as  Hairston  had  always  espoused  a  more 
nuanced understanding of black power ideology than Fort, even if the latter had been 
enthusiastic about developing the Stones' community connections.418 
Once  satisfied  the  relationship  with  the  Panthers  had  ended,  the  FBI's 
COINTELPRO programme lost interest  in the Stones. Regardless of the body count 
being racked up on the South Side, the group was no longer as a threat to the United 
States. Interestingly, despite the FBI's extensive campaign of surveillance, harassment 
and infiltration of the Black Panther Party, the group was only ever responsible for three 
deaths (one police officer and two suspected informants) between its emergence in 1966 
and split in 1971. That the Stones, described by the FBI as a group, “to whom violent 
type activity, shooting, and the like, are second nature,”419 were only considered a 'threat' 
as a result of their relationship with the Panthers speaks volumes about how American 
governments see threat in terms of protecting existing governance structures rather than 
ensuring  the  government  is  able  to  meet  its  duty  of  care  for  its  citizens  without 
malicious interference.
In the early 1970s Hairston was serving a lengthy prison sentence for conspiracy 
to commit murder but he retained his commitment to black power principles. Fort too 
was  serving  time  for  defrauding  the  federal  government  as  a  result  of  the 
mismanagement of the Youth Manpower Project. However during Fort's stint in prison 
he  converted  to  Islam (Moorish Science  Temple of  America)  and upon his  release, 
which  came  before  Hairston's,  he  began  to  work  his  newfound  belief  into  the 
organisation. In 1978 he seized control of the main body of the Stones and renamed it 
of Marcus Garvey: Race and Class in Modern Society (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1986).
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'The El Rukn Tribe of the Moorish Science Temple of America', El Rukn for short. This 
move prompted numerous defections, not just of individuals (including Hairston) but 
whole factions. Even if not themselves religious, some flat-out refused to accept the 
group's new style and outlook, seeing it as a betrayal of their Christian mothers.420 These 
breakaway  groups  were  no  less  (or  more)  violent  than  the  El  Rukns,  and  the 
involvement of all sections of the Almighty Black P Stone Nation in illegal activity 
grew during this period. It would be the El Rukns however who drew renewed federal 
attention  as  a  political  threat,  this  time on a  far  grander  scale  than  that  previously 
experienced. 
Though the El Rukn 'faith' was inspired by the Afro-centric Moorish Science 
Temple of America, the group would develop a relationship with Louis Farrakhan of the 
Nation  of  Islam  in  the  early  1980s.421 Farrakhan's  anti-American  and  anti-Semitic 
rhetoric had already landed him on the radar of United States counter-terrorism agencies 
and his international connections were a growing political concern.422 In 1985 Farrakhan 
announced that he had received a $5 million loan from the Libyan government under 
Colonel  Muammar  Gaddafi,  ostensibly  for  the  purposes  of  developing  African 
American  economic  self-sufficiency.423 The  El  Rukns  saw  the  Libyans  as  an  easy 
financier and went on to make an approach for funds themselves claiming the money 
was to go towards building a mosque. 
Although the details of any conversations between Libyan officials and the El 
Rukns  are  murky  to  say  the  least  (as  was  the  whole  domestic  terrorism  case), 
interactions between the group and individuals affiliated with the Libyan government 
gave rise to the allegation that the El Rukns had accepted $2.5 million to carry out 
terrorist attacks on strategic American targets on the Libyans' behalf. In 1987 Fort and 
high-ranking El Rukns Reico Crenshaw, Alan Knox, Leon McAnderson and Roosevelt 
Hawkins were convicted of conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism against the United 
States. Yet, the trial itself was complicated (to put it mildly) and even with a conviction 
secured, the government's case can still be considered less than wholly persuasive. 
There remain important questions around the credibility of the prosecution's key 
witness  and  the  methods  used  in  the  evidence  gathering  process.  Further,  though 
technically  irrelevant  when it  comes to  conspiracy  charges,  as  Moore and Williams 
point out, “there was no proof that money ever changed hands between the El Rukns 
and Libya.”424 As a result, it is difficult to say whether and to what extent the group was 
actually guilty of the crime for which it was accused. The extent of the El Rukns guilt, 
however,  matters  less  than  the  fact  that  the  federal  government  remained  more 
concerned by, and invested in, a vague potential collaboration between the El Rukns and 
the Libyan government than the loss of life and pubic order for which the former group 
was responsible in large swaths of the city of Chicago (including housing developments 
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sponsored through federal grants). At the same time, there was no consideration of the 
effect  such  a  massive  destabilisation  of  the  El  Rukn  leadership  would  have  at  the 
grassroots  level  as  disparate  factions  and  potential  leaders  were  put  in  direct  (and 
violent) competition for control.425 Thus, even this domestic terrorism case was guided 
by framing (or perception) as opposed to the actual nature of the threat (reality) in a way 
eerily  similar  to  the  governmental  response  in  Northern  Ireland,  particularly  in  the 
critical early years of the conflict. However, the results were wildly different. 
Without an understanding of the political relevance of gang violence, the federal 
government only paid attention to the Stones as a political threat when they flirted with 
crossing  the  line  between  'gang'  and  'political  activists'  as  a  result  of  potential 
partnerships  with  external  bodies.  It  was  through  these  partnerships,  which  never 
amounted to much in reality, that the group came to be cast as potential 'terrorists' – a 
group willing to use violence to support partners' clear political demands – irregardless 
of how much terror the group was responsible for in the inner city neighbourhoods of 
the South Side. It is certainly worth asking whether any of the partnerships federal level 
agencies deemed worthy of investigation would have generated the same destabilising 
effect on American life that decades of endemic and intergenerational gang violence 
have. 
Summary
Major  social  cleavages  in  Northern  Irish  and  American  society  have  been 
responsible for the generation and perpetuation of socio-economic, legal and political 
inequality on both sides of the Atlantic for centuries. This chapter however, has focused 
on the issue of how these cleavages have contributed to differential response to serious, 
mostly urban, group violence in the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) and United 
States. It explains how gang violence in Chicago has failed to generate a response in any 
way mirroring the seriousness with which Provisional IRA violence was treated during 
the Troubles in Northern Ireland despite higher levels of violence and argues differential 
response is the result of differential framing. In Northern Ireland centuries-old sectarian 
animosity feeding directly into nationalist politics ensures that all group violence, or 
even group mobilisation, on either side of the sectarian divide carries intrinsic political 
meaning and political implications. The opposite has been the case in the United States.
The lack of African American political mobilisation has meant that only those violent 
African American groups who engage the government directly using the language of 
political threat (for example calling for the violent overthrow of the government á la the 
Black Panthers) are seen as warranting high-level response. This is regardless of the 
scale of violence or impediment they present to the expression of the intrinsic rights to 
life,  liberty  and  pursuit  of  happiness  for  many  of  the  most  marginalised  American 
citizens. 
That gang violence not only poses a threat to the stability of the American social 
contract but also makes a statement about its validity has been roundly neglected in the 
425 Ryan Blitstein, “Police Struggle to Navigate New Gang Landscape,”  The New York Times  22 
November 2009, 39A; John Hagedorn and Brigid Rauch, “Housing, Gangs and Homicide: What 
Can We Learn from Chicago,” in Urban Affairs Review 42, no 4 (2007): 444-445.
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gang studies scholarship. Where the federal-level response to American gang violence 
has been muted, so too have serious demands for political accountability. It is not that 
gangs cannot attract federal attention, as the above discussion of the Almighty Black P 
Stones demonstrates. It is simply that when they do it is not because of their very real 
participation in endemic community-level violence but their links (however tenuous) to 
pre-identified political players/threats.426 Even as levels of gang violence (not just  in 
Chicago but nation-wide) sky-rocketed in the 1970s and early 1990s, the framing of 
gang  violence  as  a community  and  criminal  justice  issue  has  not  been  seriously 
challenged and, as the next chapter  will  explore,  this has led to the perpetuation of 
inadequate intervention and suppression-dominated responses to the problem. 
Much of the Provisional IRA's routine community violence varied little from 
that carried out by the likes of the Stones – tit-for-tat or revenge killings, punishment 
beatings or executions and defensive violence aimed at providing the community with 
protection from outside attack. Both the Provisionals and the Stones also grew primarily 
because  of  their  successful  mobilisation  of  socio-economically  disenfranchised  and 
educationally disadvantaged young men seeking to protect and defend themselves and 
their  immediate  communities  from  inter-community  and  state  violence. These 
commonalities are aspects of the Provisional IRA's operations that have been routinely 
ignored or marginalised within the prevailing scholarly narratives of the organisation 
which focus primarily on its development as a political force. 
This chapter has put forth the argument, missing from our current understanding 
of the Provisional IRA, that its existence rather than its actions were what necessitated a 
significant political response. The level of violence perpetrated by the organisation and 
its routine targeting of the institutions and representatives of the British state within and 
outside of Northern Ireland no doubt shaped the form and intensity of the response, but 
not  the  fact  of  response  itself.  Because  in  Northern  Ireland  any  real  or  perceived 
alteration in the sectarian balance of power affects a change in the political balance of 
power,  the  existence  of  the  Provisional  IRA as  a  militant  republican  organisation 
constituted a threat to the security of the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as 
much because of its own potential for action as from the loyalist response it was likely 
to incite. Where the civil rights movement has already been perceived as a republican 
conspiracy  by  loyalists,  conditions  on  the  ground  made  it  such  that  even  limited 
defensive action by the Provisional IRA, by denying loyalists the opportunity to regain 
ground 'lost' or 'under threat', posed a threat to the existing balance of power. That many 
in the Dublin-based Provisional leadership also sought from the very beginning to use 
unrest  as  an  opportunity  to  provoke  the  British  into  leaving  Northern  Ireland 
exacerbated the scale of the real and perceived threat, but did not create it.
The roots of this politicisation (and thus differential response) date back to the 
426 In stark contrast to the level of federal attention given to the gang violence issue, a tremendous 
amount of attention at  the federal  and state  levels has been devoted to  tackling gangs'  drug 
selling activities as part of the American 'war on drugs' first announced in 1971. However drug s 
are not the focus of this thesis. Federal response to drug trafficking does not change the fact that 
endemic gang violence has failed to warrant consideration as a public order crisis despite the fact 
that it undermines the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and American founding 
principles.
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mid-16th century Protestant Reformation. The nature of the Reformation of England 
and the governance relationship between England and Ireland imposed upon Ireland a 
new relationship between church and state that alienated native and Old English alike 
who  retained  their  ties  to  the  Catholic  church.  Where  the  Reformation  in  England 
combined the heads of church and state  into one person (the monarch),  it  created a 
dynamic where religious disloyalty automatically begat political disloyalty. On the other 
hand, Protestantism came to signify political  loyalty  and trustworthiness.  In the 17 th 
century the British government, recognising the failure of its early reformation efforts in 
Ireland, sought to increase the ties between Britain and Ireland through plantation. The 
influx  of  Dissenters  (non-Anglican  Protestants,  mostly  Scottish)  into  Ireland, 
specifically the north-east corner of Ulster, would change the demographic composition 
of this part of the island and distinguish it permanently. 
By the time of the first modern Irish separatist nationalist uprising in the late 18th 
century, the depth of the social cleavage was such that it was already possible to doubt 
whether mobilisation across the sectarian divide on any major scale could take place. 
However, the alliance between the United Irishmen and the Defenders, a Catholic secret 
society responsible for sectarian attacks during the rebellion, would deepen the divide 
even further and add a new political dimension to sectarian conflict in Ireland. Rather 
than being 'disloyal' in an abstract sense, Catholicism was ascribed a deep and enduring 
link with militant separatist Irish nationalism (republicanism) even though only a small 
a minority of Catholics in Ulster  would ever be supportive of republican violence. This 
coalescence of Catholicism, political disloyalty and separatist nationalism would come 
to  define  Irish  politics  especially  in  the  territory  of  Northern  Ireland  created  by 
Government  of  Ireland  Act  1920.  With  Northern  Ireland's  existence  the  result  of 
Protestant  political  insecurities,  any  political  challenge  by  the  Catholic  minority 
population,  whether  justified  or  not,  risked  cascading  into  a  threat  to  the  existing 
constitutional arrangement. The avowedly non-sectarian civil rights movement and its 
limited demands for social and political equality regardless of class or religious identity 
dared to  question the ability  (or  willingness) of  the Northern Irish state  to fulfil  its 
responsibility to uphold the basic  rights and dignity of all  citizens as established in 
British  common  law.  This  was  interpreted  as  a  challenge  to  Northern  Ireland's 
constitutional legitimacy by militant loyalists, who in turn responded by threatening, 
and then carrying out, acts of violence in an effort to quell the civil rights movement. 
Though the Provisional IRA claimed (like the United Irishmen) that it wanted to 
attract cross-sectarian support, the rigidity of the sectarian division in Northern Irish 
society and the long-established association of republicanism with Catholicism made 
recruiting more than a few brave Protestant followers an unrealistic aspiration.427 What 
little chance there may have been of mobilising the Protestant working class largely 
evaporated before the Provisional IRA had even been formed. Not only was its position 
as a republican group intrinsically tied to 'the Catholic side', but it emerged in response 
to  Catholic  demands  for  protection  against  sectarian  violence.  Thus,  it  was 
automatically embroiled in the cycle of sectarian violence and civil disorder taking hold 
in Northern Ireland. The methods, tactics and strategy of the Provisional republican 
427 Tajfel and Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour,” 7-24.
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movement changed considerably over the course of the Troubles. Diminishing levels of 
mob-based  sectarian  violence  and  the  growth  of  the  PIRA's  base  of  volunteers, 
supporters and sympathisers allowed the group to become more proactive and explicitly 
political in its violence. Yet, any external activity, whether it be the defence of residents 
of  Short  Strand428 from sectarian  attack or the ambush of  British  soldiers along the 
border, affected the balance of sectarian and political power and deepened the cycle of 
violence and increasing civil disorder.
The Almighty P Stone Nation developed in Chicago at  the same time as the 
American civil rights movement began to expand into the northern cities with demands 
moving  beyond  and  end  to  segregation  and  the  assurance  of  voting  rights.  While 
demands made by the American civil rights movement would bear close similarities to 
those made by the Northern Irish civil rights movement it helped to inspire, the framing 
differed  considerably.  The  Northern  Irish  civil  rights  movement  demanded  the  fair 
allocation of social housing, an end to discrimination in public employment and the 
dismantling  of  local  structures  of  disenfranchisement  (gerrymandered  electoral 
boundaries;  the  company  vote).  They  pursued  'British  rights  for  British  citizens' 
regardless of whether these citizens saw themselves as British, Irish or something in 
between.429 As basic legal equality for Catholics already existed in Northern Ireland, the 
civil rights movement focused on securing political and social equality. 
Conversely,  the American civil  rights movement  at  its  most potent and well-
supported was still in the position of advocating for basic legal equality. They demanded 
safe access to the public and political spheres and it succeeded in dismantling the jim 
Crow  system  of  de  jure segregation  and  legally  supported  racial  inequality  that 
prevailed in the south. However it would be those African Americans already in the 
upper  echelons  of  the  black  class  structure  who  would  benefit  most  from  these 
changes.430 While a few low income inner-city blacks would achieve social  mobility 
against the odds, for the bulk of young inner-city African American men in Chicago the 
civil rights movement fail to yield a demonstrable improvement in their quality of life.  
Furthermore, it eliminated racial inequality and discrimination as a viable explanation 
for one's failure to succeed in a world where race was supposedly no longer an issue, 
even if race continued to matter profoundly through its ties with socio-economic status. 
Those who joined the ranks of Chicago's African American nascent supergangs were 
keenly aware of the limitations to the promises made by the civil rights movement. They 
understood all too well that neither legal equality nor 'hard work' (alone or together) 
were sufficient to guarantee a life resembling 'the American Dream'.
From the arrival of the first  slaves on the shores of what would become the 
United States in the 18th century through to the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 
428 A Catholic enclave in East Belfast. 
429 Jodi  Burkett,  Britain:  Britishness,  'Race'  and  the  Radical  Left  in  the  1960s  (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 91; Marc Mulholland, Northern Ireland: A Very Short Introduction  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 50.
430 William Julius Wilson,  The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public  
Policy,  New  Edition  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,1990);  William  Julius  Wilson, 
“Another Look at The Truly Disadvantaged,” Political Science Quarterly 106, no 4 (1991-1992): 
639-656.
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1960s  the  fate  and  status  of  'black  America'  had  been  decided  (positively  and 
negatively)  by  'white  America'  and  its  slaveholders,  politicians,  policy  makers, 
intellectuals, major business leaders, abolitionists, activists and reformers. With black 
voices almost wholly absent from the public/political sphere, there was no tradition of 
violent black political agitation into which the emergence of African American urban 
group  violence  could  be  readily  situated.  That  the  behaviour  of  the  early  African 
American gangs in Chicago bore such close similarities to the white 'ethnic' street gangs 
long  a  feature  of  the  city's  urban  landscape  meant  that  there  was  a  precedent  for 
understanding  these  groups  from  the  view  point  of  'community  history'  or  'urban 
sociology'. What has been missing from this view of the gang problem however has 
been a broader consideration of how black street gangs fit into the history of American 
racial politics. Without this, the depoliticised framing of street gang violence in Chicago 
has failed to generate a substantial intellectual or practical challenge.
It took centuries for African Americans to win legal protections for their rights as  
set out in the  Declaration of Independence. Thus, it is unfortunately unsurprising that 
the  full  realisation  of  their  citizenship  rights,  especially  for  the  most  marginalised 
African  Americans,  has  been less  than  forthcoming.  Such  negligence  is  even more 
inexcusable now than it was in 1776. After all, can the demand that the state uphold the 
fundamental principles upon which it was founded really be considered unreasonable? 
At the same time, where the state has failed in its most basic responsibility can it ever 
truly be considered stable and secure? With framing the source of differential response 
to group violence, the next chapter will explore how the lack of political significance 
accorded  to  the  problem  of  gang  violence  in  the  city  of  Chicago  has  lead  to  the 
perpetuation of inadequate, ineffective and poorly-organised responses to gang violence. 
Framing gang violence as a community and criminal justice issue has meant that the 
responsibility for dealing with this violence has been left to a myriad of government 
agencies, community groups (with and without government backing), law enforcement 
and haphazard, often ad-hoc coalitions. It is hoped that by understanding the source and 
nature  of  differential  response,  it  will  become possible  to  question  the  wisdom  of 
existing approaches and start the process of mapping a new way forward. 
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Chapter 3
Previous Responses to Gang Violence in Chicago: The Limitations of 
Intervention, Suppression and Integration
The  scale  and  intensity  of  gang  violence  in  the  early  1960s  may  not  have 
appeared altogether different from that perpetrated by the early 'ethnic' gangs described 
by  Thrasher  in  The  Gang. However,  'supergang'  violence  would  soon  escalate 
significantly in both intensity and lethality during the mid-to-late 1960s.431 The central 
argument of this chapter is that in continuing to see the city's street gangs as  simply 
more organised and lethal versions of the 'ethnic' gangs of the 1930s, the path was paved 
for the continued application of strategies developed to deal with these comparatively 
tame groups. Where these strategies were only limitedly effective against early ethnic 
gangs,  they  have  been  almost  wholly  inadequate  in  the  face  of  increased  levels  of 
serious gang violence. In order to illustrate the inadequacy of existing approaches to 
gang  violence  reduction,  this  chapter  examines  the  history  of  gang  violence 
reduction/elimination  efforts  in  the  city  of  Chicago,  something  peculiarly  under-
explored in the existing gang studies literature.432 When compared with the  tremendous 
amount  of  scholarly  attention  devoted  to  the  state's  response  to  civil  disorder  and 
paramilitary, specifically Provisional IRA, violence in Northern Ireland,433 this extreme 
paucity  of  research  on  responses  to  gang  violence  in  Chicago  becomes  even more 
noticeable. 
Previous and current gang violence reduction efforts have followed along two 
main tracks. Suppression focuses on reducing gang violence by putting gang members 
beyond action (prison/parole/house arrest/restrictions around access to public space)434 
and  deterring  future  illegal  behaviour.435 Suppression,  closely  linked  with  the 
431 Brotherton and Barrios, The Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation, 40.
432 The first chapter in Irving Spergel's Reducing Youth Gang Violence is the obvious exception to 
this rule. However, in trying to survey the whole of the American gang landscape a considerable 
amount of depth is sacrificed. Furthermore his survey fails to consider what the broader pattern 
of  inadequacy  and  inefficacy  says  about  the  'gang  violence  reduction'  project  as  currently 
designed  more broadly.  This  is  understandable,  given his  response to  the  limits of  previous 
approaches  was  to  combine  what  appeared  to  be  best  practice  from  the  suppression  and 
intervention worlds,  however  it  differs  from this  work which  argues it  is  necessary to  look 
beyond the dominant binary entirely.  (Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 1-26.)
433 See, for example: Michael Cunningham, British Government Policy in Northern Ireland 1969-
2000  (Manchester:  Manchester  University  Press,  2001);  Paul  Dixon,  “‘Hearts  and  Minds’? 
British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no 3 (2009): 
353-381; Paul Dixon, “ ‘Hearts and Minds’? British Counter-Insurgency Strategy in Northern 
Ireland,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no 3 (2009): 445-474; Alexander T. J. Lennon, ed., The 
Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks (Cambridge: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2003); Edwards,  The Northern Ireland Troubles; 
Richard English, Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); LaFree, 
Dugan and  Korte,  “Impact  Of  British  Counter  Terrorist  Strategies  On  Political  Violence  In 
Northern  Ireland”;  Laura  K  Donohue,  The  Cost  of  Counterterrorism:  Power,  Politics,  and  
Liberty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 33-56; Townshend, Political Violence  
in Ireland.
434 Irving A Spergel et al, Suppression and Intervention: Problem and Response Research Summary 
(Washington: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1994), 8, 9, 1.
435 Anthony  A Braga,  David  M Kennedy,  Elin  J  Waring  and  Anne  Morrison  Piehl,  “Problem-
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legal/criminal  justice  system,  relies  upon  the  criminalisation  of  gangs  and  quasi-
criminalisation of gang membership.  Intervention approaches (inclusive here of those 
approaches labelled 'prevention'  elsewhere)436 generally focus on inspiring individual 
disengagement from violent activity and 'gang life' by facilitating attitude change and 
highlighting/providing alternatives to gang involvement (education, training, legitimate 
employment).  Attitudinal  change,  defined  loosely  as  the  adoption  of  'pro-social'  or 
'mainstream' values (often defined by a vague white middle-class notion of normality)437 
is  seen  as  important  in  ensuring  the  longevity  of  behavioural  change.  Intervention 
approaches  have  been widely adopted by social  service agencies,  non-governmental 
organisations and community groups. They often receive their funding from the public 
sector  including  the  federal  government  and  its  organs.  Yet,  this  funding  has  not 
historically  been accompanied by high-level  government  involvement  in  programme 
design or operations, with involvement generally limited to loose oversight provided by 
specific government departments/agencies responsible for funding the initiatives.
Over the course of the last half century, the efficacy of these suppression and 
intervention  efforts  has  been  underwhelming.  Though  homicide  rates  have  roughly 
halved since their peak in the early 1990s, this drop (which still does not go far enough 
so as to restore civil order) appears part of a broader national trend and cannot be linked 
to the city's most noteworthy gang violence reduction efforts on either the intervention 
or suppression sides. From the late 1980s forwards, frustration with the limited efficacy 
of existing approaches gave rise to a small number of 'integrated' or 'comprehensive' 
efforts. However neither the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project nor Project 
Safe Neighbourhoods (the two main Chicago programmes in this vein) has achieved the 
level of integration aspired to, the former tipped quite heavily towards intervention, the 
latter towards suppression. At the same time, with evaluation often left in the hands of 
programmes  themselves  or  the  independent  (academic)  evaluators  with  whom they 
work, a lack of standardised evaluation measures has made comparing efficacy across 
programmes (or even different aspects of the same programme or the same programme 
oriented  Policing,  Deterrence  and  Youth  Violence:  An  Evaluation  of  Boston's  Operation 
Ceasefire,”  Journal  of  Research  in  Crime and Delinquency  38,  no  3  (2001):  201;  Franklin 
Zimring and Gordon Hawkins,  Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1973).
436 Much of the existing gang literature has advocated a four-pronged classification system for gang 
violence  reduction  efforts  (prevention,  intervention,  suppression,  integrated/comprehensive). 
(Robert  J  Chaskin,  “Introduction,”  in  Youth  Gangs  and  Community  Intervention:  Research,  
Practice and Evidence,  ed.  Robert  J  Chaskin (New York: Columbia University Press,  2010), 
kindle loc 109; James C Howell, “Lessons Learned from Gang Program Evaluations: Prevention, 
Intervention, Suppression and Comprehensive Community Approaches,”  in  Youth Gangs and 
Community Intervention: Research, Practice and Evidence, ed. Robert J Chaskin (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), 53; Klien and Maxson,  Street Gang Patterns and Policies, 
88.)  However,  where  Klien  and  Maxson  argue  intervention,  “involves  affecting  individuals, 
groups, and communities already stereotyped with the gang label [emphasis added],” there is a 
strong case for combining the categories of prevention and intervention in a Chicago-specific 
context. The intergenerational and intractable shape of the gang problem in Chicago means that 
preventing the emergence of gangs has been replaced by intervening in the intergenerational 
environmental transmission of gang values and memberships. (Klien and Maxson, Street Gang 
Patterns and Policies, 239.) 
437 Monti, “Origins and Problems of Gang Research in the United States,” 14.
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at  different  periods)  very  difficult.  Nevertheless,  despite  any  strong  evidence  of 
substantial success, innovation in the field of gang violence reduction has been largely 
limited  to  expansions  or  modifications  of  pre-existing  intervention  and  suppression 
approaches.  This  perpetuation  of  inadequate  and  limitedly  effective  (thus  largely 
ineffective) response has led to the entrenchment of the gang violence problem within 
the fabric of urban Chicago. 
Although there has  been very  little  federal-level  political  involvement  in  the 
response to gang violence in Chicago federal politicians have been involved in funding 
renewal and mandate expansion, commonly using pledges of more money and resources 
to convince the public that the issue is being taken seriously by the federal government 
with  little-to-no  follow  up.  Real  political  resources,  most  importantly  genuine 
commitments of time and effort to cracking the problem, have not been forthcoming. 
Individual government departments and agencies provide funding and some institutional 
support  to  non-governmental  organisations,  educational  institutions  and  community 
groups responsible for administering and/or evaluating gang programs. While the value 
of this financial investment, which fluctuates between millions and hundreds of millions 
of dollars per election cycle, should not be ignored entirely, it needs to be considered 
against  the  comparative  resourcing  of  other  security-related  priorities.  Although 
terrorism has  cost  very  few lives  when compared with  gang violence  over  the  last 
several  decades,  domestic  counterterrorism and  homeland  security  expenditures  run 
between $50 and 100  billion annually.438 Where the United States started two wars, 
ostensibly, on the back of the 9/11 attacks, even this, the deadliest terrorist attack on US 
soil,  resulted in fewer deaths (2,996) than Chicago's gang violence problem between 
1991 and 2004 (3,442). 
Hands-on governmental response to the gang violence problem in Chicago has 
commonly been left to the state of Illinois and the municipal governments of Chicago 
and the surrounding areas. However, these local governments lack the resources needed 
to  affect  lasting  change.  Resource  scarcity  has  meant  gang  violence  prevention, 
intervention, reduction and suppression efforts have often become victims of political 
posturing as resources are shifted from one target area to the next in order to chase 
public opinion and capture votes.  Consequentially,  there has been a promulgation of 
temporary, ad-hoc and/or inadequate efforts that have proven ineffective in dealing with 
Chicago's gang violence problem. What is missing form the discussion of gang violence 
reduction (with view to elimination) has been a reflection on the comment that this 
inadequacy  and  inefficacy  makes  about  how  particular  (vulnerable)  portions  of  the 
population are valued by broader society.
Suppression and Legal Approaches to Gang Violence Reduction in Chicago
Spergel traces the history of legalistic 'suppression' approaches to gang violence 
438 Richard  Jackson,  Writing  the  War  on  Terrorism:  Language,  Politics  and  Counter-terrorism 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 15; John Mueller and Mark G Stewart, Terror,  
Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 1-4.
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reduction back to  the  mid/late-1960s.439 However  it  is  possible  to trace the roots of 
suppression-focused  responses  to  gang-like  youth  activity  back  to  the  turn  of  the 
twentieth century when Chicago became home to the first juvenile court in the United 
States.440 The court was established in 1899 out of concern on the part of child welfare 
advocates (social workers) over the treatment of children by the normal (now 'adult') 
criminal  justice  system.  They were  also  very  worried  about  the  lack  of  distinction 
between children and adults in police arrest/detention procedures and the danger this 
posed for delinquent minors.  There was also an emerging awareness of the role the 
prison environment  played in  the  criminal  socialisation of young people  who might 
otherwise  be  'saved'.441 The efficacy of these  early  juvenile  courts  in  turning young 
peoples'  lives around is beyond the remit of this thesis,442 however it is important to 
understand they played an instrumental role in responding to the gang-like activity of 
Chicago's urban youth long before gangs themselves became an area of academic study. 
This  is  something  which  also  illustrates  just  how  entrenched  legal/criminal  justice 
thinking has always been in the response to Chicago's gangs. 
At the same time, it is suppression-focused efforts which most closely resemble 
the  counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency  operations  carried  out  in  Northern  Ireland 
during the Troubles. The Chicago Police Department's specialised gang unit, in its focus 
on intelligence gathering and organised tactical response bears closer similarities to the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary's 'Special Branch' than has been recognised to date.443 It was 
also  as  a  result  of  developments  coming  out  of  Northern  Ireland  that  the  United 
Kingdom set  a  modern  liberal  democratic  precedent  by  introducing  'specialty'  anti-
terrorism  legislation  (The  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act  1974).444 Anti-terrorism 
legislation would subsequently inspire anti-gang legislation in both the United Kingdom 
and the United States, sometimes going so far as to incorporate the word 'terrorism' into 
the  title  of  specific  acts  (such  as  California's  Street  Terrorism  Enforcement  and  
Prevention  Act  (1988)  and  Illinois'  Streetgang  Terrorism  Omnibus  Prevention  Act  
439 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 15. 
440 Adele  Simmons,  “Foreword,”  in  A  Century  of  Juvenile  Justice, ed.  Margaret  Rosenheim 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002),  ix; David S Tanehaus,  Juvenile Justice in the  
Making (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 3-4.
441 Tanehaus, Juvenile Justice in the Making, 7.
442 A fascinating account of the evolution and criminalisation of the juvenile justice system and its  
disproportionate effect on African American and ethnic minority youth can be found in: (Barry C 
Feld, Bad Kids: Race and the Transformation of the Juvenile Court (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999).)
443 For more information on the RUC's Special Branch and counter-terrorism operations please refer 
to:  Bradley WC Bamford,  “The Role and Effectiveness  of Intelligence  in Northern Ireland,” 
Intelligence and National Security  20, no 4 (2005): 581-607; Jon Moran, “Evaluating Special 
Branch and the Use of Informant Intelligence in Northern Ireland,”  Intelligence and National  
Security  25, no 1 (2010):  1-2;  Robert  M Pockrass, “The Police Response to Terrorism: The 
Royal Ulster Constabulary,” Police Journal 59, no 2 (1986): 143-156. 
444 For more detailed information on the United Kingdom's legislative response to Troubles violence 
in Northern Ireland, please see: Gerard Hogan and Clive Walker, The Prevention of Terrorism in  
British  Law  (Manchester:  Manchester  University  Press,  1989),  27-173;  Austin  Morgan, 
“Northern  Ireland  Terrorism:  The  Legal  Response,”  in  Combating  Terrorism  in  Northern  
Ireland, ed. James Dingley (London: Routledge, 2009), 157-176.
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(1993)).445 The United States has yet to go so far as to adopt an equivalent to Northern 
Ireland's infamous Diplock Courts, (established under the Northern Ireland (Emergency  
Provisions) Act 1973),446 but legislative responses to both political and gang violence in 
the  UK  and  US  continue  to  push  the  limits  of  'acceptable'  infringements  on  civil 
liberties and human rights. 
Although anti-gang legislation has been modelled on anti-terrorism legislation 
first developed in the United Kingdom to deal with the Provisional IRA and Troubles-
related violence/civil disorder more broadly, it has often been forgotten that legislation 
(and suppression more broadly) was not what brought about the end to the Troubles. 
The Provisional IRA ultimately came to abandon its campaign of violence when it was 
offered the opportunity to become a full participant in the decision making process over 
the  'solution'  to  the  conflict  and the  design  of  post-conflict  Northern  Ireland.  Anti-
terrorism  legislation,  particularly  its  expansions  of  arrest  and  detention  powers, 
undoubtedly  had  an  impact  on  the  Provisional  IRA's  operations,  but  the  loss  of 
volunteers to arrest and imprisonment did not bring the organisation to its knees. For 
instance,  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Act  1974 was  enacted  in  response  to  the 
Provisional  IRA's  pub bombing campaign on the  British mainland with  the  goal  of 
punishing the perpetrators and helping prevent future mainland attacks, yet Provisional 
IRA activity in England increased following 1974. While the loss of volunteers from 
active  service  as  a  result  of  the  detention  powers  of  new legislative  measures  was 
inconvenient, this is cited less commonly than intelligence successes in prompting the 
Provisional  IRA's  late  1970s  reorganisation.447 Even  still,  while  intelligence  success 
helped  to  create  a  stalemate  situation  between  the  Provisional  IRA and  the  British 
government's security services they did not bring about the 'defeat' of the Provisional 
IRA in conventional military terms. Thus, it is important not to lose sight that it was the 
peace process culminating in  The Good Friday Agreement  (1998) (also known as The 
Belfast Agreement) which brought an end to the conflict and not curfew, internment, 
heavy  handed  military  suppression,  anti-terrorism  or  any  these  initiatives  in 
combination  or  sequence.  The  experience  of  Northern  Ireland  should  be  read  as  a 
cautionary  tale  to  those  committed  to  suppression-oriented  approaches  or  keen  to 
declare a 'war on gangs'.
The Chicago Police Department's Specialised Gang Units
The Chicago Police Department (CPD) was one of the first police departments in 
the United States (the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) being the other) to create 
445 Raffy Astvasadoorian, “California's Two-Prong Attack against Gang Crime and Violence:  The 
Street  Terrorism  Enforcement  and  Prevention  Act and  Anti-Gang  Injunctions,”  Journal  of  
Juvenile Law (1998): 272-300.
446 Charles Carlton, “Judging Without Consensus: The Diplock Courts in Northern Ireland,” Law & 
Policy 3,  no  2  (1981):  225-242; John  D Jackson  and  Sean  Doran,  “Conventional  Trials  in 
Unconventional Times: The Diplock Court Experience,”  Criminal Law Forum 4, no 3 (1993): 
503-520.
447 Bamford, “The Role and Effectiveness of Intelligence in Northern Ireland,” 590-591; English, 
Armed Struggle, 213; Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 177; Kiran Sarma, “Informers and 
the Battle Against Republican Terrorism: A Review of 30 Years of Conflict,” Police Practice and 
Research: An International Journal 6, no 2 (2005): 170-171.
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a  specialised  gang  unit.448 Initially  known  as  the  Gang  Intelligence  Unit  (GIU), 
specialised gang policing in Chicago officially dates back to 1967,449 however many 
districts had already established unofficial district-level gang units prior to this.450 The 
GIU was populated by youth-division officers drawn from across the city and its first 
priority  was  suppressing  the  Stones  and  Disciples  whose  South  Side  rivalry  was 
becoming increasingly lethal. There are also indications that the relationship of these 
groups to the Youth Manpower Project which the CPD strongly opposed also ensured 
they  were  priority  targets  of  GIU surveillance  and  suppression  tactics.451 Providing 
evidence that the Stones and Disciples remained actively involved in illegal activities 
stood to  not  only  demonstrate  that  skepticism of  the  Youth  Manpower  Project  was 
justified, but also that suppression was the only way to deal with these groups going 
forward, making the case for the continued funding of the GIU and greater resourcing of 
the CPD more broadly.
Over the last 47 years, the CPD gang unit has changed in scope, shape and name 
numerous times. During the 1970s the GIU would evolve into the Gang Crimes Section 
(Gang Crimes). Gang Crimes fluctuated in membership from around 100 officers to an 
all-time  high  of  455 in  the  early  1990s.452 Officers  assigned  to  Gang  Crimes  were 
responsible either for intelligence (and were assigned to one of three sections of the 
city)  or  tactical  operations  (also  assigned  primarily  to  one  section  of  the  city,  but 
deployable city-wide). The unit collaborated with other CPD units (narcotics, homicide, 
etc)  and  state/federal  agencies  as  required.453 The  most  significant  change  to  Gang 
Crimes came with the 1982 staffing injection authorised by Mayor Jane Byrne which 
quadrupled the size of the unit from just under 100 officers to nearly 400, elevating the 
Section to Bureau status.454 With African American and Hispanic/Latino voters the key 
to Byrne's 1979 electoral victory, this might have been seen as a surprising move given 
the tense relationship between the CPD (and Gang Crimes more specifically) and the 
city's low income minority residents.455 However, Byrne remained committed to acting 
on behalf of the people and it was inner city residents who put increasing pressure on 
the mayor to intervene. Beyond the decision to increase the size of gang crimes, this 
448 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 15.
449 Charles M Katz, “The Establishment of a Police Gang Unit: An Examination of Organizational 
and Environmental Factors,”  Criminology 39, no 1 (2001): 37-38; Charles M Katz, Edward R 
Maguire and Dennis W Roncek, “The Creation of Specialised Police Gang Units: A Macro-level 
Analysis of Contingency, Social Threat and Resource Dependency Explanations,” Policing: An 
International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 35, no 3 (2002): 472; Deborah Lamm 
Weisel and Tara O'Connor Shelly,  Specialized Gang Units: Form and Function in Community  
Policing (Washington: Police Executive Research Forum, 2004), ES1; Deborah Lamm Weisel 
and Ellen Painter,  The Police Response to Gangs: Case Studies of  Five Cities (Washington: 
Police Executive Research Forum, 1997), 25.
450 Lamm Weisel and Painter, The Police Response to Gangs, 25.
451 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 13, 15.
452 Lamm Weisel and Painter, The Police Response to Gangs, 25.
453 Ibid, 26-27.
454 Ibid, 25-26.
455 Larry  Bennett,  “Chicago's  New Politics  of  Growth,”  in  The  New Chicago:  A  Social  and  
Cultural Analysis, eds. John P Koval et al  (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), 46; 
Robert W Kweit and Mary Grisez Kweit, People and Politics in Urban America, 2ed (New York: 
Routledge, 1999), 198.
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intervention also, at times, took unconventional forms. Most notably, after a spate of ten 
murders and 35 shootings (including random 'snipings') in the Carbrini-Green public 
housing project, Byrne and her husband took the unprecedented step of moving into the 
complex for three weeks. They hoped the public attention would prompt greater action 
on the part of the police and housing authority, if not stop the shooting entirely.456 At the 
same  time,  despite  her  'tough  on  gangs'  stance,  both  the  El  Rukns  and  Gangster 
Disciples  are  alleged  to  have  assisted  with  Byrne's  (ultimately  failed)  mayoral  re-
election campaign.457 
Though well-intentioned, the boost Byrne provided to Gang Crimes would be 
rather short lived. The massive increase in size of the gang unit increased its relative 
power within the CPD, substantially increasing the freedom with which it could operate 
relative to prevailing CPD hierarchies and structures. This freedom meant that Gang 
Crimes, and the CPD by extension, could crack down harder on gangs than ever before, 
however for the residents who had called for stronger action not too long ago, the CPD 
went  too  far.  The  heavy  hand  of  the  new  Gang  Crimes  Bureau  was  accused  of 
insufficiently  discriminating  between  gang  members  and  non-involved  citizens  by 
residents and civil liberties groups and it soon faced a drastic staffing cut which returned  
the Gang Crimes Bureau to unit status.458 
The next major change to the organisation of the Chicago Police Department's 
gang  unit  came  in  the  mid-1990s  alongside  the  city-wide  roll-out  of  the  Chicago 
Alternative  Policing  Strategy  (CAPS).459 CAPS  sought  to  fundamentally  reorient 
policing in Chicago by placing the community policing approach at  the heart  of its 
operation.460 The routinisation of beat meetings helped develop stronger relationships 
456 Jane Byrne,  My Chicago (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2004), 312-22; Alexander 
von  Hoffman,  House  by  House,  Block  by  Block:  The  Rebirth  of  America's  Urban  
Neighbourhoods  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 140-141; Popkin et al,  The Hidden 
War, 13; William Julius Wilson, “The Urban Underclass in Advanced Industrial Society,” in The 
New Urban Reality, ed. Paul E Peterson (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1985), 137-138.
457 Ray Hutchinson and Charles Kyle,  “Hispanic Street  Gangs in  Chicago's  Public  Schools,”  in 
Gangs: The Origins and Impact of Contemporary Youth Gangs in the United States, eds. Scott 
Cummings and Daniel J Monti (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 131; Moore 
and  Williams,  The Almighty  Black  P Stone  Nation,  153;  Irving A Spergel,  The Youth Gang 
Problem: A Community Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 122.
458 Lamm Weisel and Painter, The Police Response to Gangs, 26.
459 For detailed information on the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy,  please see:  Robert  M 
Lombardo,  David  Olson  and  Monte  Staton,  “The  Chicago  Alternative  Policing  Strategy:  A 
Reassessment of the CAPS Program,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & 
Management 33, no 4 (2010): 586-606; Arthur J Lurigio and Wesley G Skogan, “Winning the 
Hearts and Minds of Police Officers: An Assessment of Staff Perceptions of Community Policing 
in Chicago,” Crime & Delinquency 40, no 3 (1994): 315-330; Skogan, Police and Community in  
Chicago; Skogan and Hartnett, Community Policing, Chicago Style; Wesley G Skogan and Lynn 
Steiner, CAPS at Ten, Community Policing in Chicago: An Evaluation of Chicago's Alternative  
Policing Strategy (Chicago: The Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium, 2004).
460 In keeping with the CPD's renewed emphasis on community engagement, the CPD rolled out its  
own version of the Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) Program that seeks to 
develop awareness  of  the  consequences of  gang involvement,  highlight  alternatives  to  gang 
involvement and develop positive police/youth relationships in an effort to reduce gang violence. 
G.R.E.A.T., initially developed in Phoenix, was rolled out nationally during the early 1990s as 
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between the police and some residents of high crime neighbourhoods, including areas 
plagued  by  gang  violence.  Through  these  meetings  it  came  to  light  that  the 
centralisation of Gang Crimes was widely seen as ineffective and poorly reflective of 
ground-level  realities.  Decentralisation  of  tactical  officers  followed  and  gang 
'specialists' (intelligence) were reorganised into the Gang Investigation Section where 
they were responsible for building/investigating cases against gang leadership and high-
ranking  members  and solving gang-related homicide,  narcotics,  assault,  intimidation 
and forced recruitment cases.461 In 2008, the Chicago Police Department recentralised 
control over its gang-specific tactical teams under the tactical Gang Enforcement Unit 
(GEU) working in  close collaboration with the existing GIS.  The CPD also assigns 
tactical gang officers to specialist units such as Mobile Strike Force (CPD gang and 
narcotics  officers  in  co-operation  with  state  and  federal  agencies)  and  the  Targeted 
Response Unit.462 
It  is  difficult  to gauge impact  given the absence of formal  evaluation  of the 
CPD's  gang-specific  operations.  This is  a  problem shared  with  those measuring  the 
efficacy  of  police  gang  units  across  the  United  States.  Though  a  very  rudimentary 
measure of effectiveness at best, it is worth pointing out that in the years immediately 
following the creation of the gang unit in 1967, homicides (of which gang-related deaths 
count for a significant proportion) increased from 395, 512 and 548 in 1965, 1966, and 
1967 respectively to 645 in 1968, 715 in 1969, 810 in 1970 and 824 in 1971, with city 
homicides well over the 800 mark (including a staggering 1974 homicide total of 970) 
throughout  the  1970s,  except  in  1972 (705)  and 1978 (787).463 If  nothing  else,  this 
the perceived success of the Phoenix programme increased the model's viability as a funding 
prospect. The programme has demonstrated some ability to change attitudes, but whether such 
attitude  change  persists  in  the  long  term and  whether  it  translates  into  reductions  in  gang 
violence  is  less  clear.  (Finn-Aage  Esbensen  et  al,  “Evaluation  and  Evolution  of  the  Gang 
Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) Program,” Journal of School Violence 10, no 1 
(2011): 53-70.)
461 Ibid, 28-29.
462 Chicago Police Department, “Chicago Police Host 2008 Gang Summit and Training Seminar and 
Announce Citywide Gang Strategy” (press release, Chicago, 22 November 2008), 1-2.
463 Chicago Police Department,  Chicago Police Statistical Report 1965  (Chicago: Chicago Police 
Department,  1966),  9;  Chicago  Police  Department,  Chicago  Police  Statistical  Report  1966  
(Chicago: Chicago Police Department, 1967), 6; Chicago Police Department,  Chicago Police  
Annual  Report  1967 (Chicago:  Chicago  Police  Department,  1968),  9;  Chicago  Police 
Department, Chicago Police Annual Report  1968 (Chicago: Chicago Police Department, 1969), 
12; Chicago Police Department, Chicago Police Annual Report 1969 (Chicago: Chicago Police 
Department,  1970),  10;  Chicago  Police  Department,  Chicago  Police  Annual  Report  1970 
(Chicago: Chicago Police Department, 1971), 8; Chicago Police Department,  Chicago Police  
Annual  Report  1971 (Chicago:  Chicago  Police  Department,  1972),  12;  Chicago  Police 
Department,  Statistical  Summary 1972 (Chicago:  Chicago Police  Department,  1973),  n  pag; 
Chicago Police Department,  Statistical Summary 1973  (Chicago: Chicago Police Department, 
1974), n pag;   Chicago Police Department, Statistical Summary 1974 (Chicago: Chicago Police 
Department, 1975),  n pag;  Chicago Police Department,  Statistical  Summary 1975  (Chicago: 
Chicago Police Department, 1976), 9;  Chicago Police Department,  Statistical Summary 1976 
(Chicago: Chicago Police Department, 1977), 11; Chicago Police Department, Statistical Report  
1977 (Chicago: Chicago Police Department, 1978), 16;  Chicago Police Department, Statistical 
Summary 1978  (Chicago: Chicago Police Department, 1979), 16; Chicago Police Department, 
Statistical  Summary  1979  (Chicago:  Chicago  Police  Department,  1980),  16;  Chicago  Police 
Department, Statistical Summary 1980 (Chicago: Chicago Police Department, 1981), 10.
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indicates the gang unit got off to less than a glowing start and likely did not fulfil the 
hopes of the police department or the city at the time of its founding. This being said, 
during  1982,  the  year  of  the  Byrne-sponsored  shake-up  within  the  unit,  homicides 
dropped to 668 from 863 and 877 in 1980 and 1981 respectively, though this decline 
would  be  temporary.  Homicides  increased  to  729  and  741  in  1983  and  1984 
respectively, before dropping again to 666 in 1985.464 Murder rates declined in the wake 
of the shake-up of the mid-to-late 1990s, but this coincided with the as-yet inadequately 
explained  national  decrease  in  gang  violence  meaning  it  is  impossible  to  reliably 
attribute this decline to changes in the gang unit. Following the 2008 establishment of 
the GEU, homicides dropped from 513 in 2008 to 461 in 2009.465 Yet, looking at the 
longer term picture, from 2004 forwards, Chicago's annual number of homicides has 
appeared to stabilise in the mid-400s, with 2008 and 2012 exceptionally violent years, 
breaking the 500 mark.
Gang-specific Legislation
As with  terrorism,  nearly  all  the  most  objectionable  gang activity  is  already 
covered under ordinary criminal law. Homicide, assault, narcotics trafficking and money 
laundering are  all  clear  criminal  offences  regardless of  who is  responsible  for  their 
commission. Yet, like with terrorism, lawmakers have felt it increasingly necessary to 
enact  specialty  gang  legislation.  One  of  the  most  common  justifications  for  gang 
specific  legislation  is  that  it  fills  the  gap  between  existing  criminal  offences  and 
facilitative  gang  behaviours,  such  as  loitering  in  groups  in  a  known open  air  drug 
market466.467 However, where much anti-gang legislation is enacted as part of a knee-jerk 
political response to a particularly 'outrageous' incident (often the killing of an 'innocent 
464 Chicago  Police  Department,  Statistical  Summary  1980,  10;  Chicago  Police  Department, 
Statistical  Summary  1981  (Chicago:  Chicago  Police  Department,  1982),  10;  Chicago Police 
Department, Statistical Summary 1982 (Chicago: Chicago Police Department, 1983), 4; Chicago 
Police Department,  Statistical Summary 1983 (Chicago: Chicago Police Department, 1984), 4; 
Chicago Police Department,  Statistical Summary 1984  (Chicago: Chicago Police Department, 
1985),  4;  Chicago  Police  Department,  Statistical  Summary  1985  (Chicago:  Chicago  Police 
Department, 1986), 4.
465 Chicago Police Department,  2008 Annual Report: A Year in Review (Chicago: Chicago Police 
Department,  2009),  29;  Chicago Police Department,  2009 Annual Report:  A Year in  Review 
(Chicago: Chicago Police Department, 2010), 29.
466 As compared with closed drug markets where buyers and drug dealers come to know each other 
through inter-personal networks (most notably through other drug users), open air drug markets 
do not rely upon pre-existing relationships.  They also tend to be located in low-income and/or 
ethnically marginalised neighbourhoods, especially those with relatively easy access to major 
transportation  arteries.  The  public  nature  of  these  transactions  makes  them  more  liable  to 
interception by law enforcement. (Alex Harocopos and Mike Hough, Drug Dealing in Open-Air  
Markets (Washington:  Office  of  Community  Oriented  Policing  Services,  US Department  of 
Justice,  2005),  1-7;  Ramiro  Martínez  Jr,  Richard  Rosenfeld  and  Dennis  Mares,  “Social 
Disorganization,  Drug  Market  Activity,  and  Neighborhood  Violent  Crime,”  Urban  Affairs  
Review  43,  no  6  (2008):  849;  George  Rengert,  Sanjoy  Chakravorty,  Tom Bole,  and  Kristin 
Henderson,  “A Geographic  Analysis  of  Illegal  Drug Markets,”  Crime Prevention Studies  11 
(2000): 221.)
467 Beth Bjerregaard, “Antigang Legislation and its Potential Impact: The Promises and Pitfalls,” 
Criminal Justice Policy Review 14, no 2 (2003): 173-174.
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bystander')468 there is a strong case to be made that such legislation is enacted more to  
give the appearance that something is being done than to ensure law enforcement has 
the tools they need to deal effectively with the gang problem.469 
If  determining  the  efficacy  of  police  gang  units  is  extremely  difficult, 
determining the efficacy of gang-specific legislation is nigh on impossible. Statistics on 
the numbers of convictions under specific legislation are not readily available, but even 
if they were, such numbers might offer fewer answers than questions. It is exceptionally 
difficult to gauge the percentage of illegal incidents that result in legal action, making it 
difficult to tell whether legislation has impacted offending behaviour in any substantial 
way  without  asking  offenders  (apprehended  and  not)  directly,  something  which  is 
beyond the scope of this study. Also problematic is the fact that where gang-specific and 
ordinary criminal law overlap (as they often do), the prosecutor (in conjunction with the 
arresting police department) is able  to use discretion. Therefore whether someone is 
convicted under gang-specific legislation or not is something that can be affected by the 
possibility of a plea bargain, a need for judicial expedience or even the electoral cycle 
(Illinois State's Attorneys are elected officials). The impact of such factors is beyond 
measure. Nevertheless,  it  is still  important to understand the key pieces of anti-gang 
legislation that operate in Chicago as they frame police work and can reveal a great deal 
about political attitudes towards gang activity. 
Prior  to  the  introduction  of  gang-specific  legislation  in  the  late  1980s,  the 
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, more commonly known as the RICO 
Act,  was  the  key piece  of  legislation responsible  for  ensuring  that  the  collaborative 
nature of gang crime received fair punishment. The RICO Act was introduced in 1970 
468 It has been the case that the younger, 'whiter' (less African American/Hispanic/Latino) and more 
female  a victim is presented as being, the more 'innocent' they are made to appear, the greater  
the outrage generated by the death and the likelier it is that a political response will ensue. This 
ignores  the  uncomfortable  truth  that  while  young  black  and  Hispanic/Latino  men  may 
predominately be responsible for the perpetration of violent gang-related offences, they too are 
most likely to become the victims of bystander violence. It is on the basis of their race, age and 
gender  that  their  innocence  unjustifiably  becomes  automatically  contestable.  (John  A Rich, 
Wrong Place, Wrong Time: Trauma and Violence in the Lives of Young Black Men (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press,  2009),  40-41.) Supporting this claim, the first  piece of  
American gang-specific legislation was drafted and quickly enacted by the state of California in 
response to the murder of 27 year-old graphic artist Karen Toshima. Additionally, while 2005 
saw record-high levels of gun violence in Toronto, Canada, with 52 gun homicides over the 
course  of  the  year  (many during the  'summer  of  the  gun')  it  took  the  death  of  15  year-old 
bystander Jane Creba (caucasian) in a Boxing Day shoot-out (26 December) to generate a serious  
political response, with gun control (previously off the radar) instantly becoming a key federal 
election issue and prompting the introduction of Bill C-10 (which ultimately was not passed) 
which  proposed  increases  to  minimum sentences  for  firearms  offences.  The  Toronto  Police 
Service also quickly developed the Toronto Anti-violence Intervention Strategy, which included 
a rapid response unit responsible for gun seizure and a greater police presence in known gang 
hotspots.  (Julian  V  Roberts,  Nicole  Crutcher  and  Paul  Verbrugge,  “Public  Attitudes  to 
Sentencing  in  Canada:  Exploring  Recent  Findings,”  Canadian  Journal  of  Criminology  and 
Criminal Justice  49, no 1 (2007): 77-78; Kim Strosnider, “Anti-gang Ordinances After  City of  
Chicago v Morales: The Intersection of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the 
Criminal Law,” American Criminal Law Review 39 (2002): 108.)
469 Strosnider, “Anti-gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v Morales,” 108.
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with  a  view  to  helping  legislators  secure  convictions  for  the  leadership  of  major 
organised  crime  groups  (specifically  the  mafia),  and has  since  found much broader 
application. More relevantly, it has been used extensively against street gangs from the 
1980s forwards.470 The RICO Act deals with the problem of gang leaders using low-level 
gang  members  to  carry  out  particularly  risky  illegal  activities  in  order  to  shield 
themselves from prosecution for crimes they have otherwise planned and organised.471 
The RICO Act includes, “enhanced criminal penalties and civil sanctions for those who 
acquire  or  operate  an  enterprise  through  a  pattern  of  racketeering  activity.”472 
'Racketeering',  in  turn,  can  be  defined  as  the  commission  of  multiple  inter-related 
criminal offences (murder, robbery, assault, extortion, dealing in controlled substances) 
within a ten-year period.473 A gang (or any group) qualifies as an 'association in fact' on 
the  basis  of  continuity,  shared  purpose  and  the  presence  of  a  decision-making 
mechanism,  casting  a  rather  wide  net  over  even  the  most  fragmented  of  gang 
landscapes.474 
Chicago's  El  Rukns  (Almighty  P Stone  Nation)  were  one  of  the  first  street 
organisations in the United States to face a major  RICO case. Following an October 
1989 raid on the El Rukn headquarters ('The Fort'), 38 El Rukns of various ranks within 
the organisation's upper echelons faced a single indictment for 135 crimes committed 
over a 20 year period (including homicide which has no statutory limitation period). 
This represents one of the largest-ever street gang prosecutions in the United States.475 
The  RICO Act would also heavily influence the development  of the first  significant 
piece  of  anti-gang  legislation  in  the  United  States,  California's  Street  Terrorism 
Enforcement and Prevention Act, or STEP.476 In spite of STEP's potential infringements 
upon civil liberties, particularly as a result of its extremely wide definition of the gang 
(far wider than even that found in the federal  RICO Act), it has inspired gang specific 
legislation in 46 states, including Illinois. In 1996 the federal government enacted its 
own  small  piece  of  gang-specific  legislation  with  subsection  521  “Criminal  Street 
Gangs” added to Title 18 (“Crimes and Criminal Procedure”) of the United States Code 
(main body of federal criminal law).477
470 Moore and Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 169; A Laxmidas Sawkar, “From the 
Mafia to Milking Cows: State RICO Act Expansion,”  Arizona Law Review 41, no 4 (1999): 
1137;  Joseph Wheatley,  “The Flexibility of  RICO and its  Use on Street  Gangs Engaging in 
Organized Crime in the United States,” Policing 2, no 1 (2008): 82, 85.
471 Sawker, “From the Mafia to Milking Cows,” 1133-1134; Wheatley, “The Flexibility of RICO 
and its Use on Street Gangs Engaging in Organized Crime in the United States,” 83.
472  Sawkar, “From the Mafia to Milking Cows,” 1133.
473 Wheatley, “The Flexibility of RICO and its Use on Street Gangs Engaging in Organized Crime 
in the United States,” 83.
474 Ibid, 84.
475 Moore and Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 204-205; Wheatley, “The Flexibility 
of RICO and its Use on Street Gangs Engaging in Organized Crime in the United States,” 85.
476 Further information on the STEP Act can be found in: Astvasadoorian, “California's Two-Prong 
Attack against Gang Crime and Violence”; Alexander A Molina, “California's Anti-gang Street 
Terrorism Enforcement Act: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back,” Southwestern University Law 
Review  22, no 2 (1993): 457-482; Strosnider, “Anti-gang Ordinances After  City of Chicago v  
Morales,” 101, 109-110; Van Hofwegen, “Unjust and Ineffective”.
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In  the  state  of  Illinois  (of  which  Chicago  is  its  largest  city)  the  most  all-
encompassing  piece  of  anti-gang  legislation  is  the  Illinois  Street-gang  Terrorism 
Omnibus Prevention Act, also known as ISTOP, enacted in 1993. The language used in 
the preamble (specifically Section 5, subsections (b) and (c) is incredibly evocative and 
seems to quite passionately recognise the impact of street gangs on the communities in 
which they operate:
(b) The General Assembly finds, however, that urban, suburban, and 
rural  communities,  neighborhoods  and schools  throughout  the State 
are  being  terrorized  and  plundered  by  street-gangs.  The  General 
Assembly  finds  that  there  are  now  several  hundred  street-gangs 
operating in Illinois, and that while their terrorism is most widespread 
in urban areas, street-gangs are spreading into suburban and rural areas 
of Illinois. 
(c)  The  General  Assembly  further  finds  that  street-gangs  are  often 
controlled by criminally sophisticated adults who take advantage of 
our  youth  by  intimidating  and  coercing  them  into  membership  by 
employing them as drug couriers and runners, and by using them to 
commit  brutal  crimes  against  persons  and  property  to  further  the 
financial benefit to and dominance of the street-gang.478 
ISTOP  employs a definition of gang membership even wider  than that employed in 
previous gang legislation, including California's STEP Act.479 It defines a 'street-gang' as 
a group of three or more individuals operating with some sort of hierarchy that engages 
in  a  pattern  of  criminal  activity  (two  or  more  felony/property  defacement  offences 
within five years of each other) where at least one offence has occurred after the act's 
passage.480  
Though the strength of ISTOP's preambulatory language is not matched by the 
strength of its actual reforms, it did create a civil cause of action against street gangs. 
This allows prosecutors to file civil suits against gang members and to seek monetary 
damages.  More  crucially  it  provides  for  court  orders  preventing  defendants  from 
associating with one another in public. Those who continue to associate in violation of a 
court order can be arrested and charged with a criminal misdemeanour, at which point a 
thorough search (of the person/vehicle/house) can be conducted with the hope of finding 
evidence capable  of leading to  more serious criminal charges.  Other  state anti-gang 
legislation is less innovative. The 2009 Illinois Public Act 096 0829 also known as the 
'gang  gun law'  increases  penalties  for  the  unlawful  possession  of  firearms by gang 
members,481 while a gang-specific RICO Act (The Illinois Street Gang and Racketeer  
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Law), enacted during 2012's gang violence spike, 
further stiffens penalties for gang related offences. 
At a local level, city ordinances remain the most common way of dealing with 
Chicago's gang problem.482 The most noteworthy and controversial is the Chicago Gang 
478 Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Act of 1993, 740 ILCS 147.
479 David R Truman, “The Jets and Sharks Are Dead: State Statutory Responses to Criminal Street 
Gangs,” Washington University Law Review 73, no 2 (1995): 688.
480 Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Act of 1993, 740 ILCS 147.
481 Public Act 096-0829, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.8.
482 Strosnider, “Anti-gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v Morales,” 111.
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Congregation Ordinance enacted in 1992, replaced in 2000 by a revised ordinance of 
the same name. The original ordinance attracted considerable attention after it was ruled 
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in the 1999 case of  The City of  
Chicago v Morales.483 The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance after finding it too 
vague to adequately curtail police discretion.484 The court also considered (but remained 
undecided on) the matter of whether the ordinance provided adequate notice to citizens 
of what was and was not prohibited behaviour.485 The original ordinance allowed police 
to arrest  groups of two or more persons gathered in public for no apparent  purpose 
where one of the group was reasonably believed by police to be a gang member if the 
group  failed  to  disperse  when  requested.486 This  essentially  gave  the  police  the 
discretion of determining who was and was not a gang member (often by appearance), 
effectively penalising gang membership which was not a criminal offence in and of 
itself.487 The  ordinance  also,  by  extension,  punished  non-gang  individuals  for 
association with someone who might reasonably be believed to be a gang member, a 
rather confusing prospect given the inability of a citizen to read the mind of enforcing 
police  officers.  Unsurprisingly,  the  law  was  applied  almost  exclusively  in  low 
income/ethnic minority neighbourhoods and its lack of clarity meant it was unclear with 
whom and under what circumstances it was possible for residents to freely converse or 
gather in public without fear of dispersal or arrest.488 
If the purpose of gang violence reduction or gang elimination efforts is to make 
all Chicago neighbourhoods places where residents can realise and express their rights 
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, it is easy to see how this ordinance could be 
seen as counter-productive, presenting a serious unjustifiable infringement on residents' 
liberty.  Further,  the  replacement  ordinance  does  little  to  remedy  the  problematic 
vagueness of the original. By limiting its application to police-identified 'hotspots' need 
not  be  publicly  disclosed,  the  ordinance  is  likely  to  apply  only  in  the  same  low-
income/ethnic  minority  neighbourhoods  targeted  by  the  initial  ordinance.489 The 
replacement ordinance is less vague perhaps,  but there remains significant room for 
police discretion and potential abuse. The ordinance replaces 'objectionable loitering' 
with 'gang loitering' defining the latter as:
…  remaining  in  any  one  place  under  circumstances  that  would 
warrant a reasonable person to believe that the purpose or effect of 
that behavior is to enable a criminal street-gang to establish control 
over identifiable areas, to intimidate others from entering those areas,  
or to conceal illegal activities.490 
The absence of a mens rea requirement (intent) leaves individuals not engaged in any 
crime open to punishment based on the perceptions of a vaguely defined 'reasonable 
483 Ibid, 102-103.
484 John M Scheb and John M Scheb II, Criminal Law, 5ed (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2009), 310-311.
485 Strosnider, “Anti-gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v Morales,” 102.
486 Ibid, 102.
487 Angela  L  Clark,  “City  of  Chicago  v  Morales:  Sacrificing  Individual  Liberty  Interests  for 
Community Safety,” Loyola University Law Journal 31, no 1 (1999): 114.
488 Clark,  “City  of  Chicago  v  Morales,”  114;  Strosnider,  “Anti-gang  Ordinances  After  City  of  
Chicago v Morales,” 103.
489 Strosnider, “Anti-gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v Morales,”  137, 141.
490 Ibid, 135-136.
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person'.491 This  quasi-criminalisation  of  general  shadiness  carries  serious  racial  and 
class implications within Chicago's highly segregated urban landscape.
Intervention Approaches to Gang Violence Reduction in Chicago
Chicago was the first city to implement a juvenile court and one of the first to 
develop a gang crimes unit. Thus, it should come as little surprise that Chicago has long 
been host to pioneering gang intervention efforts also. Though designed to deal with 
juvenile delinquency more broadly, the first major gang intervention programme in the 
United  States  was  the  Chicago  Area  Project  (CAP)  of  the  mid-1930s.  Since  the 
emergence of the supergangs in the 1960s, gang intervention efforts have proliferated 
throughout inner-city Chicago. The neighbourhoods with the highest levels of violence 
also  often  host  the  highest  concentrations  of  gang  intervention  programmes.  This 
section will focus specifically on the pioneering work done by the Chicago Area Project 
in the 1930s, the lessons to be learned from the Youth Manpower Project and the limited 
success of the much hyped CeaseFire-Chicago programme, covering three of the most 
well  known  (and  best  resourced)  community  intervention  initiatives  to  have  been 
carried  out  in  the  city.  It  argues  that  the  basic  building  blocks  of  intervention 
programmes have remained largely unchanged since the development of the Chicago 
Area Project. CAP's extensive use of outreach workers, emphasis on encouraging young 
people to develop 'pro-social' (mainstream) attitudes, provision of alternatives to gang 
involvement  in  the  form  of  recreation/education/training/employment,  academic/ 
'theory-based' design, and integration of evaluation thinking (even if only on an ad-hoc 
basis) have all been incorporated in whole or in part by subsequent gang intervention 
efforts. Unfortunately, these subsequent intervention efforts have also inherited CAP's 
very  limited  efficacy.  There  have  been  few  major  gang  intervention  programme 
'successes' (in terms of substantial falls in gang violence or gang participation rates) but, 
even  more  disconcertingly,  previous  programme evaluations  indicate  Chicago-based 
intervention  efforts  are  batting  below  average  in  terms  of  delivering  results  when 
compared to those found in other major American cities.492 
Contemporaneously,  making  direct  comparisons  of  efficacy  between 
intervention programmes is very difficult.  The Chicago Area Project was the first  to 
embed  evaluation  within  its  operational  principles,  however  Shaw  and  McKay 
delivered neither robust continuous evaluation of CAP nor an operational evaluation 
framework. This inconsistency in evaluative practice  was unfortunately inherited by 
evaluators looking to determine the efficacy of subsequent gang intervention efforts. 
Until  the  1990s,  most  intervention  programmes  lacked  a  comprehensive  evaluation 
protocol. Independent evaluation by social scientists, while not uncommon, was neither 
regularised nor routinised,  seemingly dependent upon academic interests and budget 
constraints. In today's operational climate, evaluation has become a far more integral 
part  of  programme  operations,  especially  as  most  programmes  are  reliant  upon 
government (municipal, state and federal) or charitable foundation funding for survival 
with funders expecting (or demanding) to know the social return on investment. 
491 Ibid, 136.
492 James C Howell, Youth Gang Programs and Strategies (Washington: Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention, 2000), 3-4.
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Yet,  evaluation  continues  to  lack  standardisation.  Programmes are  evaluated, 
quite rightly, in terms of their ability to meet their own self-defined and funder-defined 
objectives,  but  these  specific  objectives  and  definitions  of  'success'  vary  from 
organisation  to  organisation.  Furthermore,  with  the  presence  of  one  or  more  gang 
intervention  programme  in  almost  all  gang-affected  neighbourhoods,  even  where 
programmes  attempt  quasi-experimental  or  experimental  evaluation  using  common 
measurement tools the data, and thus the results, is often cloudy at best because finding 
clean  'project'  and  'comparison'  sites  is  exceptionally  difficult.493 Though qualitative 
evaluation  measures  might  be  clearer  in  terms  of  determining  specific  programme 
impacts,  here  too  differing  programme  objectives  increase  incomparability.  It  is 
therefore most appropriate to consider efficacy on a programme by programme basis. 
This work hones in on only a few key gang violence reduction efforts which utilise 
intervention approaches, but the extent to which these approaches are shared across a 
broader  range  of  Chicago-based  intervention  programmes  can  be  seen  in  the  chart 
provided as 'Appendix A: Common Elements of the Intervention Approach to Reducing 
Gang Violence' at the end of this volume. 
The Chicago Area Project
The  Chicago  Area  Project  is  widely  recognised  as  the  first  community 
development and gang intervention effort in the United States.494 Gradually established 
over  the  course  of  the  early  1930s,  CAP was designed by prominent  University  of 
Chicago sociologist Clifford Shaw with the support of his Chicago School compatriots 
Ernest Burgess and Henry D McKay. Its initial goal was the reduction and prevention of 
juvenile  delinquency.495 Despite  its  influence  on  later  institutionally-directed  gang 
intervention  programmes  CAP  under  Shaw  strongly  resisted  institutionalisation, 
deliberately remaining, “a loose organization constantly in flux, amorphous in form, and 
unconventional in method”496 - essentially a living laboratory for the era's pre-eminent 
urban sociologists. Shaw and his colleagues used CAP to learn more about the role of 
'urban ecology' in the concentration of delinquency (social disorganisation theory) and 
the capacity of communities to develop their own solutions to the problem of juvenile 
delinquency.497 Throughout his leadership, Shaw insisted that CAP was, “not a blueprint 
for  reform,  but  simply  a  conceptual  framework  meant  to  encourage  and  facilitate 
indigenous  social  invention.”498 The  existence  of  the  Chicago  Area  Project  as  an 
organisational  entity  was  more  an  'administrative  convenience'  meant  to  facilitate 
493 Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago, 7-40.
494 Franzese, Covey and Menard, Youth Gangs, 253-256; Spergel,  Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 
5-6; Andrew V Papachristos, “Too Big to Fail: The Science and Politics of Violence Prevention,” 
Criminology & Public Policy 10, no 4 (2011): 1055.
495 Steven Schlossman and Michael Sedalk,  The Chicago Area Project Revisited (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 1983), 1.
496 John Bartlow Martin, “A New Attack on Delinquency: How the Chicago Area Project Works,” 
Harper's Magazine 188 (1944): 503.
497 Solomon Kobrin, “The Chicago Area Project – A 25 Year Assessment,” Annals of the American  
Academy of Political and Social Science 322 (1959): 19; Schlossman and Sedalk, The Chicago 
Area Project Revisited, 1, 42-44. 
498 Schlossman and Sedalk, The Chicago Area Project Revisited, 60.
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fundraising for the local projects than anything else.499 CAP also openly challenged the 
then-dominance  of  the  psychological/psychiatric  approach  to  the  'treatment'  of 
delinquency and advocated for social/community approaches.500 
In the years following Shaw's 1957 death, the Chicago Area Project would drift 
away from its  focus  on juvenile  delinquency in order  to devote greater attention to 
community organisation.501 It  has  also become far  more institutionalised than it  was 
under  Shaw  (in  arguable  defiance  of  its  founding  principles).502 Yet,  CAP's  early 
experimental years provided a blueprint for future gang intervention efforts widely used 
today.  Academic  design,  community organisation/leadership  and the  use  of  outreach 
workers (specifically those of backgrounds similar to the young people the programme 
sought to reach) remain hallmarks of gang intervention eighty years after Shaw and 
McKay first set  about exploring whether the South Side might be able  to transform 
itself. The ethnic gangs responsible for much of the delinquency in project areas were of 
the same kind as those identified by Thrasher in 1927,503 and thus far less lethal than he 
gangs which emerged in the 1960s, questioning the logic of applying the same tactics to 
these far more lethal groups. Tackling petty theft, vandalism and 'lewdness'504 arguably 
requires  a  radically  different  strategy  than  tackling  frequent  fatal  and  near-fatal 
shootings.
Today the involvement of individual academics and academic research centres in 
the design, development and evaluation of gang violence reduction efforts is something 
that can almost be taken for granted. In the early 2000s CeaseFire-Chicago would make 
one of its major selling points the fact that it was 'theory driven', even though its true  
originality  lay  in  its  epidemiological  theoretical  approach  (breaking  away  from the 
social science approaches which had traditionally dominated the field).505 The Chicago 
Area Project was also very much grounded in the major theoretical developments of its 
time. The social disorganisation theory of urban sociology (as interpreted by Shaw and 
McKay and developed by the Chicago School) that underpins CAP argues individual 
criminological  behaviour  (delinquency)  is  conditioned  by  one's  urban  social 
environment,  with  poverty and residential  instability  correlated  with  higher  rates  of 
delinquency.506 Though later gang intervention programmes would be underpinned by a 
range  of  social  theories,  Shaw and McKay's  interpretation  of  social  disorganisation 
would  go  on  to  directly  influence  the  Comprehensive  Gang  Model  developed  by 
Spergel used in the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project on Chicago's West 
Side during the 1990s.507
499 Martin, “A New Attack on Delinquency,” 503.
500 Schlossman and Sedalk, The Chicago Area Project Revisited, v.
501 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 6.
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CAP also highlighted the importance of formal social scientific evaluation for 
community programmes,508 although (as alluded to previously) it failed to live up to its 
own evaluatory ambitions. During the first ten years of CAP's life, most of the data it  
collected about its efficacy (qualitative and quantitative) received limited dissemination 
through  annual  reports  and  site  documentation.509 “Methods,  Accomplishments  and 
Problems of the Chicago Area Project”, the first major social scientific evaluation of the 
Chicago Area Project was delivered in 1944 but never formally published. It revealed 
that two of the three programme areas had enjoyed statistically significant declines in 
rates of juvenile delinquency, but Shaw was cautious about ascribing these 'successes' to 
the programme specifically.510 By the time this report was delivered, he already doubted 
whether  it  would  ever  be  possible  to  statistically  prove  that  any  given  community 
intervention could alone be responsible for a decline in delinquency.511 
Solomon Kobrin, who shared Shaw's skepticism around the ability of statistics to 
illustrate  programme  efficacy,512 nevertheless  provided  the  first  independent  and 
scholarly assessment  of  CAP in  1959.  He argued the  programme was successful  in 
terms  of  demonstrating  the  validity  of  the  theoretical  principle  of  community 
organisation, but paid little attention to its capacity to reduce juvenile delinquency. In 
the 1980s CAP's early years would be revisited by a team of researchers from RAND 
led by Steven Schlossman. Their large-scale archival research project was carried out on 
behalf of the National Institute of Education.513 Yet, these later evaluations were unable 
to demonstrate any more effectively than earlier work that CAP was responsible for the 
remarkable decline in delinquency rates observed in the Russell Square project area,514 
while  warning  that,  “until   scholars  and  policy  analysts  develop  more  imaginative 
means to assess performance in the field,  it  is  premature to generalize that 'nothing 
works'.”515  
508 Ernest Burgess, Joseph Lohman and Clifford Shaw, “The Chicago Area Project,” in Coping with 
Crime: Yearbook of  the National Probation Association (US),  ed.  Marjorie  Bell  (New York: 
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The Chicago Area Project was not the first delinquency prevention and reduction 
effort to make use of outreach workers, however it was the first to employ outreach 
workers whose backgrounds mirrored the communities in which they worked516 as early 
outreach  workers  were  often  religious  leaders  or  missionaries.517 Unlike  previous 
outreach efforts, CAP workers were also encouraged to engage with young people on 
their own terms, meeting them in the locations in which they naturally gathered and 
speaking with them in the local dialect. These 'curbstone counsellors' were to serve as, 
“knowledgeable older brothers and close friends to children who were already in trouble 
with the law, or who were committing delinquent acts that would invariably lead them 
into legal difficulties.”518 Out of necessity, in the early days of the project the ranks of 
indigenous outreach workers were complemented by dedicated  and passionate  older 
youth from outside the community (often college students studying related subjects). 
However a great deal of effort was put into the recruitment of area natives who were  
strongly believed to be most effective in these outreach roles.519 Unlike traditional social 
work efforts, curbstone counsellors were not to force attitudinal and behavioural change 
upon  young  people.  Instead  they  were  expected  to  serve  as  models  of  'legitimate' 
behaviour with the hope that, as rapport developed naturally, youth would 'reform' on 
their own:520
His is not a militant campaign of reform, but a gradual one of altering 
standards and changing goals through casual conversation and day-to-
day contact. Often the employed leader does nothing but hang around 
with the teenagers for weeks at a time – idling around street corners,  
drifting to the candy store with them, or to the movies on Saturday 
nights. As he becomes a trusted ally of the young gang, he is able to 
suggest  more  creative  excursions:  baseball  practice  as  an  organized 
team, basketball at St. Michael's gym, woodworking in its craft shop. 
Growing in the esteem of the boy gang that  he has associated with 
almost daily, the leader is eventually privileged to make suggestions 
that at first would have ostracized him or drawn derisive jeers. He is 
able to guide their behaviour into more legitimate channels. Gradually, 
going  to  school,  respecting  park  property,  buying  fruit  instead  of 
stealing it,  become as much the thing to do as were their opposites 
several months before.521
The  curbstone  counsellor  philosophy  was,  and  remains,  grounded  in  the  idea  that 
sometimes all  a  young person needs is  an  opportunity  to  talk to  someone with the 
516 Schlossman and Sedalk, The Chicago Area Project Revisited, x; Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang 
Violence, 6.
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wisdom of experience (but not the sense of superiority that often accompanies it)522 and 
to feel as though if things go wrong there will be someone there to advocate on their 
behalf.523
Outreach workers modelled on CAP's curbstone counsellors became an integral 
component of gang intervention initiatives across the United States, including in New 
York.  However,  “few  incorporated  a  similar  respect  for  the  community  and  for 
individual  delinquents,  and  fewer  still  implemented  its  policy  of  community 
empowerment.”524 In a development Shaw likely would have found distressing, by the 
1950s there was an increasing professionalisation of outreach work with colleges and 
universities  the  recruiting  grounds  for  a  new breed of  outreach worker.525 Although 
professionalised outreach workers were perhaps no more comfortable with middle class 
norms or expectations than their  young charges, they lacked the ability to ingratiate 
themselves in the same way as a someone resident in or whose life was intimately tied 
to the community. 
With the emergence of supergangs in the 1960s, some skeptics began to assert 
that the soft approach taken by outreach workers might actually be contributing to the 
problem.526 There was no concrete evidence  outreach workers were responsible for the 
increasing  the  coherence  and lethality  of  Chicago's  gangs,  but  there  was  also  little 
evidence that they were successful in redirecting the energies of gang-involved and at-
risk youth to more positive pursuits. Consequentially outreach work fell out of favour 
with programme designers and funders527 even if outreach workers never disappeared 
completely. In Chicago they would rise to prominence once again as part of the Little 
Village Gang Violence Reduction Project in the 1990s and CeaseFire-Chicago in the 
2000s, something that further illustrates the tendency to rehash past strategies in the 
absence of clear evidence of success.
The Youth Manpower Project
The  Youth  Manpower  Project,  administered  by  the  Woodlawn  Organisation 
(TWO) with the support of a $1 million grant from the federal Office of Economic 
opportunity in 1968 remains quite probably the least effective intervention programme 
in the history of gang violence  reduction.528 While  the programme itself  was highly 
controversial, its direct objectives were not particularly radical or innovative. The Youth 
Manpower Project sought to provide job readiness training, employment, educational 
opportunities and conflict mediation to the two gangs responsible for the increase in 
522 Schlossman and Sedalk, The Chicago Area Project Revisited, 61.
523 Ibid, xi.
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lethal gang-related violence in the Woodlawn neighbourhood on the South Side.529 That 
the  Youth  Manpower  Project's  self-help  philosophy extended  community  ownership 
principles  to  the  gangs  identified  as  most  problematic  in  Woodlawn  (Blackstone 
Rangers  and  Devil's  Disciples)  courted  considerable  controversy  even  before 
programme operations began. The programme's philosophy argued the skills needed to 
bring about change already existed within the gang.530 However, while the group may 
have had strong latent organisational, management and entrepreneurship skills, the gang 
leadership who took assumed leadership roles in the Youth Manpower Project lacked 
the  formal  job  training,  job  search  and  community  relations  skills  needed  for  the 
programme to function properly. The Youth Manpower Project did not receive support 
from the municipal government and faced open opposition from the Chicago Police 
Department  who  feared  the  programme  would  strengthen  the  local  celebrity  and 
perceived credibility of the gangs involved.531
Three job training and educational centres were established in Woodlawn, two 
run by the  Stones,  one  by the  Disciples.  The Xerox Corporation helped design  the 
curriculum  and  the  Chicago  Urban  League  agreed  to  assist  with  helping  those 
completing the program find jobs.532 Gang leaders, including Jeff Fort, were added to 
the programme payroll as assistant project directors and centre chiefs, positions which 
included  annual  salaries  of  $5,000-$6,500  for  recruiting  participants  (younger  gang 
members and affiliates) and managing the 'instructors' pulled from the middle ranks of 
the  gang  leadership.533 Gang  members  who agreed to  participate  in  the  programme 
received $45 weekly, plus assistance to cover the cost of travel to and from the local 
training and education centres.534 
By and large the gang-involved program staff had limited experience of formal 
education and little, if any, formal employment experience.They also lacked the formal 
teaching and administrative experience that would have allowed them to jump into their 
new roles more easily.  With only three professional  staff  allocated to the project by 
TWO it  is  easy to  see  how the programme quickly spiralled beyond administrative 
control.535 There was an insufficient number of administrative staff at TWO to be able to 
adequately train its 'non-traditional' hires, thus they were not supported in translating 
their  informally-developed  skills  into  the  more  structured  setting  of  a  government-
backed programme.536 This administrative under-staffing also left the programme, which 
sought to involve 600 gang-involved youth in total,537 open to exploitation by the gangs 
529 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 12. 
530 Moore and Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 61. 
531 Jacobs, Stateville, 140-141; Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 12.
532 Moore and Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 61.
533 Jacobs, Stateville, 141.
534 Jacobs, Stateville, 58; Moore and Williams,  The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 58; Spergel, 
Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 10.
535 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 13.
536 Rev Arthur M Brazier, co-founder of the Woodlawn Organization, would himself admit that with 
hindsight it was clear the programme granted the gangs too much control too quickly and that  
gang-led teaching/training should have developed over time with professionals initially taking 
the lead, presumably to allow for greater skills development at the grassroots level. (Moore and 
Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 58.)
537 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 13.
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it was developed to help. Furthermore, there is little indication that the Youth Manpower 
Project was able to train or transition more than a few gang-involved youth for/into 
formal employment.538 
Without consistent or sufficient administrative oversight or clear accountability 
measures, the gangs had something approaching free reign over programme resources 
(time, space and, most problematically, finances). Local education authorities and the 
police claimed the Stones and Disciples encouraged young gang members to drop out of 
formal education in favour of joining the Youth Manpower Project so as to exact a 'cut' 
from their participation fee. It has also been claimed the training and education centres 
were used to plan/organise gang activities539 and became sites of narcotics dealing and 
use, illegal gambling and weapons storage.540 Allegations of fraud and gross financial 
mismanagement that emerged during the programme's operation prompted a full-blown 
Senate  investigation.541 Accusations  abounded  of  cheque  forgery,  gang  leaders 
demanding kick-backs from participants and payments going to individuals who failed 
to  attend.542 Rev  Arthur  M  Brazier,  co-founder  and  President  of  the  Woodlawn 
Organization, had hired an external accounting firm to audit the project, understanding 
the heightened importance of financial controls on such a controversial programme, but 
the  firm  failed  to  ensure  these  controls  were  implemented  consistently  and  were 
themselves sufficient to prevent fraud.543 Although the Youth Manpower Project failed 
to meet its objectives, this failure cannot reasonably be read as an indictment of the 
groups' ownership of their own transformation process or even the inability of gangs to 
change more broadly. The shocking lack of administrative oversight and accountability, 
including financial accountability (to the point that the Youth Manpower Project might 
best  be  read  as  a  case  study  in  organisational  worst  practice) means  that  the 
programme's philosophy was never truly given a fair airing.
 
CeaseFire-Chicago/Cure Violence
CeaseFire-Chicago (herein referred to as CeaseFire) launched in 1999 with two 
project  sites  (West  Garfield  Park  and  West  Humboldt  Park).  Both  commenced 
operations  in  early  2000.544 It  would  quickly  expand over  the  course  of  the  2000s, 
peaking with 22 project sites in 2007 at which point funding from the state of Illinois 
was abruptly cut leading to the closure of most programme sites and forcing structural 
re-organisation by the Chicago Project for Violence Prevention (CPVP), housed within 
the University of Illinois at Chicago's School of Public Health, which was responsible 
for  administering  the  programme.  Operating  with  limited  foundational  funding  and 
small  government  grants  from this  point  forward,  CeaseFire  has  moved away from 
programme operation and now focuses  on developing the national  and international 
538 Ibid, 14.
539 Ibid, 13.
540 Jacobs, Stateville, 141.
541 Jacobs, Stateville, 141; Moore and Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 103.
542 Jacobs,  Stateville, 142; Moore and Williams,  The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 59; Spergel, 
Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 13.
543 Moore and Williams, The Almighty Black P Stone Nation, 103.
544 Nancy  Ritter,  “CeaseFire:  A Public  Health  Approach  to  Reduce  Shootings  and  Killings,” 
National Institute of Justice Journal 264 (2009): 20
P Stones and Provos N Ives-Allison 124
export  potential  of  its  violence  reduction  model.545 This  restructuring  included  a 
rebranding with CeaseFire-Chicago was rechristened Cure Violence in 2012. 
Unlike  most  gang  programmes  designed  by  social  scientists,  CeaseFire  was 
grounded  in  epidemiological  theory.  Seeing  parallels  between  the  spread  of  gun 
violence and the AIDS, tuberculosis and cholera epidemics on which he had previously 
worked,  physician  and epidemiologist  Gary Slutkin  founded CPVP with the  aim of 
bringing  a  public  health546 approach  to  the  field  of  violence  reduction.547 The 
epidemiological  theory  of  violence  reduction  treats  gun  violence  as  a  contagious 
disease548 and  argues  that  in  order  to  stop  its  spread  it  is  necessary  to  reduce 
opportunities for transmission. In operational terms this means:
(1)  detecting and  interrupting  ongoing  and potentially  new infectious 
events; (2) determining who are most likely to cause further infectious 
events from the infected population and then reducing their likelihood of 
developing disease and/or subsequently transmitting; and (3) changing 
the  underlying  social  and  behavioral  norms,  or  environmental 
conditions, that directly relate to the spread of the infection.549
Initially, CPVP focused on building community partnerships in an effort to 'stabilise' 
violence in  the north  and west  of  the  city.550 However  in  the  wake  of  the 'miracle' 
reductions in gun violence delivered by Boston's Operation Ceasefire551 interest in and 
support for community-based gun violence programmes grew, providing a favourable 
funding  climate  in  which  to  grow  CPVP  operations  and  test  the  limits  of  its 
epidemiological theory. CeaseFire-Chicago was the result of this growth.552 
In  order  to  'stop  the  shooting'  CeaseFire  was  determined  to  work  with  the 
communities most deeply affected by gun violence and those within them who were at 
highest risk of contagion and transmission (potential shooters/victims). This often meant 
working with gang members in gang controlled neighbourhoods. Still, it is important to 
545 Papachristos,  “Too  Big  to  Fail,”  1056;  Skogan,  Harnett,  Bump  and  Dubois, Evaluation  of  
CeaseFire-Chicago, 2-19.
546 Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago, iii.
547 Jeffrey A Butts and Caterina Gouvis Roman, “A Community Youth Development Approach to 
Gang Control Programs,” in Youth Gangs and Community Intervention: Research, Practice and  
Evidence, ed. Robert Chaskin (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 184.
548 Gary  Slutkin,  “Violence  is  a  Contagious  Disease,”  in  Contagion  of  Violence:  Workshop 
Summary, Institute of Medicine (Washington: The National Academies Press, 2013), 94.
549 Slutkin, “Violence is a Contagious Disease,” 108.
550 Digby Diehl, “The Chicago Project for Violence Prevention,” excerpt from  To Improve Health  
and Health  Care  Volume  VIII  (Princeton:  The  Robert  Wood  Johnson Foundation,  2004),  4. 
Available:  <http://www.rwjf.org/content/am/web-assets/2005/01/the-chicago-project-for-
violence-prevention>.
551 Also known as the Boston Gun Project. For more information on Operation CeaseFire, please 
refer to: Braga, Kennedy, Waring and Morrison Piehl, “Problem-oriented Policing, Deterrence, 
and Youth Violence,” 195-225; David M Kennedy, Anthony A Braga, Anne M Piehl and Elin J 
Waring,  Reducing Gun Violence: The Boston Gun Project's Operation Ceasefire  (Washington: 
National Institute of Justice, 2001); Anne Morrison Piehl, David M Kennedy and Anthony A 
Braga,  “Problem  Solving  and  Youth  Violence:  An  Evaluation  of  the  Boston  Gun  Project,” 
American Law and Economics Review 2, no 1 (2000): 58-106.
552 Though  after  this  dramatic  drop,  homicides  (including  gang-related  homicides)  began  to 
increase. (Howell, “Lessons Learned from Gang Program Evaluations, 57)
P Stones and Provos N Ives-Allison 125
stress  that  although  CeaseFire  worked  with  gang  members  in  gang-affected 
neighbourhoods it saw and presented itself as a gun violence intervention programme 
rather  than  a  gang  violence  intervention  programme  more  specifically. It  made  no 
attempt to dismantle the city's gangs, it simply wanted them (and others around them) to 
stop  shooting.553 As  a  result  its  outreach  programmes  were  open  to  all  'high  risk' 
individuals regardless of gang allegiance or membership status. In spite of the potential 
for  innovation  created  by  its  epidemiological  underpinning,  in  practice  CeaseFire 
operated  much  like  an  amalgam  of  existing  best  practice  in  gang  intervention.  Its 
operations  focused  on  community  mobilisation,  coalition-building,  education  and 
outreach, all hallmarks of the Chicago Area Project.554 Arguably, the most innovative 
aspects of the CeaseFire programme – the use of 'violence interrupters' and the strength 
of its data-sharing relationship with the police555 represented advances in outreach and 
coalition-building rather than new and original strategies for violence reduction.
Outreach workers were not initially a part of CeaseFire's operations, however 
after  their  introduction  in  2001 they quickly  became integral  to  its  work.  Outreach 
workers took on responsibility for coalition building, partnership management, client 
screening,  coordinating community  education  campaigns,  organising  public  outreach 
events  (vigils,  marches),  participating  in  evaluation  exercises  and  general  'brand' 
promotion.  This was alongside  managing a caseload of approximately 15 high-need 
'clients'  (high-risk  individuals  in  need  of  assistance  and  willing  to  engage with  the 
program).556 Prior  to  the  introduction  of  outreach  workers,  it  was  believed  the 
programme could achieve its objectives though the development of strong partnerships 
with  pre-existing  community  groups.557 However,  as  this  extensive  list  of  outreach 
worker  responsibilities  illustrates,  this  way  of  working  would  have  placed  an 
exceptional demand on partner time and resources. Local partnerships would remain 
very important in the CeaseFire model as site operations were run through community 
host  partners,  including  (typically)  the  administration  of  outreach  workers,  but  the 
outreach workers themselves were invaluable in increasing the operating capacity of the 
CeaseFire programme. 
Again taking its cue from CAP, CeaseFire recruited outreach workers from the 
communities in which it worked, specifically those with histories of violence or gang 
membership who had since turned their lives around. This served three purposes. Firstly, 
the  status  of  these  individuals  and  the  respect  they  engendered  within  the  local 
553 At the same time, it is because of the strong correlation between gangs and gun violence that  
CeaseFire-Chicago can fairly be considered alongside the likes of the Chicago Area Project or 
The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project. 
554 Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago, 1-4.
555 Ibid, ES-16, 1-11 – 1-12, 
556 Judith  A Lewis,  Michael  D  Lewis,  Judy  A Daniels  and  Michael  J  D'Andrea,  Community 
Counselling: A Multicultural – Social Justice Perspective, 4ed (Belmont: Brooks/Cole/Cengage, 
2011), 190-191; Charles Ransford, Candice Kane and Gary Slutkin. “Cure Violence: A Disease 
Control Approach to Reduce Violence and Change Behavior,” in Epidemiological Criminology:  
Theory to Practice, eds. Eve Waltermaurer and Timothy A Akers (New York: Routledge, 2013), 
237; Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago, ES-15,  2-5, 4-1 – 
4-2, 4-7 – 4-14, 4-29 – 4-30.
557 Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago, 4-1.
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community  offered  the  best  opportunity  to  reach  those  most  likely  to  engage  in 
violence.  Secondly,  it  provided  programme  clients  with  a  'role  model'  for  change. 
Thirdly, the depth of connection between outreach workers and the local community 
helped CeaseFire keep an ear to the ground allowing it to keep track of feuds and other 
developments likely to lead to violence.558 Yet, the same things that made someone an 
ideal  outreach  worker  candidate  also  rendered  him  (outreach  workers  were 
overwhelmingly male) a risky hire.559 
Rather than ignoring this  reality, as the Youth Manpower Project had largely 
done when employing active gang members, the CPVP put in place a number of risk 
mitigation controls and support systems to help ensure staff could handle the demands 
of  the  role  and  avoid  becoming  a  liability  to  the  CeaseFire  programme.  Thorough 
background checks were conducted and the CPD was given a veto on the hiring panels 
used to make appointments. All outreach workers approved by hiring panels were drug 
tested and accepting the position also meant agreeing to further on-the-job tests (though 
positive tests did not always yield consistent consequences).560 Recognising the lack of 
formal qualifications and work experience often held by outreach workers (they were 
still expected to have the equivalent of a high school diploma), substantial training and 
professional  development  was  offered  and  made  mandatory.561 The  presence  of 
supervisors at  each site  (from various backgrounds, many with previous  community 
development/gang intervention experience) provided immediate accountability as well 
as support and mentorship.562 
This system of checks and balances worked remarkably well,  although there 
were a few incidents that required CeaseFire to take tough action.  Despite outreach 
workers' proximity and connection to the streets,  from 2001 until 2007 fewer than a 
dozen outreach workers were arrested, almost all on drug possession offences (a fair 
number of these cases were quickly dismissed as 'bad cases').563 The most visible case 
involving a  CeaseFire  outreach worker  arose as  the  programme was coming up for 
funding renewal in 2007. The individual in question was charged with the possession of 
an illegal firearm and cannabis production. While one can only speculate on the impact 
this  might  have  had (if  any)  on the  failure of  the  programme to secure  its  funding 
renewal,  negative publicity at  such a critical  time certainly did not help CeaseFire's 
case.564 
In 2004 a funding injection led to the development of the 'violence interrupter' 
initiative.  The  interrupters,  are  the  most  recognisable  aspect  of  the  Ceasefire 
programme,  having  been  the  subject  of  the  critically  acclaimed  and  internationally 
distributed documentary  The Interrupters  (Steve James, 2011) and a  New York Times  
Sunday  Magazine feature  by  Alex  Kotlowitz.565 Interrupters,  generally  former  gang 
558 Ibid, 4-17 - 4-18.
559 Ibid, 4-4.
560 Ibid, 3-2 – 3-6; 4-3.
561 Ibid, ES-7-8.
562 Ibid, ES-13, 2-3, 4-6 – 4-7..
563 Ibid, 3-8 – 3-9, 
564 Ibid, 3-17.
565 Alex Kotlowitz, “Blocking the Transmission of Violence,” The New York Times, 4 May (2008): 
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leaders and influentials, are expected to be able to reach and command the respect of 
those  hardcore  gang  members  beyond  the  reach  of  most  outreach  workers.566 
Interrupters,  retained  in  small  numbers  amidst  CeaseFire's  transformation  into  Cure 
Violence,  are  the  bridge  between  the  programme's  epidemiological  theory  and 
traditional gang outreach work. They are charged with stopping the 'transmission'  of 
violence when and where it is most likely to occur, essentially the human equivalent of a 
condom in an HIV prevention effort. Interrupters, while expected to contribute to public 
education  and  awareness  efforts,  did  not  share  the  same  administrative  burden  as 
outreach workers and could focus their energies more directly on defusing conflicts. 
This included speaking with family and friends of  gun violence victims in  order to 
mitigate the potential of retaliation, mediating gang conflicts and interpersonal disputes 
('beefs')  before they escalated into violence,  and providing immediate alternatives to 
violence (ex. Taking a walk to calm down or having a chat indoors) for disagreements 
on the brink of boiling over.567
However, for the interrupters themselves, their positions were very precarious. 
They operated on 900 hour temporary worker contracts with mandatory 30 day lay-offs 
between contracts.568 The  persistence of  this  arrangement  until  at  least  2007 speaks 
volumes  to  the  fact  that  the  organisational  structures  of  even  the  most  outwardly 
'progressive' intervention programmes often contain an embedded and unacknowledged 
privileging of skills and values associated with the (often white) middle-classes over 
'street' skills and values needed to exact change. That 41% of interrupters surveyed as 
part of the evaluation process reported being happy with this contractual engagement 
(although a staggering 39% were not)569 does not imbue it with fairness. There is little 
doubt  that  academic  and  administrative  staff  would  not  have  accepted  similar 
contractual conditions (and were never asked to) in spite of the fact that their skills were 
really no more specialist or valued than those of the interrupters within the context of 
the programme. 
This  entrenchment  of  intertwined  class  and  racial  inequality  within  the 
administration of traditional gang violence reduction programmes further strengthens 
the need for the type of gang-led violence transformation approach to be outlined in the 
next  chapter.  In  ensuring  high-level  government  officials/representatives,  similar  in 
function  to  diplomats,  are  not  in  charge  but  equal partners in  peace-building  such 
glaring inequalities can be reduced. Violence transformation only works if all parties 
understand and respect the equal value of one another's time & commitment as well as 
the reality is that all sets of resources and skills are equally essential to ensuring the 
process  works.  Equal  footing  within  the  violence  transformation  process  will  not 
eradicate inequality in condition or opportunity more broadly, or even among process 
participants as they exist beyond the negotiating table. However, forced equal footing 
for the purposes of working towards a common goal may help to change high-level 
52-60. 
566 Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago, ES-12, 5-1.
567 Ransford, Kane and Slutkin, “Cure Violence,” 236; Varano and Wolff, “Street Outreach as an 
Intervention Modality for At-Risk Youth,” 86.
568 Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago, 3-9, 3-11.
569 Ibid, 3-9, 3-11.
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government attitudes about the health of American 'meritocracy', an essential first step 
to  encouraging  politicians  and  policy-makers  alike  to  begin  to  tackle  American 
inequality in a new and more effective way, something that offers the greatest likelihood 
of eradicating gang violence more broadly.570
Having considered the 'innovations' offered by CeaseFire, it is now possible to 
ask whether the programme worked. Unfortunately, as has been the case with previous 
gang violence intervention efforts, it is unclear the extent to which observed decreases 
were  the  direct  result  of  CeaseFire's  efforts.  The  final  report  of  the  extensive  and 
comprehensive  independent  evaluation  of  CeaseFire  led  by  Wesley  G  Skogan  (and 
carried out with the financial support of the National Institute of Justice) is cautiously 
optimistic about the programme's success. Though there was variation across sites, most 
experienced a decline in shootings and of the seven sites subjected to close hotspot 
analysis there were declines in violence across the board with these declines definitely 
or quite probably the result of programme efforts in four hotspot areas.571 Declines in 
reciprocal  and  gang-related  killings  in  four  programme  areas  studied  were  also 
reported.572 Yet the results of additional independent studies based on the same data sets 
were  more  mixed.  So  Young  Kim found  that  while  CeaseFire  project  areas  saw a 
statistically significant decline in shootings, its impact on killings were unclear as some 
project areas CeaseFire outperformed comparison areas while other were very much 
outperformed.573 Richard Block found that the program definitely had a positive effect 
on shooting density in three of seven areas tested, quite probably had an impact in a 
fourth area and possibly had some impact in two additional areas, yet acknowledged 
problems  in  statistical  clarity  made  it  difficult  to  be  more  positive  about  the 
programme's results.574 The independent evaluation provided by Andrew V Papachristos 
was the least positive, arguing that the programme's impact on disrupting the networks 
of gang violence key to its spread was not discernible, with noticeable changes in only 
two of  the  eight  areas  considered  in  depth.575 Obscuring  the  data  used  across  these 
evaluations  was  the  fact  that  Project  Safe  Neighbourhoods  (PSN)  was  active  in  a 
number of project and comparison sites576 combined with the fact that not all project 
570 For more on the nature, reproduction and impact of inequality in the United States please refer  
to: Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty First Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2014);  Thomas Piketty  and Emmanuel Saez, “Income Inequality  in  the United States,  1913-
1998,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no 1 (2003): 1-39; Wilkinson and Pickett, The 
Spirit  Level;  Erik  Olin  Wright,  “Race,  Class,  and  Income Inequality,”  American  Journal  of  
Sociology 83, no 6 (1978): 1368-1397.
571 Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago, ES-16 – ES-18.
572 Ibid, 7-38.
573 So Young Kim, “Intervention Analysis of the CeaseFire Program,” in Evaluation of CeaseFire-
Chicago by Wesley G Skogan, Susan M Hartnett, Natalie Bump and Jill Dubois (Washington: 
National Institute of Justice, 2008), A-2, A-12.
574 Richard  Block,  “Impact  of  CeaseFire  on  Geographical  Crime  Patterns,”  in  Evaluation  of  
CeaseFire-Chicago by Wesley  G Skogan,  Susan M Hartnett,  Natalie  Bump and Jill  Dubois 
(Washington: National Institute of Justice, 2008), B-34.
575 Andrew V Papachristos, “The Impact of CeaseFire on Gang Homicide Networks,” in Evaluation 
of CeaseFire-Chicago by Wesley G Skogan, Susan M Hartnett, Natalie Bump and Jill Dubois 
(Washington: National Institute of Justice, 2008), C-34 – C-35.
576 Skogan, Harnett, Bump and Dubois, Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago, 7-40.
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sites operated with equal (or comparable) resources.577 Furthermore hanging above the 
programme  was  the  unexplained  national  drop  in  violence  levels  which  affected 
Chicago from the late 1990s forwards.578 In sum, it does appear as though CeaseFire 
was able to achieve some reductions in the levels of gang violence in its project areas, 
however evaluation results question the extent to which the programme has been the 
revolutionary  success  of  its  self-presentation.  In  other  words,  its  successes  were  as 
limited as its innovations, reinforcing the need for a new approach.
Integrated Approaches
In the late 1980s Chicago's homicide rate was significantly lower than it had 
been a decade before, yet the emergence of the so-called 'crack epidemic' in low income 
communities across the country increased hostility towards street gangs. In the early 
1990s the number of homicides in Chicago returned to levels seen in the 1970s, marking 
a substantial increase from violence levels experienced during the late 1980s. This was a 
phenomenon seen in other large cities as well, with gang violence in New York and Los 
Angeles reaching to heights previously unseen. Though there is no definitive proof that 
these increaseswere directly connected to the crack epidemic, the believed connection 
meant pressure to crack down on gangs reached fever pitch during this period.579 Irving 
Spergel was leading the development of the Juvenile Gang Suppression and Intervention 
Research and Development Program sponsored by the OJJDP at the time (1987 through 
1991). With mounting evidence that single strategy approaches to gang violence were 
roundly ineffective, Spergel and his team set about designing a new model for violence 
reduction. In particular they sought to bring together the most effective parts of previous 
suppression,  prevention  and  intervention  approaches,  theoretically  eliminating  those 
strategies which proved ineffective in isolation. The final result was the Comprehensive 
Community-wide  Gang  Program  Model,  now  known as  the  OJJDP Comprehensive 
Gang Model or Spergel Model.580 This model would be tested in cities across the United 
States,  starting with  the  Little  Village  Gang Violence  Reduction  Project  (GVRP)  in 
Chicago. 
The Spergel Model remains the most widely recognised integrated approach to 
violence reduction to date but it is not the only one. Modelled after Operation Ceasefire 
in Boston, Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), was rolled out nationally during the early 
2000s with Chicago a key programme city. If the GVRP was ultimately an intervention-
leaning effort, PSN was a suppression-leaning effort, though no less comprehensive or 
integrated in scope or aims.581 The purpose of this section is to illustrate how these two 
programmes,  supposedly on the cutting edge of  gang violence reduction theory and 
research, have been neither particularly ground-breaking nor effective, at least not on 
577 Ibid, 8-16.
578 Ibid, ES-18.
579 Jeanette Covington,  Crime and Racial Constructions: Cultural Misinformation about African  
Americans in Media and Academia  (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010), 13-14; Popkin et al, 
The Hidden War, 24; Bill Sanders,  Youth Crime and Youth Culture in the Inner City (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 155.
580 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 27-29.
581 Chicago's Project Safe Neighborhoods operation also greatly informed the development of the 
City of Chicago's official Violence Reduction Strategy launched in 2009.
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the scale needed to really transform Chicago's gang violence problem.
The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project (GVRP)
The impetus for the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project came in the 
form of  a  $1 million grant  from the  Illinois  Criminal  Justice  Information Authority 
(ICJIA)  to  the  Chicago  Police  Department  which  earmarked  $500,000  for  the 
development of a pilot  gang violence reduction project in the city's Hispanic/Latino 
communities.582 Spergel  was  invited  to  submit  a  concept  paper  based  on  the 
Comprehensive Community-wide Gang Program Model and his concept was selected to 
form the basis of what eventually became the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction 
Project (GVRP). As the name suggests, the GVRP operated in the almost exclusively 
Hispanic/Latino  Little  Village  neighbourhood  on  the  West  Side.583 Although  the 
programme  was  administered  by  the  CPD,  and  as  such  policing  was  more  deeply 
embedded in the programme structure than with traditional intervention-focused efforts, 
its  administrators  failed  to  demonstrate  a  clear  and  consistent  commitment  to  the 
programme. Staffing changes,  changes to the CPD's organisational  structure and the 
intensive investment  of time, energy and resources  required by the transition to the 
Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) which occurred during the same period 
all played a role here. It is believed by Spergel that it is this lack of commitment which 
ultimately resulted in the programme being brought to a close in spite of early positive 
results.584 CPD ambivalence also meant that Spergel and colleagues, already responsible 
for programme design and under contract for programme evaluation, were charged with 
overseeing  its  implementation,  even  taking  direct  responsibility  for  administering 
GVRP's outreach component. Though necessary for programme survival, it did mean 
that the project lacked the semi-independent evaluation initially hoped.585
The  programme  model  employed  by  the  GVRP,  grounded  in  social 
disorganisation theory586 comprised five key components:  (1) social intervention; (2) 
community  mobilization;  (3)  provision  of  social  opportunities;  (4)  suppression 
(socialised control); and (5) organisational change and development.587 Components (1), 
(2), (3) and (5) had long been integrated as key elements of intervention programmes, 
with  the  only  major  change  being  the  integration  of  (4)  suppression,  which  the 
programme did not actually take any responsibility for, instead leaving this 'part' to be 
carried out independently by the CPD's gang unit. While not an entirely new concept, 
had the GVRP been able to fully develop its organisational change and development 
strategy,  it  could  potentially  have  changed  the  relationship  between  the  CPD, 
community groups and gang members,  re-humanising gang members in the eyes of 
local police and community leaders.588 Unfortunately this component was never fully 
582 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 29-30.
583 Howell, “Lessons Learned from Gang Program Evaluations,” 60; Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang  
Violence, 338.
584 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 327-341.
585 Spergel et al, The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project in Chicago (Chicago: Illinois 
Criminal Justice Information Authority, 2003).
586 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 27.
587 Ibid, 29.
588 RAT Judy, “On the Question of Nigga Authenticity,” in That's the Joint!: The Hip-hop Studies  
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realised.589 The GVRP set a very modest bar for 'success' – reductions in violence within 
the  project  area,  or  at  least  increases  in  levels  of  violence  smaller  than  those 
experienced in comparison areas. 
The programme focused on inter-agency collaboration and coalition building as 
key to success, with outreach workers focusing on community mobilisation and direct 
work with high-risk clients (limited to a total of 100 individuals identified as having a 
very high risk of becoming shooters or victims). Outreach workers were drawn largely 
from  the  community's  ex-gang  population  and  monitored  closely.  Their  safety  and 
security  was  considered  high  priority  and all  outreach workers  were  provided with 
medical/life insurance and bulletproof vests (things many CeaseFire outreach workers 
would later go without). Behavioural codes of conduct were adhered to closely. Workers 
were prohibited from engaging in risky behaviours likely to jeopardise their safety and 
the  programme's  reputation  including  romantic  relationships  with  gang-affiliated 
persons and/or allowing gang members to stay over in their places of residence or use 
their vehicles (presumably extending to gang-affiliated relations as well).590 
The strictness of these behavioural controls (perhaps a step too far in limiting 
employee  freedoms)  meant  turnover  was  higher  than  programme  operators  had 
expected. There was also concern over the over-identification of some project workers 
with their gang-affiliated clients.591 Together this made the outreach component difficult 
to manage. At the same time, managing the ever-changing priorities (and neglect) of the 
programme by its CPD administrators (not to mention those of the community partners 
the GVRP relied upon) proved a constant challenge. Although the programme has been 
rated  'effective'  by  the  OJJDP Model  Programs  Guide,592 it  was  unable  to  achieve 
reductions in either gang-related or overall violence although it fared better than many 
of the project comparison sites in some evaluatory categories.593 More positively, there 
was an increase in the number of community residents who perceived the safety of their 
neighbourhoods  to  have  increased  between  the  programme's  start  and  end  dates.594 
Where these mixed results might be claimed a tentative (and highly limited) success, 
Spergel  has  been  very  cautious  about  overestimating  the  programme's  effect  on 
changing crime rates.595 In sum, the programme cannot conclusively be determined to 
be a categorical failure or a success, however it is fair to say that its impact was really 
very underwhelming. The programme did face administrative challenges, yet this is not 
a problem unique to the GVRP alone. Many programmes face similar administrative 
challenges, but are nevertheless expected to deliver positive results.  Thus, although the 
scale of poor administration on the Youth Manpower Project meant implementation did 
Reader, 2ed, eds. Murray Forman and Mark Anthony Neal (New York: Routledge, 2012), 106.
589 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 153.
590 Ibid, 81, 83-84.
591 Ibid, 104-110.
592 Office of Juvenile Justice and  Delinquency Prevention, “Gang Violence Reduction Program,” 
OJJDP Strategic Planning Tool, accessed  1 August 2014, <https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/
spt/programs/71>.
593 Spergel et al, The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project in Chicago, 15-21 – 15-47.
594 Ibid, 16-31.
595 Spergel,  Reducing  Youth  Gang  Violence,  305-326;  Spergel  et  al,  The  Little  Village  Gang 
Violence Reduction Project in Chicago, 15-51.
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not  adequately  test  programme  values,  the  same  cannot  be  said  here.  At  least  in 
Chicago, the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model illustrated itself only as effective as 
traditional gang violence intervention or suppression efforts and inadequate in dealing 
with the scale of Chicago's gang problem even within a single neighbourhood. 
Project Safe Neighborhoods
As was the case with CeaseFire, Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) emerged in 
the wake of the success of Operation Ceasefire in Boston. PSN Chicago is part of a  
national  Project  Safe Neighborhoods initiative.596 In keeping with other  PSN efforts 
nation-wide,  and  the  original  Operation  Ceasefire  model,  it  utilises  a  focused 
deterrence/'pulling  levers'  approach  to  violence  reduction.  PSN  works  by 
simultaneously increasing the 'opportunity cost' of engaging in violence and bolstering 
community-support for anti-violence norms. It focuses on four specific interventions 
which  are  together  expected  to  yield  significant  declines  in  the  homicide  rate,  gun 
homicide specifically: (1) increase in federal (as opposed to state-level) prosecutions for 
those with past felony convictions found carrying or using weapons; (2) increase in the 
length of sentences associated with federal prosecutions; (3) gun recovery and other 
supply-side  policing  measures;  and (4)  the  use  of  offender  notification  meetings  to 
encourage  deterrence  and  reinforce  desired  messages  about  anti-violence  social 
norms.597 Offender  notification  meetings  are  three  pronged,  beginning  with  a 
presentation by law enforcement which details increased arrests and convictions as a 
result of program efforts. This is followed by a brief presentation from an ex-offender 
who had turned his life around (highlighting the possibility for change). The sessions 
end with short presentations by social service agencies and community groups able to 
provide  individuals  with  tangible  information  on  the  support  available  should  they 
choose to change. Overall, the programme does lean towards a suppression approach, 
but  it  remains  heavily  involved  in  providing  community  outreach  education 
programmes, conducting school presentations and working with ex-offenders.598 
The  most  extensive  evaluation  of  the  programme,  conducted  by  Andrew  V 
Papachristos, Tracey L Meares & Jeffrey Fagan and published in 2007 as “Attention 
Felons:  Evaluating  Project  Safe  Neighborhoods  in  Chicago,”  in  the  Journal  of  
Empirical Legal Studies, presented generally positive results. The evaluation found that 
during the first two-years of the programme, homicides in the 'treatment area' dropped 
by approximately 35% overall and for every 100 guns recovered one could expect a 
beat-level  decline  in  the  log  homicide  rate  of  approximately  18%.599 Offender 
notification meetings appeared to make a particularly significant contribution to project 
success, with each 1% increase in offender attendance associated with an approximate 
596 Edmund F McGarrell et al,  Project Safe Neighborhoods – A National Program to Reduce Gun  
Crime:  Final  Project  Report  (East  Lansing:  Michigan  State  University  School  of  Criminal 
Justice, 2009).
597 Andrew V Papachristos,  Tracey  L Meares  and  Jeffrey Fagan,  “Attention  Felons:  Evaluating 
Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago,”  Journal of Empirical Legal Studies  4, no 2 (2007): 
223.
598 Papachristos, Meares and Fagan, “Attention Felons,” 230.
599 Ibid, 224, 258.
P Stones and Provos N Ives-Allison 133
13% decrease in beat-level log homicide rates.600 This particular innovation was quickly 
incorporated  into  violence  reduction  efforts  as  near  and  far  as  Cincinnati  and 
Glasgow.601 
Still,  it  is  difficult  to  determine  which  aspects  of  these  meetings  were  most 
effective. If it is the first part of the meeting responsible for driving change, this lends 
support to a deterrence-focused approach. If it is the latter two, this would lend support 
for incentivisation. Knowing if one approach is particularly effective (or if both together 
were crucial) can help better tailor the programme to play to its strengths.602 At the same 
time,  as  was  the  case  with  CeaseFire,  evaluators603 highlighted  the  difficulty  in 
ascertaining  the  precise  extent  to  which  the  PSN initiative  was  responsible  for  the 
reductions found given the presence of other violence reduction initiatives (including 
CeaseFire)  in  project  areas.604 In  sum,  though  Project  Safe  Neighborhood  likely 
achieved reductions in  levels of  violence,  like CeaseFire  before it,  the  limits  of  its 
impact  on gang structure fail  to  guard against  future 'eruptions'  whether  they last  a 
weekend or a summer. Ensuring those involved are punished is important, but for those 
whose lives have been lost, this type of approach might be seen as perhaps too little, too 
late. 
Conclusion
Since  the  emergence  of  Chicago's  supergangs  in  the  early  1960s millions  of 
public  dollars  (and  millions  more  provided  by  charitable  foundations)  have  been 
funnelled into dozens of gang violence reduction initiatives. Yet, street gangs remain as 
embedded within the fabric of inner-city Chicago as they were in the late 1960s or the 
early 1990s. Furthermore, in spite of the tremendous financial investment made in gang 
violence  reduction,  it  remains  possible  to  argue  that  we  are  no  closer  to  finding  a 
solution to the problem of gang violence in the city today than we were not just fifty but 
eighty  years  ago when comparatively  docile  informal  ethnic  youth  groups were the 
pressing  urban  concern.  This  chapter  has  surveyed:  Chicago  Police  Department's 
specialised  gang  operations;  anti-gang  legislation  covering  Chicago;  the  pioneering 
Chicago Area Project of the 1930s; the Youth Manpower Project; The Little Village 
Gang  Violence  Reduction  Project  (GVRP);  CeaseFire-Chicago;  and  Project  Safe 
Neighborhoods (in order of launch date). While not an exhaustive list, it does cover the 
major  landmark  programmes  across  the  suppression-intervention  spectrum including 
key comprehensive/integrated initiatives. Not one of these programmes has been able to 
demonstrate its ability to generate deep, sustainable reductions in gang violence. This 
does  not  mean that  there  have  been no successes.  Project  Safe  Neighborhoods,  for 
example, was able to yield limited reductions in levels of violence within project sites 
while CeaseFire appears to have reduced the intensity of violence in at least some of its 
600 Ibid, 256.
601 Community  Initiative  to  Reduce  Violence.  The  Violence  Must  Stop  (Glasgow:  Violence 
Reduction Unit, nd); Robin S Engel et al, Implementation of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce  
Violence (CIRV): Year 1 Report (Cinnicinnati: University of Cincinnati Policing Institute, 2008).
602 Papachristos, Meares and Fagan, “Attention Felons,” 266.
603 With the caveat  that  Papachristos  was also responsible for  an independent evaluation of  the 
CeaseFire data. (Papachristos, “The Impact of CeaseFire on Gang Homicide Networks”.)
604 Papachristos, Meares and Fagan, “Attention Felons,” 262-264.
P Stones and Provos N Ives-Allison 134
project areas' most troubled 'hotspots'. 
The average annual number of homicides in the city have, since 2004, stabilised 
at about half the level seen during the 1970s and early 1990s. But, as no specific effort 
(or even a collection of efforts) can claim to be responsible in whole or even in part for 
this dramatic decline, this indicates patterns of gang violence in the city have been less 
affected by changes in violence reduction efforts than those who conduct  this work, 
funders and the public at large (especially inner-city residents) would hope. In looking 
at  the  breadth  of  previous  (and  ongoing)  approaches  to  gang violence  reduction  in 
Chicago, three inter-related problems emerge: (1) There has been a tremendous lack of 
radical  innovation  in  the  gang violence reduction  field in  spite  of  consistent  under-
performance and more  general  inefficacy  because;  (2)  gangs largely  continue  to  be 
treated as essentially similar to early ethnic street gangs, a problem which itself is the 
result of; (3) a failure to recognise the effect of the persistent stability and depth of the  
racial divide in the post civil-rights era on the intractability of gang violence and the de-
politicisation of 'race-related' issues including gang violence. 
As has been highlighted throughout this chapter,  the basic building blocks of 
both  the  suppression  and  intervention  approaches  to  gang  violence  reduction  were 
established long before Chicago's supergangs were born. The use of the criminal justice 
system to control and/or 'reform' socio-economically marginalised young people whose 
behaviour  (carried  out  individually  or  as  part  of  a  group)  deviates  from/challenges 
mainstream social norms dates back to at least the 19th century when the juvenile justice 
system first emerged in Chicago. Specialised police gang units and legislation may have 
increased  the  investigative,  arrest,  detention  and  sentencing  powers  of  the  criminal 
justice system, but they have not fundamentally challenged how gang violence is to be 
dealt with. Whether an individual responsible for carrying out a gang killing is arrested 
by a the gang unit or beat officers, or whether he is tried under specialty legislation, 
ordinary criminal law (in the case of insufficient proof of gang motivation for example) 
or  juvenile  law,  that  person  will  still  be  punished  with  a  lengthy  prison/juvenile 
detention sentence. Simultaneously, there has been little investigation into the specific 
efficacy of police gang units605 or anti-gang legislation, even in the face of growing 
concerns over the extent to which this legislation (to be enforced by these specialised 
police units) infringes upon the civil rights and liberties of those it was theoretically 
designed to protect.606 Still, it is clear that even with an average of 400-500 homicides 
per  year  and  thousands  of  non-fatal  shootings,607 the  problem remains  beyond  the 
control of law enforcement and the criminal justice system more broadly. 
Intervention programmes may speak of their innovation loudly and frequently, 
but they remain closely modelled on the principles and strategies first employed by the 
Chicago  Area  Project  during  its  most  experimental  years  (1930s),  something  that 
605 Lamm Weisel and Painter, The Police Response to Gangs, 19-32; Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang  
Violence, 13, 15-16.
606 Bjerregaard, “Antigang Legislation and its Potential Impact”; Clark, “City of Chicago v Morales: 
Sacrificing  Individual  Liberty  Interests  for  Community  Safety”;  Strosnider,  “Anti-gang 
Ordinances After City of Chicago v Morales”; Van Hofwegen, “Unjust and Ineffective”. 
607 There were 2,185 shootings in Chicago in 2013. (“Chicago Shooting Victims,” Chicago Tribune 
Online, accessed 1 August 2014, <http://crime.chicagotribune.com/chicago/shootings>.)
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extends equally to Spergel's  'comprehensive'  GVRP. As detailed in Appendix A, the 
Youth  Manpower  Project,  CeaseFire,  GVRP and  even  Project  Safe  Neighborhoods 
share(d) CAP's commitment to community partnership and coalition building as well as 
a  desire  to  highlight  or  provide  alternatives  to  gang  life.  Furthermore  all  of  the 
intervention/integrated programmes discussed have been subject to some form of social 
scientific evaluation. Outreach workers, modelled after CAP's 'curbstone counsellors', 
were integral to the operations of CeaseFire and the GVRP as they have been in other 
programs left unexplored. CeaseFire and GVRP are and were, again like CAP, designed 
by academics to test theoretical assumptions about how violence operates in the urban 
environment. Also common is an inability to demonstrate how reductions in violence 
experienced by programme areas (with the exception of a small number of CeaseFire 
sites)608 were the direct result of programme efforts. 
That  these  efforts  have  been  unable  to  yield  the  expected  or  desired  social 
transformations  for  which  they  were  designed  is  highly  problematic.  Yet  it  is  also 
unsurprising  given  the  CAP approach  upon  which  they  are  directly  or  indirectly 
modelled was also unable to demonstrate significant success across its project sites in 
dealing with much lower level violent behaviour (and general delinquency).609 Project 
Safe  Neighborhoods  as  a  suppression-leaning  integrated  approach  utilising  a 
combination  of  focused  deterrence/suppression  and  offender  notification  meetings 
arguably shows the greatest  amount of promise,  but it  too shies away from making 
direct claims supporting its responsibility for observed reductions in violence.610 In the 
face of such underwhelming performance across the board, what is truly shocking is 
that  there  has  not  been  a  serious  challenge  to  the  logic  of  existing  intervention, 
suppression  and  integrated  approaches.  More  shocking  still  is  the  amount  of  self-
congratulation for (at best) mediocrity that occurs within the violence prevention field 
as a whole. Though violence increased in the GVRP project area over the duration of 
the  project  and  did  not  even  consistently  manage  smaller  levels  of  increase  than 
comparison areas, it was nevertheless rated 'effective' by the National Gang Centre.611 
CeaseFire  also  received  an  'effective'  rating  in  spite  of  its  inability  to  consistently 
demonstrate any tangible responsibility for decreasing levels of violence.612 In order to 
begin  to  really  transform  Chicago's  gang  landscape  we  need  to  rethink  how  gang 
violence is approached from the ground up, something only possible once we begin to: 
(1) recognise and take seriously the differences between today's gang landscape and that 
of the 1930s; (2) understand how the history of race in America has come to frame our 
understanding of gangs, gang members, and the victims of gang violence (the subject of 
the previous chapter); and (3) realise the bold statement persistent and endemic gang 
violence makes about the state of the American social contract.
608 Richard Block, “Impact of CeaseFire on Geographical Crime Patterns,” B-34.
609 Kobrin,  “The Chicago Area Project  – A 25 Year Assessment”;  Schlossman and Sedalk,  The 
Chicago Area Project Revisited.
610 Papachristos, Meares and Fagan, “Attention Felons,” 262-264.
611 Office of Juvenile Justice and  Delinquency Prevention, “Gang Violence Reduction Program,” 
OJJDP Strategic Planning Tool, accessed  1 August 2014, <https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/
SPT/Programs/139>.
612 Office  of  Juvenile  Justice  and  Delinquency Prevention,  “Cure  Violence,”  OJJDP Strategic 
Planning Tool, accessed  1 August 2014, <https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/SPT/Programs/
71>.
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As argued in chapter 2 and at the beginning of this chapter, the lack of precedent 
for the rise of African American supergangs meant that based on superficial similarities 
at the time of their emergence, they were presumed to be essentially the same as the 
ethnic gangs studied by Thrasher and which Shaw and McKay's Chicago Area Project 
attempted  to  'treat'.  However,  unlike  these  earlier  ethnic  gangs,  which  tended  to 
disappear  as  previously  marginalised  ethnic  groups  became  assimilated  within 
mainstream  American  'whiteness',  the  inequalities  faced  by  low-income  African 
Americans  were  more  deeply  historically  entrenched.  There  will  be  no  organic 
'evaporation' of Chicago's African American supergangs. The intertwined and invisible 
reproductive structures of class and racial inequality in the post-civil  rights era have 
proven  thus-far  to  be  largely  insurmountable  barriers  to  the  type  of  mass  social 
mobility-based assimilation undergone by white immigrant groups responsible for the 
dissipation of Chicago's early ethnic gangs.613 To begin to respond appropriately to the 
city's supergangs, their intractability (and that of the urban conditions which feed their 
perpetuation)  needs to  be  recognised as  does  the endangered  state  of  the  American 
social contract between low-income African Americans (including gang members) and 
the American government. 
The lack of high level and direct state response to Chicago's persistently high 
levels of gang violence represents a failure on the part of the American government to 
protect the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness of those living in the city's 
most  socio-economically  marginalised  neighbourhoods  in  an  immediate  sense 
(including  those  of  gang  members  themselves).  However,  the  historic  exclusion  of 
African Americans from the political  realm (and thus full  membership in the social 
contract) has helped to create a self-reproducing environment of racially-underpinned 
class  inequality  in  which  much  of  the  African  American  population  continues  to 
experience their universal and inalienable rights in ways more restricted than the 'white' 
majority. 
What would an approach to gang violence reduction that recognises the political 
dimensions and racial underpinnings of Chicago's gang landscape look like? As the next 
chapter will argue, such an approach treats gang violence with the political seriousness 
and  political  urgency  it  deserves.  It  involves  the  federal  government  directly  (as 
opposed  to  its  various  agencies,  departments  or  offices)  and  recognises  gangs  as 
politically significant  agents of violence, bringing gangs and government together for 
the  common  purpose  of  developing  a  working  and  enforceable  agreement  to  end 
violence. In exchange for non-violence, the government will leverage its resources to 
support gangs in their  group transition to non-violence in the ways gangs themselves 
identify as most beneficial (within the parameters of the law). Though a small start, it is 
hoped  that  the  violence  transformation  process  could  also  help  transform  the 
relationship between the government of the United States and its most marginalised 
613 Given  continuing  high  levels  of  Hispanic/Latino  immigration  into  Chicago  (and  the  United 
States more generally), it remains to be seen whether this population will, once numbers have 
stabilised, begin to assimilate as other immigrant groups have done, or if a new racial division 
rivalling the black/white divide in  terms of  depth of entrenchment  will  emerge.  (Rob Paral,  
“Latinos of the New Chicago,” in The New Chicago: A Social and Cultural Analysis, ed. John P. 
Koval et al (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), 105-114.)
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inner-city  residents  in  a  way similar  to  the changes  in the  relationship between the 
Northern  Irish  government  and  the  Catholic  population  during  its  conflict 
transformation process.
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Chapter 4
Violence Transformation: A New Way Forward?
The first three chapters looks backwards, explaining how we have arrived at this 
point in time when after fifty years of endemic gang violence in Chicago the problem 
has  continued  to  escape  recognition  as  serious  &  endemic  civil  disorder  and  a 
significant ongoing threat to state stability because of the extent to which it undermines 
the state's ability to live up to its founding principles. How this misrecognition affects 
response, allowing for heavy investment in what are, ultimately, largely ineffective and 
inadequate violence reduction measures, has also been explored. The first chapter of this 
work highlights how the academic polarisation of political and 'non-political' violence 
(including  gang  violence)  has  reinforced  a  broad  societal  de-politicisation  of  gang 
violence and its presentation as a community social problem and criminal justice issue. 
Chapter 2 turns its attentions to the historical roots of this division, examining how the 
historic  politicisation  of  sectarian  and  national  difference  in  Ireland  (later  Northern 
Ireland) has contrasted with the exclusion of African Americans from the political realm 
and the under-politicisation of racial inequality. It is acknowledged that the current gang 
violence problem is equally shared between Chicago's highly segregated low-income 
black and Latino/Hispanic inner-city communities. However, it is also argued that the 
pervasiveness  and  depth  of  racialised  inequality  has  imbued  African  American 
supergangs and their affiliated descendants with a durability not found among earlier 
white  'ethnic'  gangs,  leading in  turn  to  the  apparent  intractability  of  the  city's  gang 
violence problem. 
As the Latino/Hispanic population of Chicago has expanded rapidly since the 
1970s  with  no  sign  of  slowdown,614 it  is  impossible  to  say  whether  long-term 
assimilation will weaken the strength and size of these gangs as was the case with the 
earlier ethnic gangs. Much more certain is the reality that after fifty years of endemic 
gang violence, we cannot afford to wait to find out.  As argued in the previous chapter,  
today's  response  to  gang  violence  in  Chicago  remains  rooted  in  suppression  and 
intervention  strategies  designed to  deal  with  the  comparatively  transient  and  docile 
ethnic  gangs  of  the  1920s/1930s.  Innovation  has  been  limited  to  intensification, 
variation or combination, yet these efforts have not been able to account for fluctuations 
in  levels  of  gang  (or  general)  violence  or  demonstrate  themselves  more  than  very 
limitedly effective. It is clear that truly radical innovation is needed and now is the time 
to turn our attentions to the future and the question of 'where do we go from here?'.
This chapter argues a flexible strategy is needed that combines a recognition of 
the significance and severity of the political threat with an understanding of the history 
of racially-biased socio-economic inequality in Chicago. Politicising the gang violence 
issue and response, though difficult and controversial, offers our best opportunity for 
bringing  Chicago's  half  century  of  (un)civil  conflict  to  a  close.  It  allows  for  a 
recognition of the political  statement  made by the persistence of gang violence and 
illuminates  the  role  political  decision  making  has  played  in  generating  conditions 
conducive  to  gang  development  and  the  promulgation  of  ineffective/inadequate 
614 Paral, “Latinos of the New Chicago,” 108-109.
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response. What might a political solution to endemic gang violence in Chicago look like 
in  practice?  Part  of  the  answer  for  Chicago's  future  might  be  found  in  looking  at 
Northern Ireland's past, with the long-view of the Northern Irish peace process offering 
a loose model to adapt and build from.615 The 'violence transformation' process as this 
adapted  model  will  be  referred  to  herein,  centres  around  the  development  and 
implementation of an agreement between the highest level of the federal government 
and  the  gangs  (sets/factions)  most  responsible  for  the  scale  and  perpetuation  of 
Chicago's gang violence problem. 
Chicago's street gangs may not share the same overt political ambitions as Sinn 
Féin, but this does not mean that they cannot be persuaded/incentivised to renounce 
violence permanently and begin a process of disarmament. While power-sharing and the 
creation  of  new political  bodies  may hold  no sway,  some of  the  social  rebalancing 
incentives that  helped  persuade  the  Provisional  republican  movement  to  end  their 
campaign of  violence  may be surprisingly relevant  here.  Policing reforms,  language 
rights (particularly for Latino/Hispanic gangs) and the possibility of limited prisoner 
release may prove as enticing in Chicago as they were in Northern Ireland. Though 
impossible to predict specific outcomes, what is more certain is that in order to succeed 
violence transformation requires genuine and sustained commitment on the part of the 
federal  government.  It  also  requires  co-operation  between  the  government  and  the 
'influentials'  of  Chicago's  highly  fragmented  gang  landscape.  The  remainder  of  this 
chapter focuses on outlining the shape of the process, exploring the five main stages of 
agreement-centred  violence  transformation,  represented  visually  in  Appendix  B:  (1) 
groundwork  (intelligence  gathering  and  political  prioritisation);  (2)  informal 
communication; (3) formal communication; (4) agreement; and (5) implementation & 
monitoring. 
Before moving forward, it is important to recognise that in building off from the 
long-view of the Northern Irish peace process, many of the central principles of 'conflict 
615 Given the existence of a tremendously rich and diverse body of literature on the Northern Irish  
peace process, this work seeks to avoid unnecessary duplication by not rehashing the details of 
the long road to peace. The specific works that have most greatly informed the development of  
the violence  transformation  model  here proposed include: Gerry Adams,  Hope and History:  
Making Peace in Ireland (Australia: Hardie Grant, 2003); Paul Bew, The Making and Remaking  
of the Good Friday Agreement (Dublin: Liffey Press, 2007); Trevor Birney and Julian O'Neill, 
When  the  President  Calls  (Derry:  Guildhall  Press,  1997);  Tony  Blair,  A Journey  (London: 
Hutchinson, 2010).  152-199; Sean Byrne,  Economic Assistance and Conflict Transformation:  
Peacebuilding  in  Northern Ireland  (London:  Routledge,  2011);  Alistair  Campbell,  The Irish 
Diaries (1994-2003) (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 2013); Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke and Fiona 
Stephen,  eds.,  A  Farewell  to  Arms?:  Beyond  the  Good  Friday  Agreement  (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2006); Marianne Elliot, ed., The Long Road to Peace in Northern  
Ireland: Peace Lectures from the Institute of Irish Studies at Liverpool University  (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2007); English, Armed Struggle, 227-389; George Mitchell, Making 
Peace: The Inside Story of the Making of the Good Friday Agreement  (London: Heinemann, 
1999); Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 217-292; Mo Mowlam, Momentum: The Struggle  
for Peace, Politics and the People (London: Cornet, 2003); Padraig O'Malley, “Making Peace in 
South Africa and Northern Ireland,” in Northern Ireland and the Divided World: Post-Agreement  
Northern Ireland in Comparative Perspective,  ed. John McGarry (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 276-308; Powell,  Great Hatred, Little Room;  Smithey,  Unionists, Loyalists and  
Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland. 
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transformation'  are  embedded  in  the  violence  transformation  approach.616 Most 
significantly, there is the shared commitment to, “engaging with and transforming the 
relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that 
supports the continuation of violent conflict.”617 Alongside the violence transformation 
process  and following the  achievement  of  any formal  agreement,  attention  must  be 
devoted to fostering a renewed sense of shared humanity within American society that is 
capable  of  lessening  the  marginalisation  of  low  income  inner-city  Americans  long 
presented  as  a  burden  and  criminal  threat. One  of  the  most  obvious,  and  perhaps 
simplest,  ways  to  begin  this  process  of  change  is  to  encourage  (or  demand)  media 
sensitivity in the portrayal of homicide victims. The demonisation of gang members in 
the media and public debate has facilitated their dehumanisation,618 with their deaths 
(not forgetting many are juveniles) roundly ignored or even passively justified as 'what 
they  deserve'  for  having  found  themselves  caught  up  in  gang  life.  These  negative 
stereotypes  are  often  extended  to  young  African  American  men  from  inner-city 
neighbourhoods more broadly. Even in the absence of evidence of gang involvement, 
true innocence is always somehow suspect. This devaluing of human life on the basis of 
race, socio-economic status and, most controversially, gender, is wholly unacceptable.619
Simultaneously,  there  needs  to  be  a  ramping  up of  the  national  debate  over 
American inequality and the way it has eroded the fabric of American society. This is a 
difficult challenge, not least of all because of the influence of 'big money' on American 
electoral politics.620 Still, policies focused on lessening the impact of inequality offer the 
best  potential  for side-stepping past  and ongoing racially-charged animosity towards 
616 For further information on conflict transformation as a concept in its own right please refer to: 
Bruce W Dayton and Louis Kriesberg, eds, Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding: Moving  
from Violence to Sustainable Peace  (New York: Routledge, 2009); Lindred L Greer, Karen A 
Jehn and Elizabeth A Mannix, “Conflict  Transformation: A Longitudinal  Investigation of the 
Relationships  between  Different  Types  of  Intragroup  Conflict  and  the  Moderating  Role  of 
Conflict  Resolution”  Small  Group Research 39,  no 3 (2008):  278-302;  John Paul Lederach, 
Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1995); John Paul Lederach, The Little Book of Conflict Transformation (Intercourse: Good 
Books, 2003); Raimo Väyrynen, “To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of 
National and International Conflicts,” in New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution  
and Conflict  Transformation,  ed.  Raimo Väyrynen (London:  SAGE,  1991),  1-25;  and  Peter 
Wallensteen,  “The  Resolution  and  Transformation  of  International  Conflicts:  A  Structural 
Perspective,”  in  New  Directions  in  Conflict  Theory:  Conflict  Resolution  and  Conflict  
Transformation, ed. Raimo  Väyrynen (London: SAGE, 1991), 129-152.
617 Hugh Miall, “Conflict Transformation: A Multi-dimensional Task” (Berlin: Berghof Research 
Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2001), 3. 
618 Finn-Aage  Esbensen  and  Karin  E  Tuskini,  “Youth  Gangs  in  the  Print  Media,”  Journal  of  
Criminal Justice  and Popular  Culture 14,  no 1 (2007):  28;  James  T Kloppenberg,  Reading 
Obama: Dreams, Hope and the American Political Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2011), 201; Richard C McCorkle and Terance D Meith, Panic: The Social Construction of  
the Street Gang Problem (Upper Saddle: Prentice Hall, 2002), 81-82.
619 Rosalee A Clawson and Rakuya Trice, “Poverty as We Know It: Media Portrayals of the Poor,” 
The Public Opinion Quarterly 64, no 1 (2000): 53-64; Everette E Dennis and Edward C Pease, 
eds. The Media in Black and White (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1997); Dennis Rome, Black 
Demons:  Media's  Depiction  of  the  African  American  Male  Criminal  Stereotype (Westport: 
Praeger, 2004).
620 Martin Gilens,  Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
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anti-poverty initiatives621 by casting a wide enough net  so as to  ensure the working 
classes  and  'middle  America'  also  see  an  improvement  in  their  economic 
circumstances.622 The  intense  skepticism  many  Americans  have  over  perceived 
government  expansion (framed as  the  socialist  or  communist  threat)  might  seem to 
mean some will be entirely beyond reach when it comes to gathering support for this 
type of policy making, but that need not necessarily be the case. Co-ordinated national 
provision will actually lower government spending in some areas, reducing the overall 
size of government and creating a stronger economy.
Just  as  the  model  of  the  Northern  Irish  peace  process  cannot  be  applied 
wholesale to gang violence in Chicago, the violence transformation model outlined here 
cannot be directly applied to gang violence elsewhere in the United States. Given the 
intensive investment of political and financial resources this approach requires it simply 
would  not  be  prudent  to  attempt  this  type  of  high-level/high-touch  violence 
transformation in cities where gang violence is neither as entrenched nor as lethal (for 
example Portland, Oregon or Denver, Colorado). This is not to say a new approach that 
looks beyond traditional suppression/intervention efforts is not needed in these places as 
well,  but  as  is  the  case  for  Chicago,  the  optimal  approach  is  sensitive  to  local 
circumstances and their relationship to national historical, social, political and economic 
forces. Just as NATO troops in Afghanistan had to recognise the differences between 
fighting in urban Kabul and rural Kandahar province, new approaches to gang violence 
reduction  need  to  balance  an  understanding  of  the  national  'big  picture'  with  local 
realities,  constraints  and  opportunities.  This  being  said,  it  is  hoped  that  in  moving 
beyond  the  traditional  suppression/intervention  approaches  to  gang  violence,  the 
violence transformation process might help to inspire more innovative thinking around 
how gang violence might best be reduced or eliminated in different local circumstances. 
At the same time, the violence transformation process is not readily transferable to cities 
where  the  gang  violence  problem  (regardless  of  its  intensity)  is  closely  related  to 
transnational  gang  networks  involved  in  large-scale  drug  smuggling  (ex.  Mara 
Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street Gang).623 Even if the roots of the gang problem 
are  similar,  transnational  networks  do  need  to  be  handled  internationally  in  co-
ordination and co-operation with relevant international partners such as Mexico and El 
Salvador.
621 Jill Quadagno,  The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994).
622 Martin Gilens, “Racial Attitudes and Opposition to Welfare,”  The Journal of Politics  57, no 4 
(1995): 994-1014; Martin Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare: The Media, and the Politics of  
Antipoverty Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Mark Peffley, Jon Hurwitz and 
Paul M Sniderman, “Racial Stereotypes and Whites' Political Views of Blacks in the Context of 
Welfare and Crime,” American Journal of Political Science 41, no 1 (1997): 30-60; Wilson, The 
Truly Disadvantaged, 18-24.
623 Thomas  J  Boerman,  “Central  American  Gangs:  An  Overview  of  the  Phenomenon  in  Latin 
America and the US,” Journal of Gang Research 15, no 1 (2007): 35-52; JJ Fogelbach, “Mara 
Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Ley Anti Mara: El Salvador's Struggle to Reclaim Social Order,” San 
Diego International Law Journal 7 (2005): 223-258; Sonja Wolf, “Mara Salvatrucha: The Most 
Dangerous Street Gang in the Americas?” Latin American Politics and Society 54, no 1 (2012): 
65-99.
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Stage 1: Strategisation
Initiating communications with key gang influentials will undoubtedly cause a 
tremendous amount of political controversy and backlash. Thus, it is important to ensure  
communication is launched in as warm a political climate as possible. Simultaneously, 
given the political risks to be faced by whichever government accepts the challenge of 
recognising and dealing with gang violence as a significant threat to American political 
principles and civil order, it  is also essential the highest calibre intelligence be made 
available to it. The intelligence gathered the Chicago Police Department has gathered 
over  the  last  half  century  will  undoubtedly  be  useful.  However,  as  a  local  police 
department,  it  simply  does  not  have  the  resources  needed  to  bring  its  intelligence 
gathering and analysis capacity to a level where the American president can relatively 
safely stake his career on its ongoing validity. Thus, the strategisation process requires 
concurrent investment in intelligence gathering and political prioritisation. This will not 
be realised overnight, and indeed it may be the longest stage in the process. British 
involvement  in  intelligence  gathering  in  Northern  Ireland  dates  back  to  the  early 
1970s,624 even if establishing Northern Ireland as a national political priority was, at the 
time (before the Provisional IRA began its mainland campaign), an uphill battle. It took 
much of the decade before the fruits of intelligence operations really began to have a 
substantial  impact,  and it  should be expected  that  the process  would take a  similar 
length of time in Chicago. 
Stage 1A: Intelligence Gathering
As alluded to in chapter 3, improvements in British intelligence were crucial to 
the development and maintenance of the stalemate between the Provisional IRA and the 
British security services, in turn increasing the pressure on both parties to revisit and, 
ultimately,  pursue  a  political  resolution  to  the  conflict.625 Extrapolating  from  the 
Northern Irish experience to provide insight into how states in general can respond to 
terrorism  more  effectively,  Richard  English  argues,  “intelligence  is  the  most  vital  
element in successful counter-terrorism [emphasis original].”626 He continues:
Investment in the process of acquiring such intelligence is, arguably, 
the  crucial  foundation  upon  which  other,  interlinked  aspects  of 
response can then be built. Without such high-quality intelligence, it 
is  likely  that  all  aspects  of  state  response  (legal,  military, 
propagandist)  will  stumble  ineffectively.  But,  armed  with  such 
intelligence,  the  state  can  win  some  tactical  victories,  and  some 
effective counter-terrorist strategies can be adopted.627
The  same might  be  readily  said  for  gang-specific  intelligence.  Without  a  thorough, 
nuanced and, most importantly, evolving picture of the gang landscape, state response 
within a violence transformation context risks being inappropriately and/or inefficiently 
targeted. 
624 Bamford, “The Role and Effectiveness of Intelligence in Northern Ireland,” 581; Gillespe, The 
A-Z of the Northern Irish Conflict, 130.
625 Bamford, “The Role and Effectiveness of Intelligence in Northern Ireland”; English, Terrorism, 
133;  Sarma, “Informers and the Battle Against Republican Terrorism”.
626 English, Terrorism, 131.
627 Ibid, 132.
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The gang landscape in Chicago is ever-changing, with sets and factions falling in 
and out  with  one  another  on  almost  a  daily  basis.  Without  the  presence  of  a  clear 
hierarchy, it can also be difficult to identify who wields enough influence to persuade 
loosely controlled (or completely uncontrolled) 'front-line' gang members to lay down 
their arms, or even resist retaliation.628 Targeting the wrong individuals undermines the 
whole process by illustrating a lack of federal understanding of the situation on the 
ground and may make it even more difficult to earn the support of, and trust from, the 
gang influentials needed for the process to work.
In order for the government to even begin to map out its strategy for reaching 
out to Chicago's gangs, strong ongoing intelligence is needed in five areas: 
 1. Cartography
– Which low level groups sets/factions/crews 'run' which blocks? Who do they see 
as their main allies and rivals within/outside of their block?
– What supergangs, if any, do these groups claim to 'rep'? How has this influenced 
their relationship with surrounding crews? 
– How much mobility do specific gang members have? Which areas are off limits 
or generally avoided? 
 2. Networks of Violence
– Who are the most violent sets/factions/crews? How has this evolved over the last 
2 , 5 and 10 years respectively? 
– What key networks of sets, crews and clicks are currently responsible for the 
greatest numbers of assaults, homicides and shootings? How has this evolved 
over the last 2 and 5 years?  How did these networks of retaliation (or feuds) 
originate and how have they been sustained? 
 3. Operating Conditions
– What  are  the  greatest  challenges  and  opportunities  facing  Chicago's  street 
gangs? 
– How have they previously adapted to their operating environment (demolition of 
high-rise projects in the 1990s and 2000s; mass arrests of gang leadership)? 
– How 'warm' is the current business climate and how does each group generate its 
income? 
 4. Networks of Influence
– In an environment lacking in traditional vertical leadership, who are the most 
influential  gang  members?  How  have  they  fostered  alliances  and  rivalries 
between their crew and others? How accessible are they (in prison, on parole, on 
the streets)?
– How are kinship networks distributed across the gang landscape and how have 
they affected alliance patterns? For example,  are  there older influentials  who 
serve as a role model to siblings, cousins or psychological kin629 in other groups?
628 Retaliation being an important part of the strict codes of respect that dominate gang culture.  
(Andrew V Papachristos, “Murder by Structure: Dominance Relations and the Social Structure 
of Gang Homicide,” American Journal of Sociology 115, no 1 (2009): 74-128.)
629 Joshua M Ackerman, Douglas T Kenrick and Mark Schaller, “Is Friendship Akin to Kinship?” 
Evolution and Human Behavior  28, no 5 (2007): 365-374; Kent G. Bailey and Gustavo Nava, 
“Psychological  Kinship,  Love,  and  Liking:  Preliminary  Validity  Data,”  Journal  of  Clinical  
Psychology 45, no 4 (1989): 587-594.
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– Who outside the gang influences the influentials and how do they feel about the 
individual's  involvement  in  gang  activity?  (parents,  grandparents,  siblings, 
teachers/ coaches/mentors)
 5. Community Politics
– Where are traditional gang violence reduction efforts most active? What form do 
they take? How are the funded?
– What community organisations present the strongest claims to neighbourhood or 
block  representation?  Are  there  organic  (non-institutionalised)  community 
leaders who also wield a considerable amount of local power? 
Intelligence  in  the  first  four  areas  is  needed  to  craft  a  communications  strategy, 
identifying who needs to be reached and through whom contact might best be initiated. 
The fifth, on the other hand, is important for understanding who in the community needs 
to be 'won over' by (but kept on the perimeter of) the process. Trust in the government 
and its institutions is low amongst African Americans and weakens the farther down the 
socio-economic  hierarchy  one  moves,630 meaning  it  is  easier  to  mobilise  against  a 
government initiative than in support of it. Without ensuring that formal and informal 
community leaders are on board, there is always the risk that the community will reject 
the process resulting in a loss of its legitimacy and ultimate collapse. At the same time, 
these  community  leaders  need  not  be  formally  included  in  the  negotiation  and 
agreement process. Doing so risks entrenchment in community politics tailored to the 
(comparatively) politically articulate agendas of community groups, marginalising the 
gangs around whom the process really needs to be centred. 
Currently the collection of intelligence directly related to gangs is handled by a 
complex  web  of  federal,  state  and  local  agencies,  though  it  is  the  Chicago  Police 
Department which is most actively engaged in the gathering and analysis of intelligence 
related to the involvement of gangs in violent crime.631 At the state level, the Illinois 
Department  of  Corrections  maintains  an  Investigations  and  Intelligence  Division 
focused on eliminating and preventing gang activity within the prison system. Federally, 
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is responsible for the collection of drugs-
related  intelligence  covering  the  narcotics  trafficking/distribution  element  of  gang 
'business' operations. However, it lacks insight into gang violence especially the type of 
low-level  interpersonal  violence  between  gang  members  most  common in  Chicago. 
More relevantly, the FBI operates the National Gang Intelligence Centre (NGIC) first 
established in 2005. As it currently stands, the NGIC focuses primarily on national and 
regional gang networks as opposed to the gang networks of particular cities. Rather than 
direct intelligence gathering, the focus is on intelligence integration so law enforcement 
agencies are able to work with the most comprehensive intelligence available.632 At the 
same time, these intelligence gathering agencies do not operate in isolation. In Chicago, 
the Joint Task Force on Gangs led by the FBI includes CPD and other federal & state 
intelligence agencies. However, going forward, there needs to be an even higher degree 
630 Shayla C Nunnally, Trust in Black America: Race, Discrimination and Politics (New York: New 
York University Press, 2012). 
631 Charles  M Katz  and  Vincent  J  Webb,  Policing  Gangs  in  America  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 131; Larry Siegel and Brandon Welsh,  Juvenile Delinquency: Theory,  
Practice, and Law (Stamford: Cengage, 2012), 351.
632 Siegel and Welsh, Juvenile Delinquency, 349.
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of coordination and capacity building, particularly in intelligence collection, capable of 
transcending the municipal/state/federal divide.
Stage 1B: Political Prioritisation
While political prioritisation can help mobilise the resources needed to expand 
intelligence operations, it can also help create a warmer socio-political climate in which 
to pitch violence transformation (even if  the temperature is only increased by a few 
degrees).  Political  prioritisation  involves  three  steps.  The  first  is  to  establish  gang 
violence as  not  simply a  federal  priority,  but  a  presidential  priority  also.  Given the 
popularity of the 'tough on crime' political stance,633 this may be the simplest and least 
controversial step in the entire process. However it needs to be clear that what is not 
needed is another 'war' rhetorically akin to the 'war on drugs' or militarily similar to the 
'war  on terror'.634 Past  political  commitment  to tackling the street gang problem has 
typically been limited to increased financial investment in the types of gang programs 
that  have,  at  least  in  Chicago,  proven  largely  ineffective.  Depending  on  political 
circumstances, it may be necessary at this point in the process, to give in partially to this 
expectation and ramp up national funding for traditional gang violence intervention and 
suppression efforts temporarily (alongside violence transformation in Chicago), even if 
the  results  are  likely  to  be  less  than miraculous.  It  is  also  not  sufficient  to  simply 
announce gang violence as a priority just once, for then it will quickly be forgotten. 
Regular statements expressing disappointment in the persistence of gang violence and 
offering condolences to the the families of gang violence victims have an important role 
to  play.  More  controversially,  and  also  without  precedent,  this  must  include  a 
recognition of the tragedy gang member deaths. The message must be clear:  All gang 
violence deaths are unnecessary, tragic and realistically preventable. 
With gang violence on the national agenda, even a small spike in gang violence 
in Chicago can pave the way for the declaration of a state of emergency at the municipal 
and state levels allowing for greater federal involvement in local affairs than normally 
acceptable.  Though  declaring  a  national  state  of  emergency  would  not  be  without 
international  precedent,635 it  would  be  more  logical  here  to  declare  a  local  state  of 
emergency as a national state of emergency runs the unnecessary and unbearable risk of 
diluting  the  resources  and  attention  available  to  (and  needed  for)  violence 
transformation in Chicago. A national state of emergency would encourage cities across 
the country to demand considerable resources to tackle local gang violence (a 'me too' 
situation)s, regardless of whether it is of a scale comparable to Chicago or not. A local 
state of emergency is important because it represents an admission at the local and state 
level  that  Chicago's  gang  violence  problem  is  beyond  local  and  state  control 
necessitating concerted federal action beyond the normal boundaries for federal action. 
633 Katherine  Beckett,  Making Crime Pay:  Law and Order in  Contemporary American  Politics  
(Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2000);  Strosnider,  “Anti-gang  Ordinances  After  City  of  
Chicago v Morales,” 108.
634 Adam Roberts, “The 'War on Terror' in Historical Perspective,” Survival 47, no 2 (2005): 114.
635 Trinidad and Tobago declared a state of emergency in 2001 to deal with levels of violent crime 
that had escalated beyond local control.  (Dave Ramsaran, “The 'Myth' of Development: The 
Case of Trinidad and Tobago,” in  Caribbean Sovereignty, Development and Democracy in an  
Age of Globalization, ed. Linden Lewis (New York: Routledge, 2013), 130.)
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Unlike the transitions between stages 2, 3 4 and 5, intelligence gathering and political 
prioritisation carry on throughout the violence transformation process.
Stage 2: Informal Communication
A period  of  informal,  indirect  and/or  covert  talks  is  needed  to  build  trust, 
establish priorities and define the parameters of formal talks should both sides agree to 
work  together  in  common  cause.636 This  stage  is  important  because  direct 
communication carries tremendous risk on both sides. Politicians may find their careers 
quickly ended, or support lost irrevocably, should they engage in  'reckless' negotiation 
with gangs. Gang influentials might very well end up paying with their lives as cultural 
prohibitions  around  'snitching'  (providing  actionable  information  to  the  police)  are 
ruthlessly  enforced.  Those  found  to  be  communicating  with  law  enforcement, 
government  officials  or  even  unidentified  'official  looking'  persons  will  have  an 
exceptionally difficult time convincing others that they are not co-operating with the 
police.637 
Taking this into consideration, informal communications are quite probably best 
conducted,  at  least  initially,  through  trusted  third  party  intermediaries  -  'external 
catalysts'. In the world of chemistry, a catalyst is, “a substance that changes the rate of a 
desired reaction,  regardless of the fate  of the catalyst  itself."638 External  catalysts  in 
violence transformation may operate in an environment of even greater uncertainty than 
chemical  catalysts,  for  human  behaviour  remains  less  predictable  than  chemical 
behaviour.639 However, external and chemical catalysts alike share a genuine and selfless 
interest in creating change. In absorbing some of the 'heat' from the federal government 
and  gang  influentials  working  up  to  formal  negotiations,  they  would  assume 
considerable  personal  risk.  All  parties  would  need  to  take  responsibility  for  doing 
whatever they can to ensure the safety of these individuals.640 As trust is built, and it 
becomes possible for parties to communicate in a more direct (though still informal) 
fashion, external catalysts may continue to be involved, facilitating and/or providing 
cover for secret meetings. 
636 Andrew  Mumford,  The Counterinsurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare 
(New York: Routledge, 2012), 102.
637 Edward W Morris, “ 'Snitches End up in Ditches' and Other Cautionary Tales,” Journal of 
Contemporary Criminal Justice 26, no 3 (2010): 254-272; Jamie Masten, “Ain't No Snitches 
Ridin' Wit' Us: How Deception in the Fourth Amendment Triggered the Stop Snitching 
Movement,” Ohio State Law Journal 70, no 3 (2009): 701-753; Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: 
Criminals, Informants and the Erosion of American Justice (New York: New York University 
Press, 2009), 112; Richard Rosenfeld, Bruce A Jacobs and Richard Wright, “Snitching and the 
Code of the Street,” British Journal of Criminology 43, no 2 (2003): 291-309.
638 PM Huang, "Abiotic Catalysis," in Handbook of Soil Science, ed. Malcolm E Sumner (Danvers: 
CRC Press, 1999), B-304.
639 Amy J Posey and Lawrence S Washington,  Trial  Consulting  (New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 64; Mark Walsh, Introduction to Sociology for Health Carers (Cheltenham: Nelson 
Thornes, 2004), 26.
640 A full general discussion of the value of backchannel communication and the role of informal 
intermediaries  can  be  found  in:  Dean  G  Pruitt,  “Negotiation  and  Mediation  in  Intergroup 
Conflict,” in Intergroup Conflicts and Their Resolution: A Social Psychological Perspective, ed. 
Daniel Bar-Tal (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2011), 277-285.
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Though their role has historically been overshadowed by the leaders who 'sign-
up' to peace,641 these peacemakers are no less vital to the process. In a Northern Irish 
context, back-channel communication is often traced back only so far as the secret talks 
between Provisional republicans and other parties facilitated by Fr Alec Reid in the mid-
1980s. Yet, as early as 1973 there existed a back-channel for communication between 
the Provisional republican movement and the British government in the form of Derry 
chip shop owner Brendan Duddy.642 In his memoirs of the Northern Irish peace process, 
Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's former Chief of Staff and lead negotiator,writes:
Duddy worked selflessly and at great risk to himself over many years 
to bring about a peaceful settlement in Northern Ireland and credit for 
his achievements is long overdue. In 1991 it was on his initiative that a 
meeting  between  Martin  McGuinness  [chief  Sinn  Féin  negotiator 
during the peace process] and Michael Oatley [then MI6] took place 
which reactivated the 'Link' [between the Provisionals and the British 
government] and helped lead eventually to the peace process. It was 
through him that  the  opening  contacts  leading  up  to  the  first  IRA 
ceasefire in 1994 took place.643
Fr Reid,  on the  other  hand,  helped establish  a  direct  line  of  communication 
between  Sinn  Féin  President  Gerry  Adams  and  the  Northern  Ireland  Office  (NIO) 
(probably as early as 1986)644 and provided the cover for these secret meetings. Secret 
contact between Adams and the Irish government dated back to conversations with Irish 
Taoiseach  Charles  Haughey  in  1981.  Though  the  Adams-Haughey  line  of 
communication had been inactive during Haughey's term out of office, Reid was also 
responsible for its reactivation shortly following Haughey's re-election as Taoiseach in 
late 1986.645 Most notably, Reid was instrumental in facilitating covert talks between 
Adams (Sinn Féin) and John Hume of the SDLP. Although initial talks in 1988 failed, 
they were reopened and made public in 1993, bringing the still embryonic peace process 
out from the shadows. Writes Ed Moloney:
To say that Father Alec Reid is the unrecognised inspiration of the Irish 
peace process would be an understatement. Long known as a confidant 
of the Sinn Fein [sic] leader, Reid is accorded in most accounts the role 
of message carrier for Adams ensuring the odyssey to peace, but the full 
story reveals him to be a much more substantial figure, who initiated, 
devised and nurtured many of the ideological innovations that  made 
Gerry Adams' journey possible... Reid persisted at times when others in 
the British and Irish governments were close to giving up...646
641 For example,  although it  was John Hume and David Trimble who were  jointly awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1998, it is undeniable that without the risks taken on by Fr Alec Reid and 
Brendan Duddy before him the peace process, as least as we now understand it, may never have 
come to fruition. 
642 Niall Ó Dochartaigh, “The Role of an Intermediary in Back-channel Negotiation: Evidence from 
the Brendan Duddy Papers,” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways Toward Terrorism and  
Genocide 4, no 3 (2011): 214-225; Niall Ó Dochartaigh, “Together in the Middle: Back-channel 
Negotiation in the Irish Peace Process,”  Journal of Peace Research  28, no 6 (2011): 767-780; 
Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room, 66.
643 Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room, kindle loc 1229.
644 Moloney, A Secret Army, 246-249.
645 Ibid, 262.
646 Ibid, 225.
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In a Chicago context, it is highly improbable that the gangs themselves would think to 
open communication as there exists no precedent for such a move. Further, given the 
lack  of  interest  in  communicating  with  gangs  the  federal  government  has  thus  far 
displayed it would be difficult for a gang influential or intermediary to gain access to the  
corridors of federal power needed to get the process moving. Therefore, responsibility 
for  initiating  informal  contact  can  reasonably  be  expected  to  lie  with  the  federal 
government. 
Given the lack of trust between gang members and government officials, it is 
imperative that the government should choose an external catalyst carefully. This person 
should (ideally) not be a government official but someone in whom the upper echelons 
of the federal government can be comfortable investing their trust. This person should 
have an understanding of the conditions of life in the inner-city and, to facilitate trust 
with prospective gang contacts, would ideally share the same racial background as those 
who  need  to  be  brought  on  board  (ex.  African  American  for  the  Stones,  Gangster 
Disciples,  Vice  Lords;  Latino/Hispanic  for  the  Latin  Kings  or  Spanish  Cobras).  A 
relatively high public profile may also help engender trust by turning a totally unknown 
'threat' into a recognisable one. There is no easy answer as to who should be approached 
to  act  (at  least  for  the  purposes  of  first  contact)  as  external  catalysts  for  gang 
influentials. It will vary in each case depending on the available intelligence. However 
this person must have a deep (preferably non-familial)  relationship of trust  with the 
target influential, with mentors, teachers, or even ex-gang leadership possible candidates  
where there is a strong enough relationship.
It is impossible to predict exactly what the outcomes of these early talks will be, 
however in order to be able to progress to formal negotiations a number of conditions 
and parameters need to first be set. Firstly, the structure (inclusions/exclusions; format) 
of formal talks needs to be determined. As of 2012 there were an estimated 600 plus  
gang factions in Chicago,647 and thus a single high-level negotiation would be like trying 
to wrangle simultaneous consensus among three United Nations General Assemblies. 
Negotiation with each gang individually or even block by block is equally impractical 
given the resource intensive nature of negotiation. Strong intelligence is able to reveal 
the  most  violent  groups  up-to-the-minute  (and  within  very  recent  history);  active 
feuds/rivalries;  and  enduring  networks  of  friendly/alliance  relations.  Traditional 
supergang affiliation may now mean very little, but kinship ties likely hold greater sway.  
Identifying these networks and targeting the most violent groups within them may offer 
a  strong  starting  point  to  open  formal  negotiations.  Other  decisions  around  formal 
negotiation location (outside of the city may be best for security purposes), mediator 
identity, whether/when to publicise the talks and time-scales are essential. What is non-
negotiable is the need for an absolute ceasefire (to be monitored by the state and an 
agreed upon third party) from gangs participating in formal negotiations. As this is a 
serious demand, not least because it is likely that not all of a particular crew's rivals will 
be included within the negotiation process at this stage, it is essential that the benefits to 
be gained by maintaining an absolute ceasefire be perceived to outweigh the risks.
647 Jeremy Gorner, “Gang Factions Lead to Spike in City Violence,” Chicago Tribune, accessed 27 
July  2014,  <http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-10-03/news/ct-met-street-gang-bloodshed-
20121003_1_gang-violence-gangster-disciples-black-p-stones>.
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Stage 3: Talking with 'Street Terrorists'? - Formal Communications
Once  formal  talks  are  underway  or  have  been made public,  opening  up  the 
negotiation  process  to  include  a  broader  range  of  gangs  may  become  possible  and 
advisable,  with  the  fundamental  requirement  that  engagement  with  the  talks  (and 
sharing in the benefits of non-violence) is dependent upon commitment to the same 
ceasefire conditions accepted by those already engaged in the process. As the number of 
gangs involved grows, splitting the group into smaller working groups (possibly along 
geographic lines – West Side, North Side, South Side), with group-nominated leaders 
taking responsibility for engaging in cross working-group negotiations may become the 
most effective means of working. Plenary sessions where working group developments 
could be shared would also be important so as to maintain trust in and commitment to 
the process by ensuring no group felt as though they were left on the outside looking in, 
lacking  the  same information  and opportunities  as  the  others.  Geographically-based 
working groups also have a specific advantage in that if it proves impossible to develop 
a single city-wide agreement, agreements reached by geographical working groups may 
emerge as an implementation-ready alternative. This would also allow greater flexibility 
in terms of incentivisation. If public transport is a deal-breaker issue for gangs on the 
West  Side  and  garbage  collection  is  critical  on  the  South  Side,  under  such  an 
arrangement lower levels of government would not be responsible for making the same 
levels of public transport and waste management improvement city-wide. Additionally, 
although the involvement of greater numbers of groups would present certain logistical 
problems, that these groups are all on active ceasefire means lower levels of violence 
across  the  city,  saving  lives  and  making a  clear  statement  in  support  of  a  political 
solution.
The  formal  negotiation  process  itself  is  likely  to  be  the  most  politically 
controversial  stage  of  the  process.  When it  comes to  dealing with  violent  non-state 
groups, the idea that the state should engage in a process of negotiation and agreement 
is one that has consistently proven highly unpalatable.648 The most common argument 
against engaging in negotiation is that it legitimises fundamentally illegitimate violence 
(the state holding a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence)649 and undermines the 
rule  of  law.650 Simultaneously,  there  is  also  a  sense  of  injustice  that  accompanies 
perception  that  'bad  guys'  are  being  rewarded  for  'poor  behaviour',  thereby  gaining 
unfair advantages over those who played by the rules of the game all along.651 A third 
common argument  against  negotiating  with terrorists  is  that  it  encourages  others  to 
adopt (or increase) violence as a bargaining tactic.652 This position has been supported 
by numerous scholars concerned with the study of terrorism, most prominently Paul 
648 Harmonie Toros, “ 'We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist 
Conflicts,” Security Dialogue 39, no 4 (2008): 411.
649 Weber, The Vocation Lectures, 33.
650 Toros, “ 'We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!',”: 408.
651 Virginia  I  Foran  and  Leonard  S  Spector,  “The  Application  of  Incentives  to  Nuclear 
Proliferation,” in The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention,ed. David 
Cortright  (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 49; Leon V Sigal, “A Rogue by Any Other  
Name,” Foreign Service Journal October (2005): 38.
652 Peter R Neumann, “Negotiating with Terrorists,” Foreign Affairs 86, no 1 (2007): 128;  Toros, “ 
'We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!',” 411.
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Wilkinson, who writes:
The  idea  that  such  criminals  should  be  accepted  as  legitimate 
interlocutors  for  their  professed  aims  would  surely  cause  general 
revulsion and in  my view is  totally  unacceptable.  There is  only one 
appropriate response to those guilty of such a grave violation of human 
rights and that is to bring them to justice.653 
The unpopularity  of  negotiation  has  meant  that  most  world leaders  have  rejected it 
outright giving rise to the now common refrain 'we will not negotiate with terrorists'.654 
Yet, as Audrey Cronin has pointed out, “virtually all democratic governments facing 
terrorist campaigns have been forced to negotiate at some point, and many have even 
made  concessions,  although  of  course  there  are  differences  in  degree.”655 Though 
Margaret Thatcher and John Major refused to communicate with 'terrorists' (meaning 
the Provisional IRA specifically) the historical record has revealed both Prime Ministers 
did engage in contact with the group (albeit infrequently, informally and secretly).656 At 
the time, the decision to admit Sinn Féin into all party talks, even after the group had 
accepted the Mitchell Principles was highly controversial, yet now the Northern Irish 
peace process is often heralded as a great example of the possibilities of negotiation.657 
If  negotiation,  or  even  communication,  is  so  unpopular,  why  is  it  that 
governments continue to take the political risk? Cronin identifies five tactical benefits of  
talking  to  terrorists  covering  both  communication  and  negotiation:  (1)  potential  for 
temporary pause in violence; (2) provision/confirmation of important intelligence about 
structure and networks; (3) an understanding of the real  motivations of violent groups 
away from the 'heat of the moment' and/or publicity machines;658 (4) possible division of 
groups into factions making a 'divide and conquer' strategy possible; (5) demonstration 
to passive supporters of the openness of political avenues to address grievances.659 
Not all of these benefits can be accrued (or even constitute benefits) within a 
Chicago-specific context.  Most  significantly,  the last  thing Chicago needs is  greater 
fragmentation of the gang landscape. Divide and conquer only works so long as the 
divisions are not so numerous as to create anarchy, which is more or less the situation in 
urban Chicago. Street gangs traditionally lack publicity machines and rarely engage in 
653 Paul  Wilkinson,  Terrorism versus  Democracy:  The  Liberal  State  Response,  3ed  (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 66.
654 English,  Armed Struggle, 268; Louise Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” in  Democracy and 
Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, eds Robert J Art and Louise Richardson (Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 91; Toros, “ 'We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!',” 407-
408.
655 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist  
Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 35.
656 English,  Armed Struggle, 268; Louise Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” in  Democracy and 
Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past, eds Robert J Art and Louise Richardson (Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 91; Toros, “ 'We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!',” 407-
408.
657 Neumann, “Negotiating with Terrorists,” 128; Toros, “ 'We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!',” 
408.
658 (2) and (3) are also highlighted by Louise Richardson as upsides of negotiation. (Richardson, 
“Britain and the IRA,” 91.)
659 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, 36-38. 
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political posturing, preferring to keep their business activities under the radar. However, 
it is possible to see gang-context equivalents of the other benefits listed. The ceasefire 
requirement should, theoretically, allow law enforcement and gang intelligence to focus 
on those groups outside of the loop and those who break the agreed upon ceasefire. As 
with negotiation processes involving terrorist groups, those involving gangs can also be 
reasonably expected to yield significant intelligence gains. 
Chicago's supergangs and their  fragmented affiliates have traditionally lacked 
the  political  coherence  and  articulacy  of  groups  engaged  in  more  overtly  political 
violence,  both  facilitating  and  a  consequence  of  their  broader  de-politicisation. 
However,  the  negotiation  process  creates  a  space  for  gangs  to  reflect  upon  their 
motivations  together  and in  isolation,  perhaps  for  the  first  time.  In  identifying  and 
discussing  common  priorities  and  concerns,  gang  sets  and  factions  will  have  the 
opportunity to increase their political articulacy, decreasing their political isolation and 
social isolation by extension. Finally, talks also send a clear message to communities 
besieged by gang violence and long ignored by the federal government that they too are 
noticed and valued.
For groups engaged in violence the benefits are often more tangible. For gangs 
in particular, entry into high-level negotiation can be seen to produce four key benefits: 
(1) recognition; (2) the opportunity to be heard and taken seriously; (3) gains in the 
quality of life for the broader membership; and (4) the ability to address and take action 
on some of the major inequalities that  have conditioned their current circumstances. 
There  will  be  those who,  in  focusing  on the  hyper-capitalist  and hyper-consumerist 
stereotypes of gang organisations, argue such benefits will be lost on gang members. 
However, there exists no evidence indicating that gang members are any less rational 
than those engaged in conventional political violence or any other typical member of the 
general public.660 Indeed gang members have often displayed an accute awareness of the 
role of politically-determined social and economic policy in maintaining/deepening the 
racial and class-based inequalities that facilitate their social marginalisation as well as 
the relationship between this marginalisation and the perpetuation of gang violence.661 
Stage 4: Agreement
As high-level  governmental  negotiations with street  gangs have never before 
been  attempted,  the  incentives  these  groups  might  advocate  for  in  exchange  for  a 
durable and enforceable commitment to permanent  non-violence cannot be predicted 
with any degree of certainty. As alluded to above, it may be that these groups decide to 
focus  on  securing  pardons  for  gang  members  serving  long-term sentences  for  non-
violent  offences. They  may  press  for  state  referendum  on  the  issue  of  marijuana 
legalisation in the hope this would provide an opportunity to start a legitimate enterprise 
capable of capitalising on existing expertise. Keeping in mind that a large number of 
gang members are also parents, other groups might demand drastic educational reform 
to ensure their children and/or younger siblings have an opportunity to overcome the 
660 Merari,  Driven to Death, 232, 249-250; Padilla,  The Gang as an American Enterprise, 68, 75, 
80. 
661 Williams, Blue Rage, Black Redemption, 217-218.
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circumstances of their birth. Some things classified for present purposes as 'incentives' 
could  be  as  simple  as  a  guarantee  of  regular  household  waste  pick-up  and  the 
refurbishment of local housing projects. Ideally, in order to both facilitate community 
approval and encourage gangs to remain committed to the agreement long enough for 
non-violence to become normalised, there should be a mix of private (for the benefit of 
signatory groups and their members) and public (for the benefit of the community/all) 
benefits.662 To  offer  these  groups  the  opportunity  to  become  meaningful  agents  of 
positive political change and valued members of the political community is to take on a 
risk, but it also offers a wonderful opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the 
broader social changes needed to tackle gang violence on a national scale. 
The conditions of the agreement to be imposed by the state are likely far simpler 
to predict, bearing at least some similarity to the demands made upon the Provisional 
IRA by the British government in exchange for allowing the former to participate in the 
devolved  power-sharing  regional  governance  institutions  established  in  the  Good 
Friday Agreement. The first, and most obvious, is an agreement to render the ceasefires 
established in advance of the negotiation process permanent. The second is to agree to 
independently-supervised disarmament.  Though this  latter  condition does  technically 
infringe upon the constitutionally-protected right to bear arms, given that participation 
in the agreement is voluntary, and that there is tremendous symbolic and practical value 
in disarmament, it is a compromise worth insisting upon. There are already numerous 
restrictions in place with regards to firearms ownership in Chicago. For example, semi-
automatic firearms/assault weapons are banned in Chicago and it was not until June of 
this year (2014) that retail gun shops were once again permitted within city limits (the 
ban was ruled unconstitutional in 2012). 
Reaching agreement  is  not  a  certainty,  and the whole  process is  full  of risk. 
Where  an  agreement  is  reached,  it  is  essential  that  it  be  presented  to  the  wider 
community to ensure that its conditions are acceptable to those most directly affected by 
the city's gang violence. Ideally, this will take the form of a city-wide referendum, as 
limiting the referendum to high violence neighbourhoods would likely be both another 
source of major political discomfort and logistically very difficult to manage. Public 
approval of the agreement can strengthen the position of the agencies (including local 
law enforcement) responsible for its implementation and monitoring. Though it would 
be wholly  inappropriate  for  the government  to  engage in  (or  be seen to  engage in) 
referendum campaigning, if  informal  community leaders  have been 'kept  abreast'  of 
developments in the negotiation process and made to feel valued by it, it can be hoped 
that they will organically mobilise in support of an agreement. The final step of the 
process, presuming success at referendum, is to open the agreement to new signatories. 
This can bring in some of those active gangs who may have initially rejected or been 
otherwise left outside the negotiation process. New signatories should be eligible to reap 
the full benefits of the agreement under the same conditions as the original parties after 
a mandatory probationary ceasefire period (for example 60 or 90 days).
662 David M Newman, Sociology: Explaining the Architecture of Everyday Life, 7ed (London: Sage, 
2008), 261-262.
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Stage 5: Implementation & Monitoring
In Northern Ireland the  implementation process  faced as  many (if  not  more) 
setbacks  than  the  initial  negotiation.  Though  the  regional  governance  institutions 
established under  the  Good Friday  Agreement now appear  stable,  there  were  many 
points  during  the  implementation  process  where  it  appeared  as  though  the  whole 
settlement  might  collapse  at  any  moment.663 It  would  be  foolish  to  think  that  the 
implementation  and  monitoring  of  the  conditions  of  agreement  within  a  violence 
transformation context would be smooth sailing. As at every stage, there are many risks, 
both  those  identified here  and those  as  yet  unanticipated.  One of  the  greatest  risks 
presented by the government side is that of a change in federal leadership. A major 
regime change where  election success  has  involved a  commitment  to  dismantle  the 
process could lead to the abandonment of promises made not just to Chicago's street 
gangs, but to the city as a whole (by virtue of the agreement's public acceptance). The 
destruction of the agreement at this point would also destroy the goodwill generated in 
Chicago.  Where  trust  between  the  government,  gang  members  and  low  income 
communities is hard won, if broken it would be all but impossible to regain. 
From the gang side of the equation it is almost a given that the ceasefire will be 
broken by some (if not most) groups at some point. The fragmentary, anarchic nature of 
the gang violence landscape means that even the most well-intentioned and committed 
group may be unable to stop an undisciplined young member from firing upon a rival in 
the  heat of  the moment.  It  is  therefore important  to ensure that the  punishment  for 
breach of the ceasefire is both firm and fair, so as to encourage greater self-control on 
the part of agreement signatories and to make signatories immediately and forcefully 
aware of what life is like outside of the agreement. Thus, where a breach of the ceasefire  
is found (and verified independently), the group in violation should face the immediate 
suspension of all support and benefits provided by the agreement for a pre-determined 
and mutually agreed upon length of time (a 'quarantine period'). If the group is able to 
demonstrate  a  renewed  commitment  to  non-violence  (maintenance  of  reinstated 
ceasefire)  during  this  quarantine  period,  they  should  be  brought  back  into  the  fold. 
However, during the quarantine period, the group should be subjected to the same (if not 
greater) intense  targeted police suppression tactics (based on continuous high-quality 
intelligence) faced by groups not party to the agreement.664 
With a ceasefire among many of the city's most violent factions, sets and crews 
in  place,  it  is  expected  that  resultant  significant  reductions  in  violence  will  render 
remaining  gang  violence  far  more  manageable.  Concurrently,  improvements  in 
intelligence gathering strategy and federal intelligence support will increase the capacity 
of local  law enforcement  to target their  action more effectively,  something likely to 
lessen  animosity  between  the  police  and  low  income  black  and  Latino/Hispanic 
663 Blair, A Journey, 152-199; Powell, Great Hatred Little Room.
664 Strict conditionality is an element of the violence reduction strategies used in Cincinnati, Ohio 
and  Glasgow,  Scotland  that  has  shown  great,  but  currently  under-assessed,  potential  for 
commitment maintenance. (Engel et al,  Implementation of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce  
Violence  (CIRV),  4-6;  Community  Initiative  to  Reduce  Violence,  The  Violence  Must  Stop;  
Violence Reduction Unit,  Community Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV): First Year Report  
(Glasgow: Violence Reduction Unit, 2009), 10.)
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communities. With gangs no longer as actively engaged in violence as they once were, 
and violent, antagonistic version of gang culture less pervasive in the city's low-income 
neighbourhoods, some existing community intervention efforts may even be able to turn 
their attentions elsewhere. 
Conclusion
Though gang violence in Chicago is largely confined to the city's most socio-
economically marginalised neighbourhoods, its scale and persistence render it a problem 
of national import. This chapter argues that as an issue of national political significance, 
gang violence in Chicago requires a federally-driven political approach. Modelling itself 
after  the  Northern Irish  peace  process,  which  delivered  a  political  resolution to  the 
seemingly insoluble Troubles, the violence transformation process proposed here argues 
that generating lasting peace through negotiation and agreement is the way forward. 
Negotiation  involving  Sinn  Féin  as  the  political  representatives  of  the  Provisional 
republican  movement  (and  thus  the  Provisional  IRA)  was  controversial,  as  are 
negotiations involving violent non-state groups around the world. Yet, without risking 
unpopularity  agreement  and  a  lasting  (though  imperfect)  peace  in  Northern  Ireland 
would never have been secured. 
For the violence transformation process to work it requires not only high-level 
political commitment and prioritisation, but high-quality intelligence and a willingness 
to  begin  the  process  of  shifting  the  way  the  public  understands  racial  and  socio-
economic inequality in America, particularly as it relates to inner city residents. Within 
the violence transformation process, external catalysts are invaluable in moving from 
strategy  to  action,  facilitating  the  development  of  initial  conversations  between  the 
government and those who wield influence within the city's most violent sets/factions. 
Where  the  maintenance  of  ceasefire  is  a  precondition  to  participation  in  formal 
negotiation,  the act of reaching the negotiating table alone would help provide  the 
significant reductions in violence needed for law enforcement to come to better grips 
with the gang problem. However, more significantly, and more beneficially at a societal 
level,  participation  in  negotiation  offers  groups  who  frequently  justify  their  illicit 
activities  on  the  basis  of  social  exclusion  and  the  absence  of  real  and  meaningful 
opportunities for social mobility665 inclusion, respect, recognition and the opportunity to 
address both their immediate violence and its root causes. 
With  groups  engaged  in  violence  themselves  driving  the  process  as  equal 
partners with the federal government, and incentives for a permanent acceptance of non-
violence  identified  and  negotiated  by  the  groups  themselves,  it  is  expected  that 
commitment to the process and its outcomes will remain high. Simultaneously, it is also 
understood that agreements are often violated. This is why enforcing the agreement and 
ensuring  that  both  the  government  and  signatory  gangs  fulfil  their  obligations  is 
665 Opportunities which make use of their skills, talents and drive while providing financial security 
(if not prosperity) and a measure of dignity and respect – a far cry from the precarious service 
industry and construction labour work often presented as 'alternatives' to gang involvement by 
well-meaning intervention programmes. (Katherine S Newman,  No Shame in My Game: The  
Working Poor in the Inner City (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 94-95.)
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essential. Again, lowered general violence provides the opportunity for law enforcement 
to clamp down heavily (and in a targeted fashion) on these groups in violation of their 
ceasefire so as to encourage re-engagement with the agreement. Firm but fair penalties 
for breach will ensure groups are rewarded for genuine commitment to change even in 
the case of occasional roadblocks. The violence transformation process as here outlined 
may be radical & risky and it carries no guarantee of success, but so too was the peace 
process in Northern Ireland. Creating peace requires taking risks, the only question is 
whether these are risks worth taking? Over the last half century, many thousands of lives 
have already been unnecessarily lost to gang violence in Chicago. This is far too many. 
Peace is not only worth the risk but long overdue.
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Conclusion
There has been no contemporary American president as engaged in the issues of 
gang violence and the Troubles in Northern Ireland as William Jefferson (Bill) Clinton 
(1992-2000). Clinton responded to the persistence of violent conflict in Northern Ireland 
by taking the controversial step of appointing a Special Envoy (formally known as the 
Special Envoy of the President and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) to provide 
diplomatic support to the peace process in Northern Ireland in 1995. In doing so, the 
president demonstrated his willingness to draw the ire of one of America's most trusted 
international allies for a chance at peace.666 On 19 February 1997 Clinton launched his 
'Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Strategy' in Boston, a city that recently experienced a 
seemingly  miraculous  decline  in  levels  of  gang  violence.  The  strategy  pledged: 
$200,000 for 1,000 local and state 'Anti-Gang Prosecution Initiatives'; Brady checks 
preventing violent juvenile offenders from purchasing handguns; funding to establish 
1,000 new after school programs; prosecution of juveniles as adults for violent federal 
offences;  safety locks  on  hand  guns;  tools  for  prosecutors  to  guard  against  witness 
intimidation; $75 million in funding for an 'Anti-Truancy, School Violence, and Crime 
Intervention Initiative'; $50 million for 'youth violence courts'  and probation-focused 
anti-violence initiatives; support for pilot programs at the state level requiring juveniles 
to  be drug tested before receiving a driver's  license;  improvements to  the Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).667 That the President responded 
to a domestic issue with substantial financial investment in a diversity of programmes 
and initiatives while an international  crisis generated a  diplomatic response is  to be 
expected. However when one considers that during the whole of Clinton's presidency 
(1993-2000) the Northern Irish conflict claimed a total of 283 lives while gang violence 
in the city of Chicago was responsible  for 293 violent deaths in 1994 alone,668 it  is 
possible to question where a peace process was most needed. 
The central argument of this thesis has been that for the last half century, the 
scale, intensity and persistence of gang violence in the city of Chicago has constituted 
an under-appreciated and largely unrecognised public order challenge and a threat to the 
liberal democratic principles upon which the United States was founded. Its purpose has 
been to  explain the source of  this  misrecognition,  shed light  on its  implications for 
response  and  re-imagine  a  future  governmental  response  that  treats  the  city's  gang 
violence as the political problem that it  truly is. The first two chapters of this work 
function, in separate ways, to provide an answer to the question of how gang violence in 
Chicago has failed to establish itself as an issue of major political significance in spite 
of the way in which it pervasively infringes upon the fundamental and inalienable rights 
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness accorded all Americans. 
Chapter 1 exposes and explores the rigid conceptual binary in the literature on 
666 Mary-Alice  Clancy,  Peace  Without  Consensus:  Power  Sharing  Politics  in  Northern  Ireland  
(Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 77.
667 'Event - Boston (2/19/97), Anti-Gang/Youth Violence,' 19 February 1997, box 81, Bruce Reed – 
Crime Series, Domestic Policy Council Office, The William J Clinton Presidential Library.
668 Chicago  Police  Department,  Biennial  Report  1993  &  1994 (Chicago:  Chicago  Police 
Department, c1995), 14.
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group violence that divides and distinguishes 'political violence' from other forms of 
group violence. The political violence scholarship has focused on those acts of group 
violence ascribed explicit political motivation, with 'political motivation' referring to an 
aspiration to change existing systems of local, national or international governance in 
some  way.  Political  violence  scholars  have  traditionally  focused  on  insurgency, 
terrorism, guerilla war/campaigns, civil war and ethnic conflict. Those forms of group 
violence  lying outside  of  these  areas  of  focus  and  excluded from this  ever-shifting 
definition  have  consequentially  come to  be  classed as  'non-political'  violence.  Non-
political violence, including gang violence, is not only denied political motivation but 
also political meaning and significance. This artificial binary is highly problematic, for 
the absence of clear political motivation expressed articulately using politically-loaded 
terminology  does not mean that certain forms of group violence are void of political 
underpinning  or  implication,  as  is  most  certainly  the  case  with  gang  violence.  The 
prevailing  image of  the  contemporary street  gang member (or gangsta) may be one 
focused on hyper-consumerism and status obsession. However, the racialised backdrop 
of urban poverty and marginalisation against which these caricatures sit is real and has 
been sustained by decades of unempathetic social and economic policy.
The second chapter  of  this  work examines  the historic origins of  differential 
labelling and response to political  violence and gang (particularly African American 
'supergang')  violence  in  Chicago.  Using  Northern  Ireland  and  its  Troubles  as  a 
comparative case study, it argues that the historically-rooted and repetitively reinforced 
politicisation of the sectarian division in Irish/Northern Irish society created a climate so 
politically  charged that the Provisional  IRA could not  escape ascription as  'political 
violence'  at  the  time of  its  emergence.  On the  other hand,  the historic exclusion of 
African  Americans  from formal  politics  and  public  life  limited  the  politicisation  of 
racial difference. Though race frequently found its way onto the political agenda, it was 
generally used as a proxy for other issues, most notably state rights and liberties. Heavy 
oppression (especially under slavery) worked to discourage informal political  protest 
and small relative gains (emancipation, person-hood, citizenship, voting rights) served 
to keep hope alive, although political and legal equality for most African Americans was 
a long time coming. Developed as a response to the oppressive nature of Jim Crow 
segregation in the south, the civil rights movement that emerged in the mid-1950s was 
the first (and remains the only) mass political mobilisation of African Americans. Yet its 
initial  focus on securing legal inequality for southern blacks made it  ill  equipped to 
tackle the pervasive de facto segregation that limited the opportunities and life chances 
of African Americans in  the north,  particularly the millions of southerners who had 
migrated to northern industrial  centres during the Great Migration only to find their 
situation little improved. 
From  the  restrictive  racial  covenants  (1920s-1940s)  locking  blacks  out  of 
predominately white middle/upper-income neighbourhoods to the 1960s triple-shifting 
of inner-city public schools when adjusting school boundaries would have lessened the 
burdens  of  overcrowding,  Chicago  was  long  an  exemplar  of  northern  de  facto 
segregation. Its urban segregation was left largely untouched by civil rights reforms, for 
where segregation is not legally enforced it cannot readily be legally destroyed. Though 
the middle and even upper-income neighbourhoods in the city are more diverse now 
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than ever before, Chicago's low income neighbourhoods have remained as segregated as 
they were during the 'radical' 1960s and 'conservative' 1950s. Divorced geographically 
and ideologically  from the  civil  rights movement  at  its  peak, the African  American 
supergang alliances  that formed during the early 1960s lacked a clear link with the 
racial politics of the era during the crucial early phase in which classifications are made. 
This,  along with  the  absence  of  any tradition  of  violent  African  American  political 
contestation or clear political rhetoric/ambition, paved the way for the classification of 
these groups as delinquent youth groups essentially similar to the white 'ethnic' gangs of 
the 1920s/1930s. Though by the mid-late 1960s these groups would reveal themselves 
to  be  more  durable,  lethal  and  politically-minded  (at  least  for  a  time)  than  their 
predecessors, the label stuck. That similar groups were emerging in Latino/ Hispanic 
communities at the same time likely contributed to the belief that as these minorities 
came to be better integrated into mainstream American society the gangs would largely 
disappear as had been the case with the earlier  white ethnic gangs.669 However,  this 
belief  was mistaken,  for  the history of  American racial  politics prevented the  ready 
assimilation  of  African  Americans.  Where  German,  Polish,  Irish  and  even  Italian 
immigrants  (who all  contributed  to  the  city's  gang problem in  the  first  half  of  the 
twentieth  century)  were,  over  the  course  of  generations,  able  to  attain  a  sense  of 
'whiteness' this simply was not possible for African Americans in the same way and on 
the  same  scale.  In  Chicago  intractable  racial  and  economic  inequality  facilitated 
intractable gang violence. 
Throughout  the  first  half  of  this  thesis,  the  importance  of  language  and 
perception are themes which often re-emerge.  How we perceive and describe things 
often matters more than reality in terms of conditioning response. Otherwise put, the 
label affixed to group violence has tended to matter more than the scale of atrocity 
committed. Although the intensity of gang violence in Chicago has routinely surpassed 
that  experienced  during  many  of  the  most  violent  years  of  the  Troubles,  serious 
consideration  of  the  situation  in  Chicago as  civil  conflict  has  been essentially  non-
existent.670 A change in  label  from 'gang rivalry'  to  'low-intensity  civil  conflict  and 
disorder' necessitates a change in response. Furthermore, to recognise the existence of 
civil conflict in a 'modern city' such as Chicago is to challenge our preconceptions of 
urban life in America. It demands government accountability for the failure to intervene 
sooner and for exacerbating the problem with decades of ill-thought socio-economic 
policy and response efforts. Indeed the degree to which labels are clung to means that it 
is easier for the United States to expend tremendous amounts of energy and resources to 
investigating  and  mitigating  the  small-scale  threat  posed  by  low-capacity  'terrorist' 
groups (ex. The Black Panther Party) than to recognise the political dimension of gang 
violence.  As  scholars,  we  must  accept  some  responsibility  for  how  the  labels  and 
classifications we develop and rely upon to make sense of the world are used to justify 
inclusion/exclusion and action/reaction/inaction in society at large. 
To  support  and/or  reinforce  the  binary  between  political  violence  and  'non-
669 John M Hagedorn, “Gangs in Late Modernity,” in  Gangs in the Global City: Alternatives to  
Traditional Criminology, ed. John M Hagedorn (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2007), 
296-297.
670 Beyond the anomalous radical grass-roots spokesperson making an emotional appeal.
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political' violence is to be partly (though unintentionally) responsible for the continued 
political  under-reaction to gang violence.  The distinction between political  and gang 
violence has been particularly rigid within the field of terrorism studies, with terrorists 
themselves and scholars of their violence both keen to put as much conceptual distance 
as possible between terrorist groups and gangs.671 However, it is important to be clear 
about the message this emphasis on distinction sends both explicitly and implicitly. One 
of the core tenants of the terrorism studies field is that the power of terrorist violence 
lies not just in the number of lives a particular attack claims, but in its ability to leave a  
psychological impact far in excess of any physical destruction.672 Indiscriminate attacks 
are seen to  inspire  a  particularly intense  amount of fear, playing upon the idea  that 
anyone – young/old; rich/poor; black/white - could instantly become a victim of terrorist 
violence.  This  fear  has  often  put  considerable  pressure  on  governments  to  respond 
immediately and in dramatic fashion. At the more docile end of the spectrum it can lead 
to hastily crafting measures such as emergency legislation which infringe upon civil 
rights (ex. the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1974) passed in the United Kingdom after a 
series  of  Provisional  IRA pub bombings  in  England),673 but  this  fear  can  also  lead 
countries to war, as it did in the United States in the wake of 9/11. 
By and large gang violence is far more discriminate than terrorist violence. Its 
victims tend to be young, African American males between age 16 and 24. Their deaths 
tend, individually and collectively, to prompt little response beyond (perhaps) a brief 
mention in the local newspaper.  All  young black men in Chicago's inner-city live in 
constant  fear  that  they  will  be  the  next  obituary.674 Yet  the  appreciable  terror  they 
experience has consistently been deemed insignificant in comparison with that created 
by  the  most  recent  low-casualty  terrorist  attack.  The  cruel  reality  of  the  strict 
classifications of 'terrorism'  and 'gang violence'  is  that the differential  response they 
generate communicates the clear message that any life is more valuable than the lives of 
the most socio-economically disadvantaged young African Americans.
The second half of this thesis focuses on response, looking at where things have 
gone wrong and in which direction future efforts need to develp. Chapter 3 chronicles 
the history of gang violence reduction efforts in Chicago while the final substantive 
chapter offers the 'violence transformation' model as a new way forward. Building on 
the discussion of differential response developed in earlier chapters, chapter 3 argues 
that  in  classifying  Chicago's  early  street  gangs  as  simply  the  next  iteration  of  the 
delinquent  white  ethnic  youth  groups  studied  by  Thrasher  and  his  Chicago  School 
colleagues, gang violence remained coded as a community social problem/'crime' issue. 
This helped to frame gang violence in such a way that it was only natural to apply the 
same basic strategies used against these earlier groups to the 'next generation' gangs. 
671 Magee, Gangsters or Guerillas?.
672 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 32, 36, 40.
673 Nicole D Ives-Allison, “Visual Rehumanisation: Torture and Terror in In the Name of the Father  
and Fifty Dead Men Walking,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 7, no 2 (2014): 205-222; Charlotte 
Nunes, “In the Name of National Security: Torture and Imperialist Ideology in Sheridan's In the  
Name of the Father and Jordan's Breakfast on Pluto,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no 4 (2009): 
916-933.
674 Nate Marshall and Demetrius Amparan, “Lost Count: A Love Story,” as performed at Brave New 
Voices, Washington, DC, 2008.
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Gang violence reduction has traditionally taken one of two approaches, suppression or 
intervention, though since the 1990s a small number have attempted to cut a new line in 
the middle by integrating elements of both. 
Suppression  works  through  criminalisation  and  is  carried  out  by  law 
enforcement and the criminal justice system. The police launch 'crack-downs' and raids 
in  an attempt to stop and/or prevent  gang activity  while  the criminal justice system 
works to ensure gang members are kept 'out of action' through lengthy prison sentences 
and/or strict parole conditions. Though often traced only so far back as the first police 
gang units in the late 1960s,675 the use of suppression strategies to reduce gang activity 
(including violence) in Chicago date at least as far back as the 1899 establishment of the 
first  juvenile  court  in  America.  The  origins  of  the  intervention  approach lie  in  the 
Chicago Area Project of the 1930s, established by urban sociologist Clifford Shaw (with 
Henry D McKay) to test social disorganisation theory and the potential for community 
self-mobilisation around the issue of juvenile delinquency. Where suppression generally 
extracts young 'delinquents' (or 'offenders' as they are now termed) from the community 
in which they reside, intervention efforts believe reintegration into the community and 
mainstream  society  is  the  key  to  lasting  violence  reduction.  Thus,  intervention 
approaches have tended to focus on fostering attitudinal change alongside behavioural 
change. Nearly all of the major features of gang intervention programmes in Chicago 
are derived from the methods of the Chicago Area Project: outreach work; coalition 
building; academic design (and evaluation); and the provision of 'alternatives' to gang 
involvement (job training, educational/employment opportunities). 
In spite of their clear links to CAP and/or other previous responses, nearly all 
new gang violence reduction efforts attempt to bill themselves as innovative, likely in 
an attempt to secure programme funding. In practice however, these innovations have 
been  quite  limited,  generally  representing  mere  tweaks  on  existing  strategies.  For 
example,  while  CeaseFire  introduced  what  could  be  considered  an  innovative 
epidemiological  theory explaining the  spread of  violence,  the  programme itself  was 
essentially an outreach programme with a coalition building aspect. The introduction of 
violence  interrupters  in  2004  represented  something  marginally  more  original  as 
previously  outreach  workers  did  not  make  it  their  mission  to  intervene  directly  in 
conflict,  but  it  was  not  radical innovation  in  the  sense that  it  marked a  major  leap 
forwards in the way we think about how to go about gang violence reduction. At the 
same time, since the introduction of the first gang law in California in 1987 (the STEP 
Act), many states have rushed to adopt their own gang-specific legislation. However the 
main function of this legislation has largely been the extension of penalties for the pre-
existing criminal offences long used to hold gang members legally accountable for their 
actions rather than the introduction of entirely new offences. Integrated approaches have 
faired only marginally better in terms of innovation. Outreach workers remained central 
to the Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project and Project Safe Neighbourhoods 
expends  a  great  deal  of  energy  securing  convictions  and  delivering  community 
education initiatives.  If any of these approaches had been able to deliver significant 
demonstrable reductions in gang violence in Chicago, this lack of innovation would not 
675 Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence, 15. 
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be an issue. However this has not been the case. Chapter 3 surveys CPD gang units, 
anti-gang laws, the Youth Manpower Project, the GVRP, CeaseFire and Project Safe 
Neighbourhoods, but not a single one of these efforts has been able to demonstrate their 
ability to deliver major lasting reductions in violence.
Aside from the brief quadrupling of the CPD's gang-specific operations in 1982, 
there has  been little  correlation between major  changes  in  the CPD's  gang violence 
operations and the city's homicide rates (with gang violence known to be major driver of 
homicide rates). Determining any clear relationship between gang-specific legislation 
and  gang  violence  levels  has  proven  to  be  exceptionally  difficult.  Administrative 
management and oversight of the Youth Manpower Project, which ran for less than a 
year (1968),  was so poor  that  it  is  impossible  to  comment upon the validity of  the 
programme's  underlying  experimental  theory.  Some  CeaseFire  and  Project  Safe 
Neighborhoods' programme areas have seen modest reductions in violence, however the 
academic evaluations of these programmes have generally been reluctant to assert that 
these  reductions  are  the  direct  result  of  programme  efforts.676 Violence  actually 
increased  in  Little  Village  during  the  three-year  lifespan of  the  Little  Village  Gang 
Violence Reduction Project. Furthermore the GVRP's programme evaluation revealed 
that  it  was unable to consistently  yield lower levels of increase in violence than all 
comparison areas.677 Not a single one of these efforts, nor all efforts in combination, can 
explain the drastic reductions in overall violence levels in the city starting in the late-
1990s and continuing through the mid-2000s when violence (homicide in particular) 
levelled off at around half of what it was in the early 1990s. In some ways the failure of 
existing gang violence reduction approaches to yield the reductions needed to restore 
civil  order  in  Chicago  is  unsurprising.  The  Chicago  Area  Project,  the  model  for 
contemporary intervention efforts, was itself unable to demonstrate success in reducing 
delinquency beyond a single project area and even within this area (Russell Square), 
programme  management  (Shaw)  and  subsequent  independent  evaluators  have  been 
reluctant to attribute declines to programme activity specifically. 678 
Given the inefficacy and inadequacy of previous approaches, it is clear that a 
radical  new  approach  to  the  problem  of  gang  violence  in  Chicago  is  needed.  The 
violence transformation model developed in chapter 4 offers a way forward rooted in 
the idea that the groups responsible for the perpetuation of endemic violence need to be 
at  the heart  of its resolution. Modelled after the Northern Irish peace process which 
succeeded by including Sinn Féin (closely linked to the Provisional IRA) as an equal 
partner in peacebuilding, the violence transformation process argues a strictly enforced 
and incentivised non-violence agreement between the federal government and Chicago 
gangs  offers  the  greatest  potential  for  peace.  The  violence  transformation  model  is 
incredibly  risky.  It  demands  major  and  unprecedented  political  sacrifices  from  the 
676 With  Richard  Block's  independent  evaluation  of  hot  spot  data  in  which  he  claims  reliably 
attributes decreases in shooting density in some project areas to CeaseFire program efforts the 
most notable exception. (Block, “Impact of CeaseFire on Geographical Crime Patterns,” B-34.)
677 Spergel et al, The Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project in Chicago, 15-21 – 15-47.
678 Kobrin,  “The Chicago Area Project  –  A 25 Year Assessment”;  Schlossman and Sedalk,  The 
Chicago Area Project Revisited.
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highest echelons of the federal government while carrying a significant risk of failure.679 
But  it  is  clear  that  continuing  to  invest  heavily  and  exclusively  in  traditional 
intervention  and  suppression  initiatives  will  not  generate  the  reductions  in  violence 
needed to say with any confidence during our lifetime that Chicago is a safe city where 
all residents are equally free to express their American rights to life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness. The American state was built to defend and protect these three 
universal and inalienable human rights. To date structures of government have failed to 
prevent a tyranny of the majority680 from de-politicising and hyper-criminalising gang 
violence while at the same time constructing and reinforcing the conditions of life in the 
inner city known to facilitate of gang development. Continuing to ignore or underplay 
the political significance of gang violence in Chicago will only serve to further distance 
the  state  from  its  founding  principles.  Is  this  the  legacy  that  future  American 
governments truly want to leave? 
Taking a chance on peace in inner-city Chicago requires embracing risk, not just 
accepting it. It is to believe against the odds that it is possible that in fifty years time 
students of Chicago's public schools will be reading about the deaths of students like 
Derrion Albert,681 Hadiya  Pendleton,  Terrance Green,682 Aaron Rushing683 and Victor 
Vega684 in their history books as opposed to reliving these tragedies endlessly among 
their own classmates. To accept the challenge of bringing about an end to gang violence 
is to simultaneously look backwards to the Declaration of Independence while looking 
into a future beyond the results of the next Gallup poll or election. 
Reflecting  upon  the  American  experience  of  World  War  II,  Franklin  D 
Roosevelt's undelivered final presidential address warns, “Today we have learned in the 
agony of war that great power involves great responsibility... We, as Americans, do not 
choose to deny our responsibility.”685 It is the unfortunate and unjustifiable reality that 
successive governments have largely denied their responsibility to Chicagoans, but it is 
not too late to change. There is no doubt that the journey to peace will be difficult, but 
transforming  conflict  and  building  peace  have  never  come  easily  anywhere. 
Nevertheless there are few who would deny that this is a journey not worth making. It 
may very well be true that a total elimination of gang violence in Chicago is impossible, 
but a lasting peace where violence is rare, exceptional and immediately condemned by 
those who were once shooters is well within reach. There will be those who remain 
skeptical about the potential for peace. However it is impossible to ignore the glimmers 
679 Cronin, Why Terrorism Ends, 36.
680 Levy, Civil War on Race Street, 189-190.
681 Cathy J Cohen, Democracy Remixed: Black Youth and the Future of American Politics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 14-16.
682 Ira Glass, “488: Harper High School Part 2,”  This American Life, podcast audio, 15 February 
2013,  <  http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/487/harper-high-school-part-
two>.
683 “Teen Dies After Kenwood Shooting,”  CBS Chicago,  19 May 2014, accessed 30 June 2014, 
<http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/05/19/teen-dies-after-kenwood-shooting/>.
684 “Teen  Boy  Killed  in  Lawndale,”  CBS  Chicago,  12  January  2013,  accessed  30  June  2014, 
<http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2013/01/12/teen-boy-killed-in-lawndale/>.
685 Michael R Fitzgerald and Allen Packwood, Out of the Cold: The Cold War and Its Legacy (New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 28.
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of hope that cut through the shadows of doubt. What if Gerry Adams, Bertie Ahern, 
Tony Blair, John Hume, David Trimble, Fr Alec Reid and scores of others had simply 
accepted the supposed impossibility of peace in Northern Ireland? Chicago is ready for 
this kind of change, the only question now is whether there is a federal government 
brave enough to deliver. 
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Appendix A: Common Elements of the Intervention Approach to Reducing Gang Violence
Pro-social 
Orientation
Community or 
Gang 
Leadership
Community 
Partnership and 
Coalition 
Building
Outreach 
Workers
 'Alternatives' 
(Employment, 
Training, 
Education)
Academic 
Design / 
'Theory-based'
Academic 
Evaluation1
Chicago Area Project (CAP) (1930s-present)2 X X X X X X X
Chicago YMCA Detached Worker Program (1960-1965)3 X
Chicago Youth Development Project (1961-1966)4 X X X X
Youth Manpower Project (1968)5 X X X X
Broader Urban Involvement & Leadership Development 
(BUILD) (1969-present)6
X X X
CeaseFire-Chicago/Cure Violence (2004-Present)7 X X X X X
Crossfire Gang Outreach (2009-present)8 X
Integrated Approaches
Little Village Gang Violence Reduction Project (1992-1995)9 X X X X X
Project Safe Neighbourhoods Chicago (2001-present)10 X X X X
1 To be classed as 'Academic Evaluation' a given intervention programme has had to undergo some form of quantitative or qualitative evaluation by scholars working within an academic research 
community. The label 'Academic Evaluation' in no way denotes that such evaluation was rigorous, thorough, or, in the case of long-term programmes, a regular occurrence. Programme evaluation 
continues to be fragmentary across the board. 
2 Solomon Kobrin, “The Chicago Area Project – A 25 Year Assessment,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 322 (1959): 19-29; Steven Schlossman and Michael Sedalk, 
The Chicago Area Project Revisited (Santa Monica: RAND, 1983); Steven Schlossman et al, Delinquency Prevention in South Chicago: A Fifty-Year Assessment of the Chicago Area Project (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 1984), 1-2.
3 Operated as a supplement to the Chicago Area Project. No final evaluative report issued, though James Short was engaged in some early evaluation of the programme. ('Committee for Detached 
Workers' Report, 1966, Box 73, Folder 2, YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago Records 1853-1980, Chicago History Museum; James F Short Jr, “Street Corner Groups and Patterns of Delinquency: A 
Progress Report,” American Catholic Sociological Review 28 (1963): 13-32.
4 Martin Gold and Hans W Mattick. Experiment in the Streets: The Chicago Youth Development Project (Final Report) (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, 1974).
5 Irving A Spergel, Street Gang Work: Theory and Practice (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1966).
6 James C Howell, Youth Gang Programs and Strategies (Washington: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2000),3.
7 Wesley G Skogan, Susan M Hartnett, Natalie Bump and Jill Dubois, Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago (Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of 
Justice, 2009).
8 Crossfire is a gang outreach program located within Willow Creek Community Church, an evangelical mega-church in the south Chicago suburbs and thus operates with a rather different ideology 
than that underpinning other major intervention efforts in the city.
9 Irving A Spergel, Reducing Youth Gang Violence: The Little Village Gang Project in Chicago (Lanham: AltaMira, 2007); Irving A Spergel et al, Evaluation of the Gang Violence Reduction Project in 
Little Village: Final Report Summary (Chicago: University of Chicago, School of Social Service Administration, 2003). 
10 Andrew V Papachristos, Tracey L Meares and Jeffrey Fagan, “Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 4, no 2 (2007): 223-272.
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Appendix B: Violence Transformation Process Model
1. Groundwork Intelligence Gathering
• Most violent groups
• Key feuds/disputes
• Operating conditions (business concerns, etc.) 
• Distribution of kinship networks
• ''Influentials' 
• Social networks (involved/non-involved) of 
influentials
• Shape of non-violent community politics
Political Prioritisation
• Establishment of gang violence as  a 
presidential priority
• Commitment of federal resources – not a 
'war' on gangs' 
• Re-framing of gang violence in the city of 
Chicago as a national emergency
Paradigm Shift
Alongside and throughout the process, it 
is essential that the federal government 
take a lead role in changing the way the 
gang problem is conceived of and 
presented to the public. This will also 
involve politically re-framing inner-city 
urban issues and matters of American 
inequality on a grand scale such as that 
found during the New Deal and War on 
Poverty.
• Re-humanisation of victims of gang 
violence regardless of race, age, 
gender, class, neighbourhood of 
residence or (as the last stage of the 
process) gang affiliation – break down 
difference between 'deserving' and 
'undeserving' victims
◦ Work with the media to change 
the representations of victims of 
colour
• Highlight the effect of inequality on 
the nation as a whole 
◦ Introduction of inequality (rather 
than poverty) reduction efforts
◦ Ensure benefits extend to the 
poor (urban and rural/black and 
white), working class and lower-
middle class to give measures a 
sense of universalism.
2. Informal 
Communications
1. Initiation of discreet informal and indirect communications with key gang influentials through 
'external catalysts'.
2. Establish full ceasefire must be in place for formal communications to be a possibility.
3. Determine parameters of negotiations: Who is to be included/excluded?; How will negotiations 
move through the city? (sector, neighbourhood); Parallel negotiations? Acceptable mediators?
3. Formal 
Communications
1. Maintenance of ceasefire throughout proceedings, breach of ceasefire will lead to exclusion, 
quarantine, and re-entry after time-frame specified at beginning of proceedings.
2. Establishment of key priorities and needs common to all groups to be able to move forward with a 
permanent ceasefire/cessation of community violence.
3. Agreement on basic incentives for non-violence, conditions and enforcement mechanisms.
4. Drafting of language of agreement.
4. Agreement 1. Formal acceptance of agreement by parties involved in negotiations.
2. Opportunity for all 'significant' gangs to sign on to the agreement.
3. Presentation of agreement to Chicago residents for referendum.
4. Acceptance of agreement formally.
5. Implementation 
& Monitoring
Implementation
• Timely implementation of all agreed measures
• 'Decommissioning' and destruction of weapons 
in a process supervised by agreed upon neutral 
third party.
Enforcement
• Breach of agreement by gang immediately 
results in suspension of all benefits 
• Groups in breach face targeted suppression 
measures.
